ETHA 10-Q Quarter ended Sept. 30, 2025

PART I – FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Item 1. Financial Statements

iShares ® Ethereum Trust ETF

Statements of Assets and Liabilities (Unaudited)

At September 30, 2025 and December 31, 2024

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(a)	Cost of investment in ether: $13,483,951,930 and $3,543,902,275, respectively.
(b)	No par value, unlimited amount authorized.

See notes to financial statements.

iShares ® Ethereum Trust ETF

Statements of Operations (Unaudited)

For the three and nine months ended September 30, 2025 the three months ended September 30, 2024 and the period from May 21, 2024 (Date of Seeding) to September 30, 2024

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(a)	Includes $352,587,218 of realized gains and $(24,774,469) of realized losses.
(b)	Includes $82 of realized gains and $(21,742) of realized losses.
(c)	Includes $353,831,422 of realized gains and $(323,277,590) of realized losses.
(d)	Net increase (decrease) in net assets per Share based on average shares outstanding during the period.

See notes to financial statements.

iShares ® Ethereum Trust ETF

Statements of Changes in Net Assets (Unaudited)

For the three, six and nine months ended September 30, 2025

See notes to financial statements.

iShares ® Ethereum Trust ETF

Statement of Changes in Net Assets (Unaudited)

For the three months ended September 30, 2024 and the period from May 21, 2024 (Date of Seeding) to September 30, 2024

See notes to financial statements.

iShares ® Ethereum Trust ETF

Statements of Cash Flows (Unaudited)

For the nine months ended September 30, 2025 and For the Period from May 21, 2024 (Date of Seeding) to September 30, 2024

See notes to financial statements.

iShares ® Ethereum Trust ETF

Schedules of Investments (Unaudited)

At September 30, 2025 and December 31, 2024

September 30, 2025

Description		Quantity				Cost				Fair Value
Ether			3,842,823			$	13,483,951,930			$	15,874,086,142
Total Investments – 100.02 %											15,874,086,142
Liabilities in Excess of Other Assets – (0.02) %											( 3,307,620	)
Net Assets – 100.00 %										$	15,870,778,522

December 31, 2024

Description		Quantity				Cost				Fair Value
Ether			1,071,415			$	3,543,902,275			$	3,571,669,777
Total Investments – 100.01 %											3,571,669,777
Liabilities in Excess of Other Assets – (0.01) %											( 407,610	)
Net Assets – 100.00 %										$	3,571,262,167

See notes to financial statements.

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iShares ® Ethereum Trust ETF

Notes to Financial Statements (Unaudited)

September 30, 2025

1 -	Organization

The iShares Ethereum Trust ETF (the “Trust”) was organized on November 9, 2023 as a Delaware statutory trust. The trustee is BlackRock Fund Advisors (the “Trustee”), which is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Trust. The Trust’s sponsor is iShares Delaware Trust Sponsor LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the “Sponsor”). The Bank of New York Mellon serves as the “Trust Administrator.” The Trust is governed by the provisions of the Third Amended and Restated Trust Agreement (the “Trust Agreement”) executed by the Sponsor, the Trustee and Wilmington Trust, National Association, a national association (“Delaware Trustee”), as of July 8, 2025. The Trust issues units of beneficial interest (“Shares”) representing fractional undivided beneficial interests in its net assets.

On May 21, 2024, BlackRock Financial Management, Inc. (the “Seed Capital Investor”) purchased 400,000 Shares for $ 10,000,000 at a per-Share price of $ 25.00 (the “Seed Creation Baskets”). The Seed Capital Investor did not receive from the Trust, the Sponsor or any of their affiliates any fee or other compensation in connection with the purchase of Seed Creation Baskets. On June 24, 2024, the Trust purchased approximately 3,031 ether with the proceeds of the Seed Creation Baskets using Coinbase Inc. (the “Prime Execution Agent”). The costs incurred in connection with the purchase of ether with the proceeds of the Seed Creation Baskets were borne by the Trust. The Sponsor’s fee started accruing daily at an annualized rate equal to 0.25 % of the net asset value of the Trust on June 24, 2024.

The Trust’s registration statement on Form S- 1 relating to its continuous public offering of Shares was declared effective by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on July 22, 2024 ( Effective Date) and the Shares were listed on The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC (“NASDAQ”) on July 23, 2024.

On July 29, 2025, the SEC issued 19b - 4 orders permitting in-kind creations and redemptions by authorized participants for the Trust. On July 31, 2025, the amendment to the Trust’s registration statement on Form S- 1 was declared effective. As a result of these regulatory actions, the Trust is authorized to create and redeem shares with authorized participants on an in-kind basis.

The Trust seeks to reflect generally the performance of the price of ether. The Trust seeks to reflect such performance before payment of the Trust’s expenses and liabilities. The Shares are intended to constitute a simple means of making an investment similar to an investment in ether.

The accompanying unaudited financial statements were prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the United States (“U.S. GAAP”) for interim financial information and with the instructions for Form 10 -Q and the rules and regulations of the SEC. In the opinion of management, all material adjustments, consisting only of normal recurring adjustments considered necessary for a fair statement of the interim period financial statements, have been made. Interim period results are not necessarily indicative of results for a full-year period. These financial statements and the notes thereto should be read in conjunction with the Trust’s financial statements included in its Annual Report on Form 10 -K for the year ended December 31, 2024, as filed with the SEC on March 5, 2025.

The Trust qualifies as an investment company solely for accounting purposes and not for any other purpose and follows the accounting and reporting guidance under the Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification Topic 946, Financial Services - Investment Companies, but is not registered, and is not required to be registered, as an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.

2 -	Significant Accounting Policies

A.	Basis of Accounting

The following significant accounting policies are consistently followed by the Trust in the preparation of its financial statements in conformity with U.S. GAAP. The preparation of financial statements in conformity with U.S. GAAP requires management to make certain estimates and assumptions that affect the reported amounts of assets and liabilities and disclosures of contingent assets and liabilities at the date of the financial statements and the reported amounts of revenue and expenses during the reporting period. Actual results could differ from those estimates.

B.

Ether

Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC (the “Ether Custodian”) is responsible for safekeeping the ether owned by the Trust. Anchorage Digital Bank N.A. is the “Additional Ether Custodian” for the Trust. At the current time, the Sponsor has no plans to move any of the Trust’s ether to the Additional Ether Custodian. The Ether Custodian and the Additional Ether Custodian are appointed by the Trustee.

The net asset value of the Trust equals the total assets of the Trust, which consists solely of ether and cash, less total liabilities of the Trust, each determined by the Trustee pursuant to policies established from time to time by the Trustee or its affiliates or otherwise described herein. The Trust’s periodic financial statements are prepared in accordance with the Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification Topic 820, “Fair Value Measurement” (“ASC Topic 820” ) and utilize an exchange-traded price from the Trust’s principal market for ether as of 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time (“ET”) on the Trust’s financial statement measurement date. The Sponsor determines in its sole discretion the valuation sources and policies used to prepare the Trust’s financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP. The Trust engages a third -party vendor to obtain a price from a principal market for ether, which is determined and designated by such third -party vendor daily based on its consideration of several exchange characteristics, including oversight, and the volume and frequency of trades.

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The Sponsor has the exclusive authority to determine the Trust’s net asset value, which it has delegated to the Trustee under the Trust Agreement. The Trustee has delegated to the Trust Administrator the responsibility to calculate the net asset value of the Trust and the net asset value per Share (“NAV”), based on a pricing source selected by the Trustee. In determining the Trust’s net asset value, the Trust Administrator values the ether held by the Trust based on an index (the “Index”), unless the Sponsor in its sole discretion determines that the Index is unreliable. The methodology used to calculate the Index price to value ether in determining the net asset value of the Trust may not be deemed consistent with U.S. GAAP. The CME CF Ether–Dollar Reference Rate – New York Variant for the ether – U.S. Dollar trading pair (the “CF Benchmarks Index”) shall constitute the Index, unless the CF Benchmarks Index is not available or the Sponsor in its sole discretion determines the CF Benchmarks Index is unreliable as the Index and therefore determines not to use the CF Benchmarks Index as the Index. If the CF Benchmarks Index is not available or the Sponsor determines, in its sole discretion, that the CF Benchmarks Index is unreliable (together a “Fair Value Event”), the Trust’s holdings may be fair valued on a temporary basis in accordance with the fair value policies approved by the Trustee.

Additionally, the Trust Administrator monitors for unusual prices and escalates to the Trustee if detected. If the CF Benchmarks Index is not used, the Trust will notify Shareholders in a prospectus supplement, in its periodic Exchange Act reports and/or on the Trust’s website. The Trust Administrator calculates the net asset value of the Trust and the NAV once on each day other than a Saturday or a Sunday, or a day on which NASDAQ is closed for regular trading (a “Business Day”). The NAV for a normal trading day will be released after 4:00 p.m. ET. Trading during the core trading session on NASDAQ typically closes at 4:00 p.m. ET. However, NAVs are not officially released until after the completion of a comprehensive review of the NAV and prices utilized to determine the NAV of the Trust by the Trust Administrator. Upon the completion of the end of day reviews by the Trust Administrator the NAV is released to the public typically by 5:30 p.m. ET and generally no later than 8:00 p.m. ET. The period between 4:00 p.m. ET and the NAV release after 5:30 p.m. ET (or later) provides an opportunity for the Trust Administrator and the Trustee to detect, flag, investigate, and correct unusual pricing should it occur and implement a Fair Value Event, if necessary. Any such correction could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

The Trust’s periodic financial statements may not utilize net asset value of the Trust to the extent the methodology used to calculate the Index is deemed not to be consistent with U.S. GAAP.

Gain or loss on sales of ether is calculated on a trade date basis using the average cost method.

The following tables summarize activity in ether for the three months ended September 30, 2025 and 2024:

Three Months Ended September 30, 2025		Quantity				Cost				Fair Value				Realized Gain (Loss)
Beginning balance			1,768,573			$	5,242,898,137			$	4,396,336,194			$	—
Ether purchased			2,516,582				9,716,662,530				9,716,662,530				—
Ether sold for the redemption of shares			( 441,125	)			( 1,471,657,646	)			( 1,798,740,023	)			327,082,377
Ether sold to pay expenses			( 1,207	)			( 3,951,091	)			( 4,681,463	)			730,372
Net realized gain			—				—				327,812,749				—
Net change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation			—				—				3,236,696,155				—
Ending balance			3,842,823			$	13,483,951,930			$	15,874,086,142			$	327,812,749

Three Months Ended September 30, 2024		Quantity				Cost				Fair Value				Realized Gain (Loss)
Beginning balance			3,031			$	10,000,000			$	10,590,295			$	—
Ether purchased			384,840				1,147,427,156				1,147,427,156				—
Ether sold to pay expenses			( 28	)			( 84,988	)			( 63,328	)			( 21,660	)
Net realized loss			—				—				( 21,660	)			—
Net change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation			—				—				( 138,509,122	)			—
Ending balance			387,843			$	1,157,342,168			$	1,019,423,341			$	( 21,660	)

The following tables summarize activity in ether for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 and the period from May 21, 2024 ( Date of Seeding) to September 30, 2024:

Nine Months Ended September 30, 2025		Quantity				Cost				Fair Value				Realized Gain (Loss)
Beginning balance			1,071,415			$	3,543,902,275			$	3,571,669,777			$	—
Ether purchased			3,471,085				12,249,273,102				12,249,273,102				—
Ether sold for the redemption of shares			( 697,568	)			( 2,302,367,865	)			( 2,332,927,732	)			30,559,867
Ether sold to pay expenses			( 2,109	)			( 6,855,582	)			( 6,849,547	)			( 6,035	)
Net realized gain			—				—				30,553,832				—
Net change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation			—				—				2,362,366,710				—
Ending balance			3,842,823			$	13,483,951,930			$	15,874,086,142			$	30,553,832

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Period from May 21, 2024 (Date of Seeding) to September 30, 2024		Quantity				Cost				Fair Value				Realized Gain (Loss)
Beginning balance			—			$	—			$	—			$	—
Ether purchased			387,871				1,157,427,156				1,157,427,156				—
Ether sold to pay expenses			( 28	)			( 84,988	)			( 63,328	)			( 21,660	)
Net realized loss			—				—				( 21,660	)			—
Net change in unrealized appreciation/depreciation			—				—				( 137,918,827	)			—
Ending balance			387,843			$	1,157,342,168			$	1,019,423,341			$	( 21,660	)

C.	Calculation of Net Asset Value

On each Business Day, as soon as practicable after 4:00 p.m. ET, the net asset value of the Trust is obtained by subtracting all accrued fees, expenses and other liabilities of the Trust from the total assets held by the Trust. The Trust Administrator computes the NAV by dividing the net asset value of the Trust by the number of Shares outstanding on the date the computation is made.

D.	Cash and Cash Equivalents

Cash includes non-interest bearing, non-restricted cash maintained with one banking institution that does not exceed U.S. federally insured limits.

E.	Offering of the Shares

Shares are issued and redeemed continuously in aggregations of 40,000 Shares (a “Basket”) or integral multiples thereof, based on the quantity of ether attributable to each Share (net of accrued but unpaid Sponsor’s fee and any accrued but unpaid expenses or liabilities). Individual investors cannot purchase or redeem Shares in direct transactions with the Trust. Only registered broker-dealers that are eligible to settle securities transactions through the book-entry facilities of the Depository Trust Company and that have entered into a contractual arrangement with the Sponsor governing, among other matters, the creation and redemption of Shares (such broker-dealers, the “Authorized Participants”), can place orders to receive Baskets in exchange for cash or ether. Baskets may be redeemed by the Trust in exchange for an amount of ether corresponding to their redemption value or for  the cash proceeds from selling the amount of ether corresponding to their redemption value.

In connection with cash creations and redemptions, the Trust engages in ether transactions for converting cash into ether (in association with purchase orders) and ether into cash (in association with redemption orders) by choosing, in its sole discretion, to trade directly with third parties (each, an “Ether Trading Counterparty”), who are not registered broker-dealers pursuant to written agreements between such Ether Trading Counterparties and the Trust, or choosing to trade through the Prime Execution Agent acting in an agency capacity with third parties through its Coinbase Prime service pursuant to the Prime Execution Agent Agreement.

F.	Federal Income Taxes

The Trust is treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes and, therefore, no provision for federal income taxes is required. Any interest, expenses, gains and losses are passed through to the holders of Shares of the Trust. The Sponsor has analyzed applicable tax laws and regulations and their application to the Trust as of September 30, 2025 and does not believe that there are any uncertain tax positions that require recognition of a tax liability.

G.	Segment Reporting

The Chief Financial Officer of the Sponsor acts as the Trust’s Chief Operating Decision Maker (“CODM”) and is responsible for assessing performance and allocating resources with respect to the Trust. The CODM has concluded that the Trust operates as a single operating segment since the Trust has a single investment strategy as disclosed in its prospectus, against which the CODM assesses performance. The financial information provided to and reviewed by the CODM is presented within the Trust’s financial statements.

3 -	Trust Expenses

The Sponsor’s fee is accrued daily at an annualized rate equal to 0.25 % of the net asset value of the Trust and is payable at least quarterly in arrears in U.S. dollars or in-kind or any combination thereof. For the nine months ended September 30, 2025, the Sponsor’s fee was $ 11,838,343 .

The Sponsor may, at its sole discretion and from time to time, waive all or a portion of the Sponsor’s fee for stated periods of time. The Sponsor is under no obligation to waive any portion of its fees and any such waiver shall create no obligation to waive any such fees during any period not covered by the waiver. For a twelve -month period, starting July 23, 2024, the Sponsor waived a portion of the Sponsor’s fee so that the Sponsor’s fee after the fee waiver would be equal to 0.12 % of the net asset value of the Trust for the first $ 2.5 billion of the Trust’s assets. In the future, if the Sponsor decides to waive all or a portion of the Sponsor’s fee, Shareholders will be notified in a prospectus supplement, in its periodic Exchange Act reports and/or on the Trust’s website. For the nine months ended September 30, 2025, the amount waived was $ 1,748,012 .

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The Sponsor has agreed to assume the marketing and the following administrative expenses of the Trust: the fees of the Trustee, the Delaware Trustee, the Trust Administrator, the Ether Custodian, the Additional Ether Custodian, and The Bank of New York Mellon (the “Cash Custodian”), NASDAQ listing fees, SEC registration fees, printing and mailing costs, tax reporting fees, audit fees, license fees and expenses and up to $ 500,000 per annum in ordinary legal fees and expenses. The Sponsor may determine in its sole discretion to assume legal fees and expenses of the Trust in excess of the $ 500,000 per annum required under the Trust Agreement. To the extent that the Sponsor does not voluntarily assume such fees and expenses, they will be the responsibility of the Trust.

4 -	Related Parties

The Sponsor and the Trustee are considered to be related parties to the Trust. The Trustee’s fee is paid by the Sponsor and is not a separate expense of the Trust.

5 -	Indemnification

The Trust Agreement provides that the Sponsor shall indemnify the Trustee, its directors, employees, delegees and agents against, and hold each of them harmless from, any loss, liability, claim, cost, expense or judgment of any kind whatsoever (including the reasonable fees and expenses of counsel) that is incurred by any of them and that arises out of or is related to ( 1 ) any offer or sale by the Trust of Baskets, ( 2 ) acts performed or omitted pursuant to the provisions of the Trust Agreement (A) by the Trustee, its directors, employees, delegees and agents or (B) by the Sponsor or ( 3 ) any filings with or submissions to the SEC in connection with or with respect to the Shares, except that the Sponsor shall not have any obligations to pay any indemnification amounts incurred as a result of and attributable to ( x ) the willful misconduct, gross negligence or bad faith of, or material breach of the terms of the Trust Agreement by, the Trustee, (y) information furnished in writing by the Trustee to the Sponsor expressly for use in the registration statement, or any amendment thereto, filed with the SEC relating to the Shares that is not materially altered by the Sponsor or (z) any misrepresentations or omissions made by an authorized participant (other than the Sponsor) in connection with such authorized participant’s offer and sale of Shares.

The Trust Agreement provides that the Trustee shall indemnify the Sponsor, its directors, employees, delegees and agents against, and hold each of them harmless from, any loss, liability, claim, cost, expense or judgment of any kind whatsoever (including the reasonable fees and expenses of counsel) ( 1 ) caused by the willful misconduct, gross negligence or bad faith of the Trustee or ( 2 ) arising out of any information furnished in writing to the Sponsor by the Trustee expressly for use in the registration statement, or any amendment thereto or periodic report, filed with the SEC relating to the Shares that is not materially altered by the Sponsor.

The Trust Agreement provides that the Sponsor and its shareholders, directors, officers, employees, affiliates (as such term is defined under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended) and subsidiaries and agents shall be indemnified from the Trust and held harmless against any loss, liability, claim, cost, expense or judgment of any kind whatsoever (including the reasonable fees and expenses of counsel) arising out of or in connection with the performance of their obligations under the Trust Agreement or any actions taken in accordance with the provisions of the Trust Agreement and incurred without their ( 1 ) willful misconduct, gross negligence or bad faith or ( 2 ) reckless disregard of their obligations and duties under the Trust Agreement.

The Trust has agreed that the Cash Custodian will only be responsible for any loss or damage suffered by the Trust as a direct result of the Cash Custodian’s negligence, fraud or willful default in the performance of its duties.

The Trust’s maximum exposure under these arrangements is unknown because it involves future potential claims against the Trust, which cannot be predicted with any certainty.

6 -	Commitments and Contingent Liabilities

In the normal course of business, the Trust may enter into contracts with service providers that contain general indemnification clauses. The Trust’s maximum exposure under these arrangements is unknown as this would involve future claims that may be made against the Trust.

7 -	Concentration Risk

Substantially all of the Trust’s assets are holdings of ether, which creates a concentration risk associated with fluctuations in the price of ether. Accordingly, a decline in the price of ether will have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares of the Trust. Factors that may have the effect of causing a decline in the price of ether include negative perception of digital assets; a lack of stability and standardized regulation in the digital asset markets; the closure or temporary shutdown of digital asset platforms due to fraud, business failure, security breaches or government mandated regulation; and a loss of investor confidence.

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8 -	Financial Highlights

The following financial highlights relate to investment performance and operations for a Share outstanding for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2025, the three months ended September 30, 2024 and the period from May 21, 2024 ( Date of Seeding) to September 30, 2024.

		Three Months Ended September 30, 2025				Three Months Ended September 30, 2024				Nine Months Ended September 30, 2025				Period from May 21, 2024 (Date of Seeding) to September 30, 2024
Net asset value per Share, beginning of period		$	18.81			$	26.47			$	25.24			$	25.00
Net investment loss (a)			( 0.02	)			( 0.01	)			( 0.04	)			( 0.01	)
Net realized and unrealized gain (loss) (b)			12.45				( 6.55	)			6.04				( 5.08	)
Net increase (decrease) in net assets from operations			12.43				( 6.56	)			6.00				( 5.09	)
Net asset value per Share, end of period		$	31.24			$	19.91			$	31.24			$	19.91
Total return, at net asset value (c)(d)			66.08	%			( 24.78	)%			23.77	%			( 20.20	)% (e)(f)
Ratio to average net assets:
Net investment loss (g)			( 0.24	)%			( 0.12	)%			( 0.21	)%			( 0.12	)%
Total expenses (g)			0.25	%			0.24	%			0.25	%			0.24	%
Total expenses after fees waived (g)			0.24	%			0.12	%			0.21	%			0.12	%

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(a)	Based on average Shares outstanding during the period.

(b)	The amounts reported for a Share outstanding may not accord with the change in aggregate gains and losses on investment for the period due to the timing of Share transactions in relation to the fluctuating fair values of the Trust’s underlying investment.

(c)	Based on the change in net asset value of a Share during the period.

(d)	Percentage is not annualized.

(e)	For the period June 24, 2024 ( Effective Date) to September 30, 2024.

(f)	For the period May 21, 2024 to September 30, 2024, the Trust’s total return was ( 20.36 )%.

(g)	Percentage is annualized.

9 -	Investment Valuation

U.S. GAAP defines fair value as the price the Trust would receive to sell an asset or pay to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. The Trust’s policy is to value its investment at fair value.

Various inputs are used in determining the fair value of assets and liabilities. Inputs may be based on independent market data (“observable inputs”) or they may be internally developed (“unobservable inputs”). These inputs are categorized into a disclosure hierarchy consisting of three broad levels for financial reporting purposes. The level of a value determined for an asset or liability within the fair value hierarchy is based on the lowest level of any input that is significant to the fair value measurement in its entirety. The three levels of the fair value hierarchy are as follows:

Level 1 −

Unadjusted quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities;

Level 2 −

Inputs other than quoted prices included within Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability either directly or indirectly, including quoted prices for similar assets or liabilities in active markets, quoted prices for identical or similar assets or liabilities in markets that are not considered to be active, inputs other than quoted prices that are observable for the asset or liability, and inputs that are derived principally from or corroborated by observable market data by correlation or other means; and

Level 3 −

Unobservable inputs that are unobservable for the asset or liability, including the Trust’s assumptions used in determining the fair value of investments.

At September 30, 2025, the value of the ether held by the Trust is categorized as Level 1.

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Item 2. Management ’ s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations.

This information should be read in conjunction with the financial statements and notes to financial statements included in Item 1 of Part I of this Form 10‑Q. The discussion and analysis that follows may contain statements that relate to future events or future performance. In some cases, such forward‑looking statements can be identified by terminology such as “may,” “should,” “could,” “expect,” “plan,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential” or the negative of these terms or other comparable terminology. These statements are only predictions. Actual events or results may differ materially. These statements are based upon certain assumptions and analyses made by the Sponsor on the basis of its perception of historical trends, current conditions and expected future developments, as well as other factors it believes are appropriate in the circumstances. Whether or not actual results and developments will conform to the Sponsor’s expectations and predictions, however, is subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, including the special considerations discussed below, general economic, market and business conditions, changes in laws or regulations, including those concerning taxes, made by governmental authorities or regulatory bodies, and other world economic and political developments. Although the Sponsor does not make forward-looking statements unless it believes it has a reasonable basis for doing so, the Sponsor cannot guarantee their accuracy. Except as required by applicable disclosure laws, neither the Trust nor the Sponsor is under a duty to update any of the forward-looking statements to conform such statements to actual results or to a change in the Sponsor’s expectations or predictions.

Introduction

The iShares Ethereum Trust ETF (the “Trust”) is a Delaware statutory trust. The Trust does not have any officers, directors, or employees, and is administered by the Third Amended and Restated Trust Agreement dated as of July 8, 2025, among iShares Delaware Trust Sponsor LLC (the “Sponsor”), BlackRock Fund Advisors (the “Trustee”) and Wilmington Trust, National Association, a national association (the “Delaware Trustee”). The Trust issues shares (“Shares”) representing fractional undivided beneficial interests in its net assets. The assets of the Trust consist primarily of ether held by a custodian on behalf of the Trust.

The Trust is a passive investment vehicle and seeks to reflect generally the performance of the price of ether. The Trust seeks to reflect such performance before payment of the Trust’s expenses and liabilities. The Trust does not engage in any activities designed to obtain a profit from, or ameliorate losses caused by, changes in the price of ether.

The Trust issues and redeems Shares only in aggregations of 40,000 Shares (a “Basket”) or integral multiples thereof, based on the quantity of ether attributable to each Share (net of accrued but unpaid Sponsor’s fee and any accrued but unpaid expenses or liabilities). Only registered broker-dealers that have previously entered into an agreement with the Sponsor governing the terms and conditions of such issuance (such broker-dealer, the “Authorized Participants”), can place orders to receive Baskets in exchange for cash or ether. Baskets may be redeemed by the Trust in exchange for an amount of ether corresponding to their redemption value or for the cash proceeds from selling the amount of ether corresponding to their redemption value.

In connection with cash creations and redemptions, the Trust engages in ether transactions for converting cash into ether (in association with purchase orders) and ether into cash (in association with redemption orders) by choosing, in its sole discretion, to trade directly with third parties (each, a “Ether Trading Counterparty”), who are not registered broker-dealers pursuant to written agreements between such Ether Trading Counterparties and the Trust, or choosing to trade through Coinbase Inc. (the “Prime Execution Agent”) acting in an agency capacity with third parties through its Coinbase Prime service pursuant to the Prime Execution Agent Agreement.

Shares of the Trust trade on The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC (“NASDAQ”) under the ticker symbol ETHA.

Valuation of Ether ; The CF Benchmarks Index

On each day other than a Saturday or a Sunday, or a day on which NASDAQ is closed for regular trading (a “Business Day”), as soon as practicable after 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time (“ET”), the Trust evaluates the ether held by the Trust as reflected by the CME CF Ether–Dollar Reference Rate – New York Variant for the ether – U.S. Dollar trading pair (the “CF Benchmarks Index”) and determines the net asset value of the Trust and the net asset value per Share (“NAV”).

CF Benchmarks Index is calculated as of 4:00 p.m. ET. The CF Benchmarks Index is designed based on the IOSCO Principles for Financial Benchmarks and is a Registered Benchmark under the UK Benchmark Regulations (“BMR”). The administrator of the CF Benchmarks Index is CF Benchmarks Ltd., a UK incorporated company, authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority of the UK as a Benchmark Administrator under the UK BMR.

Liquidity

The Trust is not aware of any trends, demands, conditions or events that are reasonably likely to result in material changes to its liquidity needs. In exchange for a fee, the Sponsor has agreed to assume most of the expenses incurred by the Trust. As a result, the only ordinary expense of the Trust during the period covered by this report was the Sponsor’s fee. The Trust’s only source of liquidity is its sales of ether.

Critical Accounting Policies

The financial statements and accompanying notes are prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the United States. The preparation of these financial statements relies on estimates and assumptions that impact the Trust’s financial position and results of operations. These estimates and assumptions affect the Trust’s application of accounting policies. A description of the valuation of ether, a critical accounting policy that the Trust believes is important to understanding its results of operations and financial position, is provided in the section entitled “Valuation of Ether; The CF Benchmark Index,” above. In addition, please refer to Note 2 to the financial statements included in this report for further discussion of the Trust’s accounting policies.

Results of Operations

The Quarter Ended September 30, 2025

The Trust’s net asset value increased from $4,395,795,808 at June 30, 2025 to $15,870,778,522 at September 30, 2025, a 261.04% increase. The increase in the Trust’s net asset value resulted primarily from an increase in the number of outstanding Shares, which rose from 233,720,000 Shares at June 30, 2025 to 508,080,000 Shares at September 30, 2025, a consequence of 332,680,000 Shares (8,317 Baskets) being created and 58,320,000 Shares (1,458 Baskets) being redeemed during the quarter. The increase in the Trust’s net asset value also benefited from an increase in the price of ether, which rose 66.18% from $2,485.81 at June 30, 2025 to $4,130.84 at September 30, 2025.

The 66.08% increase in the NAV for purposes of the Trust’s periodic financial statements (“Financial Statement NAV”) from $18.81 at June 30, 2025 to $31.24 at September 30, 2025 is directly related to the 66.18% increase in the price of ether. The Financial Statement NAV increased slightly less than the price of ether on a percentage basis due to the net Sponsor’s fee, which was $7,712,932 for the quarter, or 0.06% of the Trust’s average weighted assets of $12,565,170,179 during the quarter.

The NAV of $36.46 on August 22, 2025 was the highest during the quarter, compared with a low during the quarter of $18.28 on July 1, 2025.

Net increase in net assets resulting from operations for the quarter ended September 30, 2025 was $3,556,795,972, resulting from a net realized gain of $730,372 from ether sold to pay expenses, a net realized gain of $327,082,377 from ether sold for the redemption of Shares and an unrealized gain on investment in ether of $3,236,696,155, partially offset by a net investment loss of $7,712,932. Other than the Sponsor’s fee of $7,712,932, the Trust had no expenses during the quarter.

The Nine-Month Period Ended September 30, 2025

The Trust’s net asset value increased from $3,571,262,167 at December 31, 2024 to $15,870,778,522 at September 30, 2025, a 344.40% increase. The increase in the Trust’s net asset value resulted primarily from an increase in the number of outstanding Shares, which rose from 141,480,000 Shares at December 31, 2024 to 508,080,000 Shares at September 30, 2025, a consequence of 458,800,000 Shares (11,470 Baskets) being created and 92,200,000 Shares (2,305 Baskets) being redeemed during the quarter. The increase in the Trust’s net asset value also benefited from an increase in the price of ether, which rose 23.92% from $3,333.60 at December 31, 2024 to $4,130.84 at September 30, 2025.

The 23.77% increase in the Financial Statement NAV from $25.24 at December 31, 2024 to $31.24 at September 30, 2025 is directly related to the 23.92% increase in the price of ether. The Financial Statement NAV increased slightly less than the price of ether on a percentage basis due to the net Sponsor’s Fee, which was $10,090,331 for the period, or 0.16% of the Trust’s average weighted assets of $6,331,492,268 during the period.

The NAV of $36.46 on August 22, 2025 was the highest during the period, compared with a low during the period of $11.09 on April 8, 2025.

Net increase in net assets resulting from operations for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 was $2,382,830,211, resulting from an unrealized gain on investment in ether of $2,362,366,710, a net realized gain of $30,559,867 on ether distributed for the redemption of Shares, a net realized loss of $6,035 from ether sold to pay expenses during the period and a net investment loss of $10,090,331. Other than the Sponsor’s fee of $10,090,331, the Trust had no expenses during the period.

Item 3. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk.

Not applicable.

Item 4. Controls and Procedures.

The duly authorized officers of the Sponsor performing functions equivalent to those a principal executive officer and principal financial officer of the Trust would perform if the Trust had any officers, with the participation of the Trustee, have evaluated the effectiveness of the Trust’s disclosure controls and procedures, and have concluded that the disclosure controls and procedures of the Trust were effective as of the end of the period covered by this report to provide reasonable assurance that information required to be disclosed in the reports that the Trust files or submits under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, is recorded, processed, summarized and reported, within the time periods specified in the applicable rules and forms, and that it is accumulated and communicated to the duly authorized officers of the Sponsor performing functions equivalent to those a principal executive officer and principal financial officer of the Trust would perform if the Trust had any officers, as appropriate to allow timely decisions regarding required disclosure.

There are inherent limitations to the effectiveness of any system of disclosure controls and procedures, including the possibility of human error and the circumvention or overriding of the controls and procedures.

There were no changes in the Trust’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by this report that have materially affected, or are reasonably likely to materially affect, the Trust’s internal control over financial reporting.

PART II – OTHER INFORMATION

Item 1. Legal Proceedings.

None.

Item 1A. Risk Factors

Except as set forth below, there have been no material changes to the Risk Factors last reported under Part I, Item 1A of the registrant’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 5, 2025.

The trading prices of many digital assets, including ether, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ether, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value.

The trading prices of many digital assets, including ether, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. For instance, there were steep increases in the value of certain digital assets, including ether, over the course of 2021, and multiple market observers asserted that digital assets were experiencing a “bubble.” These increases were followed by steep drawdowns throughout 2022 in digital asset trading prices, including for ether. These episodes of rapid price appreciation followed by steep drawdowns have occurred multiple times throughout ether’s history, including in 2021-2023. As of the date of this report, digital asset prices have continued to fluctuate in 2025. For example, ether lost approximately 12.2% of its value according to some sources in mid-October 2025 as part of wider digital asset market turmoil, widely attributed to global trade tensions, which triggered a number of dislocations in the digital asset market (the “October 2025 Flash Crash”), including liquidations of up to $20 billion in collateral in the form of various digital assets (including, but not limited to, ether) securing trades (particularly perpetual futures contracts and various forms of financing transactions), along with reported service interruptions, halted orders, forced unwinding of trades, and other issues, across centralized and decentralized exchanges.

Extreme volatility may persist, and the value of the Shares may significantly decline in the future without recovery. The digital asset markets may still be experiencing a bubble or may experience a bubble again in the future. For example, in the first half of 2022, each of Celsius Network, Voyager Digital Ltd., and Three Arrows Capital declared bankruptcy, resulting in a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem and negative publicity surrounding digital assets more broadly. In November 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), one of the largest digital asset platforms by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals amid rumors of the company’s liquidity issues and likely insolvency, which were subsequently corroborated by its CEO. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resigned and FTX and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States, while other affiliates have entered insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceedings around the globe, following which the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal fraud and other charges, and the SEC and CFTC brought civil securities and commodities fraud charges, against certain of FTX’s and its affiliates’ senior executives, including its former CEO. In addition, several other entities in the digital asset industry filed for bankruptcy following FTX’s bankruptcy filing, such as BlockFi Inc. and Genesis Global Capital, LLC (“Genesis”). In response to these events (collectively, the “2022 Events”), the digital asset markets have experienced extreme price volatility and other entities in the digital asset industry have been, and may continue to be, negatively affected, further undermining confidence in the digital asset markets. These events have also negatively impacted the liquidity of the digital asset markets as certain entities affiliated with FTX engaged in significant trading activity. If the liquidity of the digital asset markets continues to be negatively impacted by these events, digital asset prices, including ether, may continue to experience significant volatility or price declines and confidence in the digital asset markets may be further undermined. In addition, regulatory and enforcement scrutiny has increased, including from, among others, the Department of Justice, the SEC, the CFTC, the White House and Congress, as well as state regulators and authorities. These events are continuing to develop, and the full facts are continuing to emerge. It is not possible to predict at this time all of the risks that they may pose to the Trust, its service providers or to the digital asset industry as a whole.

The prices of some digital assets, including ether, have fluctuated significantly following the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Many expect the new administration to facilitate a supportive regulatory approach toward the digital asset industry. Through his executive orders, President Trump has indicated that the administration will work toward providing greater regulatory clarity for blockchain technology and digital assets, thereby fostering their development in the U.S. Similarly, the digital asset industry expects favorable legislation from the new U.S. Congress as certain members have expressed interest in advancing digital asset specific legislation. There can be no assurance that market expectations around future activity by the administration or Congress will be fulfilled, or that digital asset prices will rise or maintain their current levels. Some commentators have referred to the digital asset market post-President Trump’s election as a bubble. There can be no assurance that such a bubble does not exist. The failure of the administration and Congress to provide the expected level of regulatory clarity and support for blockchain technology and digital assets, could lead to a decline in digital asset prices, including ether. Such a decline could cause a decline in the value of the Shares and cause Shareholders to suffer losses. Moreover, there can be no assurance that political dynamics and sentiments toward the digital asset industry, or market perceptions of those sentiments, will not shift over time.

On March 6, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order for the “Establishment of the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and United States Digital Asset Stockpile” (the “Order”). The Order requires the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury to establish two offices to administer and maintain a “Strategic Bitcoin Reserve” (the “Bitcoin Reserve”) and a U.S. Digital Asset Stockpile (the “Digital Asset Stockpile”), respectively. The Bitcoin Reserve will be capitalized with bitcoin forfeited as part of U.S. criminal or civil proceedings or in satisfaction of penalties imposed by executive agencies. The Order directs the Secretaries of the U.S. Treasury Department and the U.S. Department of Commerce to develop budget-neutral strategies for acquiring additional bitcoin for the Bitcoin Reserve. As established by the Order, the Bitcoin Reserve will not contain ether, and there can be no assurance, and there is no present indication, that it would be changed to include ether in the future. The Digital Asset Stockpile will be capitalized initially with digital assets other than bitcoin forfeited as part of criminal or civil asset forfeiture proceedings, which could include ether; however, there will be no new acquisitions of ether as part of the Digital Asset Stockpile. The anticipation of a U.S. government-funded strategic cryptocurrency reserve may have motivated large-scale purchases of ether in the expectation of the U.S. government potentially acquiring ether to fund such an expected reserve, and the market price of ether may have decreased as a result of the ultimate content of the Order, which did not ultimately provide for acquisition of ether as part of the Bitcoin Reserve, though ether could be held as part of the Digital Asset Stockpile. While legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, which would direct the acquisition of 1 million bitcoin by the federal government over a five-year period, no such similar federal legislation has been introduced that would provide for acquiring ether. Even if such legislation providing for the acquisition of ether were to be introduced at the federal level, it could fail to pass. Bills have also been introduced in several state legislatures to authorize the acquisition of bitcoin by state governments or their instrumentalities, some of which have failed to pass; however, the Sponsor is not aware as of the date of this report that similar legislation at the state level has been introduced in respect of ether, in the same quantity as legislation in respect of bitcoin. If now or in the future, the U.S. federal government or any state government or any instrumentality thereof does not announce ether acquisition plans or does announce such plans, but these plans fall short of market expectations, the price of ether may decline, which may impact Share value. Even if government acquisitions of ether were to occur or if legislation requiring acquisitions of ether is enacted, the price of ether may decline if there are implementation challenges, unexpected difficulties, policy or legal reversals, any of which may negatively impact Share value. Further, executive orders such as the Order are subject to change and can be reversed or overturned. The enduring existence and size of the Digital Asset Stockpile is subject to complex challenges and uncertainty that makes it difficult to evaluate its effect on the value of ether and the Shares, now or in the future. There can be no assurance that any particular legislation will ever be introduced or passed at either the federal or state level providing for the acquisition of ether by governmental instrumentalities.

Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of ether, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. The Trust is not actively managed and will not take any actions to take advantage, or mitigate the impacts, of volatility in the price of ether.

If the digital asset award or transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum network are not sufficiently high to incentivize validators, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate validating activities, validators may cease expanding validating power or demand high transaction fees, which could negatively impact the value of ether and the value of the Shares.

In 2021, the Ethereum network implemented the EIP-1559 upgrade. EIP-1559 changed the methodology used to calculate transaction fees paid to ether validators in such a manner that reduced the total net issuance of ether fees paid to validators. If the digital asset awards for validating blocks or the transaction fees for recording transactions on the Ethereum network are not sufficiently high to incentivize validators, or if certain jurisdictions continue to limit or otherwise regulate validating activities, validators may cease expending validating power to validate blocks and confirmations of transactions on the Ethereum blockchain could be slowed. For example, the realization of one or more of the following risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares:

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A reduction in the processing power expended by validators on the Ethereum network could increase the likelihood of a malicious actor or botnet (a volunteer or hacked collection of computers controlled by networked software coordinating the actions of the computers) obtaining control. See “-If a malicious actor or botnet obtains control of more than 50% of the validating power on the Ethereum network, or otherwise obtains control over the Ethereum network through its influence over core developers or otherwise, such actor or botnet could manipulate the Ethereum blockchain to adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate.”

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Validators have historically accepted relatively low transaction confirmation fees on most digital asset networks. If validators demand higher transaction fees for recording transactions in the Ethereum blockchain or a software upgrade automatically charges fees for all transactions on the Ethereum network, the cost of using ether may increase and the marketplace may be reluctant to accept ether as a means of payment. Alternatively, validators could collude in an anti-competitive manner to reject low transaction fees on the Ethereum network and force users to pay higher fees, thus reducing the attractiveness of the Ethereum network. Higher transaction confirmation fees resulting through collusion or otherwise may adversely affect the attractiveness of the Ethereum network, the value of ether and the value of the Shares.

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To the extent that any validators cease to record transactions that do not include the payment of a transaction fee in blocks or do not record a transaction because the transaction fee is too low, such transactions will not be recorded on the Ethereum blockchain until a block is validated by a validator who does not require the payment of transaction fees or is willing to accept a lower fee. Any widespread delays or disruptions in the recording of transactions could result in a loss of confidence in the Ethereum network and could prevent the Trust from completing transactions associated with the day-to-day operations of the Trust, including creations and redemptions of the Shares in exchange for ether or cash with Authorized Participants.

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During the course of the block validation processes, validators exercise the discretion to select which transactions to include within a block and in what order to include these transactions. Beyond the standard block reward and transaction fees, validators on many blockchains, including the Ethereum blockchain, have the ability to extract what is known as Maximal Extractable Value (“MEV”) by strategically choosing, reordering, or excluding certain transactions during block production in return for increased transaction fees or other forms of profit for such validators. In blockchain networks that facilitate DeFi protocols in particular, such as the Ethereum network, users may attempt to gain an advantage over other users by offering additional fees to validators for effecting a certain order or inclusions of certain transactions within a block. Certain software solutions, such as MEV Boost by Flashbots, have been developed which facilitate validators and other parties in the ecosystem in capturing MEV. MEV Boost is one way to capture MEV on the Ethereum network, but it is not the only way, although it is widely understood that most validation on the Ethereum network involves MEV Boost. MEV Boost is designed to separate block building from block proposal ("proposer-builder separation"), with the intent to decentralize validation activity and reduce the likelihood of transaction censorship by validators. In MEV Boost, there are four groups of market participants: "searchers", who identify MEV opportunities by scanning the publicly visible so-called memory pool (“mempool”) of pending but unexecuted transactions awaiting validation; "builders", who take transactions awaiting validation and build them into potential blocks in a manner that captures the MEV opportunities identified by searchers, but do not propose the block to the Ethereum network; "relays", who send limited information about the block (such as the amount of transaction fees payable to the validator), but not the complete list of transactions, to the validator who will propose them to the Ethereum network; and "proposers", the validators who have been selected by the Ethereum network to propose a particular block, who are generally intended to accept blocks in the form proposed by block builders and relayed by relays without changing their contents (leading to the intended proposer-builder separation that MEV-Boost was designed to facilitate). The presence of MEV on many blockchains, including the Ethereum blockchain, may incentivize associated practices such as sandwich attacks or front running that can have negative repercussions on DeFi users. A “sandwich attack” on many blockchains that enable DeFi transactions, including the Ethereum blockchain, is executed by placing two transactions around a large, detected transaction to capitalize on the expected price impact. For instance, a market participant (such as a searcher on MEV Boost) might identify a sizable transaction within the publicly visible mempool that will significantly alter an asset’s price on a decentralized exchange. The participant could then for example orchestrate a transaction bundle: one transaction to acquire the asset prior to the detected transaction, followed by the large transaction itself, and a final transaction to sell the asset after the market price has increased due to the large transaction’s execution. Such transaction bundles can be submitted to validators through mechanisms like MEV-Boost (in the case of the Ethereum network, with other networks having other mechanisms), with validators receiving a share of the profits as an incentive to include the specific transaction bundle in the block. In the context of MEV on the Ethereum network, “front running” is said to occur when a user spots a transaction in the mempool, and then pays a high transaction fee to a validator to have their transaction executed on a priority basis in a manner designed to profit from the pending but unexecuted transaction that is still in the mempool. MEV may also compromise the predictability of transaction execution on many blockchains, including the Ethereum blockchain, which may deter usage of the network as a whole. Although based on widely available information given that transactions in the mempool are publicly visible, there have also been instances of validators allegedly leveraging the MEV-Boost software to allegedly trick the software into prematurely releasing the full contents of proposed blocks, such as by a block proposer providing a false signature to the relay. For example, in April 2023, certain Ethereum validators (acting as proposers) allegedly exploited the MEV Boost software that allegedly allowed them to view the full contents of proposed blocks submitted by relays before this information was made public (for example, by allegedly signing transactions with relays using false signatures), allegedly enabling them to insert their own front-running transactions (acting as builders) in front of the front-running transactions originally identified by searchers, propose modified blocks containing those front-running transactions, and allegedly capture approximately $25 million in profits by manipulating block order to the detriment of the original sandwichers (i.e., the searchers who identified MEV opportunities for block builders to incorporate into potential blocks and relays to relay to potential proposers). On May 15, 2024, Anton Peraire-Bueno and James Peraire-Bueno were indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for this exploitation of MEV-Boost and specifically charged with wire fraud, wire fraud conspiracy, and money laundering. They assert defenses on a variety of grounds, including, among others, that the searchers in MEV Boost conducted the original sandwich attacks, which victimize ordinary traders by driving up costs and exploiting their trades in the publicly visible mempool in the first place. As of the date of this report, the case has not been decided yet. The case, which the indictment itself acknowledges is the "first of its kind", raises novel issues for the digital assets industry given that validators attempting to capture MEV is a widespread practice on many blockchain networks, including the Ethereum network, and is widely viewed as a test case by legal commentators, illustrating that applicable law and regulation around MEV remains unsettled. Any potential perception of MEV as unfair manipulation, despite its prevalence on many blockchain networks, including the Ethereum network, may lead to adverse publicity, legal and regulatory uncertainty, or discourage users and other stakeholders from engaging with DeFi protocols or the Ethereum network in general, which could cause ether to lose value. In addition, it is possible governmental authorities, regulators or legislators could enact rules which restrict practices associated with MEV, which could diminish the popularity of the Ethereum network among users and validators and could – if it hampers or impedes existing validation processes – potentially even lead to a reduction in network security or cause ether to lose value. MEV is a novel issue, and while it is impossible to predict with certainty how it could affect the price of ether over time, any of these or other outcomes related to MEV may adversely affect the value of ether and the value of the Shares.

The open-source structure of the Ethereum network protocol means that the core developers and other contributors are generally not directly compensated for their contributions in maintaining and developing the Ethereum network protocol. A failure to properly monitor and upgrade the Ethereum network protocol could damage the Ethereum network and an investment in the Trust.

The Ethereum network operates based on an open-source protocol maintained by the core developers and other contributors, largely on the GitHub resource section dedicated to Ethereum network development. As new ether are rewarded solely for validator activity (other than the 2014 pre-mine) and are not sold on an ongoing basis to generate revenue to support development activity, and the Ethereum network protocol itself is made available for free rather than sold or made available subject to licensing or subscription fees and its use does not generate revenues for its development team, the core developers are generally not compensated for maintaining and updating the source code for the Ethereum network protocol. Consequently, there is a lack of financial incentive for developers to maintain or develop the Ethereum network and the core developers may lack the resources to adequately address emerging issues with the Ethereum network protocol. Although the Ethereum network is currently supported by the core developers, there can be no guarantee that such support will continue or be sufficient in the future. For example, there have been recent reports that the number of core developers who have the authority to make amendments to the Ethereum network’s source code in the GitHub repository is relatively small, although there are believed to be a larger number of developers who contribute to the overall development of the source code of the Ethereum network.

Another example of Ethereum's open-source dependencies is that Shipyard, one of the key maintainers of libp2p – the peer-to-peer networking stack under Ethereum –ceased support for Go and JavaScript by September 30, 2025. Libp2p is important for the efficient operation of the Ethereum network, particularly in broadcasting new blocks and validator votes, which illustrates Ethereum's open-source dependencies. A failure to maintain or evolve the network’s open-source components could materially impair the Ethereum network’s functionality and, in turn, adversely impact the price of ether and value of the Shares.

Digital asset networks face significant scaling challenges and efforts to increase the volume and speed of transactions may not be successful.

Many digital asset networks, including the Ethereum network, face significant scaling challenges due to the fact that public blockchains generally face a tradeoff between security and scalability. One means through which public blockchains achieve security is decentralization, meaning that no intermediary is responsible for securing and maintaining these systems. For example, a greater degree of decentralization generally means a given digital asset network is less susceptible to manipulation or capture. In practice, this typically means that every single validator on a given digital asset network is responsible for securing the system by processing every transaction and every single full node is responsible for maintaining a copy of the entire state of the network. As a result, a digital asset network may be limited in the number of transactions it can process by the fact that all validators participate in validating in each block and the capabilities of each single fully participating node.

As of September 30, 2025, the Ethereum network handled approximately 15 transactions per second (according to Dune analytics). In an effort to increase the volume of transactions that can be processed on a given digital asset network, many digital assets are being upgraded with various features to increase the speed and throughput of digital asset transactions. As corresponding increases in throughput lag behind growth in the use of digital asset networks, average fees and settlement times may increase considerably. For example, the Ethereum network has been, at times, at capacity, which has led to increased transaction fees. In December 2017, the popularity of the blockchain-based game Cryptokitties led to significant network congestion on the Ethereum network. The game, which allows players to trade and create virtual kitties, represented by non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”), was reported by some sources to have accounted for more than 10% of the entire Ethereum network traffic at the time causing increases in transaction fees and delays in transaction processing times, and driving Ethereum network traffic to a reported then-all time high. Since January 1, 2020, ether transaction fees have increased from $0.08 average daily transaction fees per ether transaction, to a high of up to approximately $200.06 average daily transaction fees per transaction on May 1, 2022. As of September 30, 2025, ether transaction fees stood at $0.46 per transaction, on average. Increased fees and decreased settlement speeds could preclude certain uses for ether (e.g., micropayments), and could reduce demand for, and the price of, ether, which could adversely impact the value of the Shares.

In the second half of 2020, the Ethereum network began the first of several stages of an upgrade culminating in the Merge. The Merge amended the Ethereum network’s consensus mechanism to a process known as proof-of-stake, and was intended to address the perceived shortcomings of the proof-of-work consensus mechanism in terms of labor intensity and duplicative computational effort expended by validators (known under proof-of-work as “miners”) who did not win the race, under proof of work, to be the first in time to solve the cryptographic puzzle that would allow them to be the only validator permitted to validate the block and receive the resulting block reward (which was only given to the first validator to successfully solve the puzzle and hash a given block, and not to others). Instead, under proof-of-stake, a single validator is randomly selected to solve the cryptographic puzzle needed to validate a block, which it proposes to a committee of other validators, who vote for whether to include the block (or not), which reduces the computational work performed – and energy expended – to validate each block compared to proof-of-work.

Following the Merge, core development of the Ethereum source code has increasingly focused on modifications of the Ethereum protocol to increase speed, throughput and scalability and also improve existing or next generation uses. Future upgrades to the Ethereum protocol and Ethereum blockchain to address scaling issues – such as network congestion, slow throughput and periods of high transaction fees owing to spikes in network demand – have been discussed by network participants, such as sharding. The purpose of sharding is to increase scalability of the Ethereum blockchain by splitting the blockchain into subsections, called shards, and dividing validation responsibility so that a defined subset of validators would be responsible for each shard, rather than all validators being responsible for the entire blockchain, allowing for parallel processing and validation of transactions. However, there appears to be uncertainty and a lack of existing widespread consensus among network participants about how to solve the scaling challenges faced by the Ethereum network.

The rapid development of other competing scalability solutions, such as those which would rely on handling the bulk of computational work relating to transactions or smart contracts and applications built on the Ethereum network (consistent with common usage, all such applications are referred to as “decentralized applications” or “dApps”, whether or not decentralized in fact) outside of the main Ethereum network and Ethereum blockchain, has caused alternatives to sharding to emerge. “Layer 2” is a collective term for solutions which are designed to help increase throughput and reduce transaction fees by handling or validating transactions off the main Ethereum network (known as “Layer 1”) and then attempting to take advantage of the perceived security and integrity advantages of the Layer 1 Ethereum network by uploading the transactions validated on the Layer 2 protocol back to the Layer 1 Ethereum network. The details of how this is done vary significantly between different Layer 2 technologies and implementations. For example, “rollups” perform transaction execution outside the Layer 1 Ethereum network and then post the data, typically in batches, back to the Layer 1 Ethereum network where consensus is reached. “Zero knowledge rollups” are generally designed to run the computation needed to validate the transactions off-chain, on the Layer 2 protocol, and submit a proof of validity of a batch of transactions (not the entire transactions themselves) that is recorded on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. By contrast, “optimistic rollups” assume transactions are valid by default and only run computation, via a fraud proof, in the event of a challenge. Other proposed Layer 2 scaling solutions include, among others, “state channels”, which are designed to allow participants to run a large number of transactions on the Layer 2 side channel protocol and only submit two transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum network (the transaction opening the state channel, and the transaction closing the channel), “side chains”, in which an entire Layer 2 blockchain network with similar capabilities to the existing Layer 1 Ethereum network runs in parallel with the existing Layer 1 Ethereum network and allows smart contracts and dApps to run on the Layer 2 side chain without burdening the main Layer 1 network, and others. To date, the Ethereum network community has not coalesced overwhelmingly around any particular Layer 2 solution, though this could change.

There is no guarantee that any of the mechanisms in place or being explored for increasing the speed and throughput of settlement of Ethereum network transactions will be effective, or how long these mechanisms will take to become effective, which could cause the Ethereum network to not adequately resolve scaling challenges and adversely impact the adoption of ether and the Ethereum network and the value of the Shares. There is no guarantee that any potential scaling solution, whether a change to the Layer 1 Ethereum network like sharding or the introduction of a Layer 2 solution like rollups, state channels or side chains, will achieve widespread adoption. Alternatively, in theory, the widespread adoption of Layer 2 solutions could succeed in reducing congestion on the Layer 1 Ethereum network by moving transactions and computational work to the Layer 2 level and thereby reduce direct transactions on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, but by reducing transactions on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, could reduce demand for ether on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, which could in theory negatively impact the price of ether. It is possible that proposed changes to the Layer 1 Ethereum network could divide the community, potentially even causing a hard fork, or that the decentralized governance of the Ethereum network causes network participants to fail to coalesce overwhelmingly around any particular solution, causing the Ethereum network to suffer reduced adoption or causing nodes, users or validators to migrate to other blockchain networks. It is also possible that scaling solutions could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects or flaws, security risks, or other problems that could cause them to suffer operational disruptions. For example, in April 2024, Starknet, a Layer 2 built on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, suffered an outage reportedly caused by a rounding error bug that halted production of new blocks on Starknet’s Layer 2 blockchain network. Similar outages, bugs, defects, or other problems could affect Layer 2s in the future. Similarly, in multiple instances throughout 2022 and 2023, the Arbitrum Layer 2 network experienced outages due to failures in its primary node responsible for submitting transactions to the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Although the Layer 1 Ethereum network is believed not to have been affected by those outages, problems on Layer 2s in the future could conceivably affect or cause issues for the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Alternatively, if a widely used Layer 2 network were to fail, it could reduce demand for ether because it would eliminate a source of demand for using ether to record transactions from the Layer 2 onto the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Any of the foregoing could adversely affect the price of ether or the value of the Shares.

A temporary or permanent “ fork ” could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

The Ethereum network operates using open-source protocols, meaning that any user can become a node by downloading the Ethereum Client and participating in the Ethereum network, and no permission of a central authority or body is needed to do so. In addition, anyone can propose a modification to the Ethereum network’s source code and then propose that the Ethereum network community support the modification. These proposed modifications to the Ethereum network’s source code, if adopted, can lead to forks (referred to as “planned forks” because they take place through a formal process).

In the case of planned forks, the core developers, including those associated with or funded by the Ethereum Foundation, are able to access and alter the Ethereum network source code and, as a result, they are typically responsible for proposing quasi-official or widely publicized releases of updates and other changes to the Ethereum network’s source code called EIPs. Any user can propose an idea for modifying the Ethereum network’s source code, and the core developers are responsible for merging the proposed idea into the EIP repository on GitHub, where it formally becomes an EIP. However, the release of proposed updates to the Ethereum network’s source code by core developers does not guarantee that the updates will be automatically adopted. The developers of each Ethereum Client must agree to implement the EIP’s changes to the Ethereum network in the source code for their respective client software, nodes must accept the changes made available by the developers of the Ethereum Client software they use by choosing to individually download the modified Ethereum Client software, and ultimately a critical mass of validators and users – such as dApp and smart contract developers, as well as end users of dApps and smart contracts, and anyone else who transacts on the Ethereum blockchain or Ethereum network – must support the shift, or the upgrades will lack adoption.

Typically, in the case of a planned fork, once the EIPs are formally introduced by being merged into the EIP repository on GitHub, a robust debate within the Ethereum community as to the advisability of the proposed change ordinarily follows. Assuming the core developers at the protocol level and the developers of individual Ethereum Clients reach a broad consensus among themselves in favor of introducing the change into the respective source code they are responsible for developing and maintaining, the source code modification will be introduced and made available to download. A modification of the Ethereum network’s source code is only effective with respect to the Ethereum nodes that download it and modify their Ethereum Clients accordingly, and in practice such decisions are heavily influenced by the preferences of validators and users. Typically, after a modification is introduced and if a sufficiently broad critical mass of users and validators support the modification and nodes download the modification into their individual Ethereum Clients, the change is implemented and the Ethereum network continues to operate uninterrupted, assuming there are no software issues (e.g., bugs, outages, etc.). However, if less than a sufficiently broad critical mass (in practice, amounting to a substantial majority) of users and validators support the proposed modification and nodes refuse to download the modification to their Ethereum Clients, and the modification is not backwards compatible with the Ethereum blockchain or network or the Ethereum Clients of nodes prior to their modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “hard fork” of the Ethereum network, with one group of nodes running the pre-modified software, with users and validators continuing to use the pre-modified software, while the other group would adopt and run the modified software. The effect of such a hard fork would be the existence of two versions of the Ethereum network running in parallel on separate networks using separate blockchain ledgers, yet lacking interchangeability. In practice, in a hard fork, the two networks would compete with each other for developers, node operators, users, validators, and adoption, potentially to their mutual detriment (for example, if the number of validators on each network is too small leading to security concerns, as discussed below, or if the number of users on each is reduced compared to the number of users of the single pre-fork blockchain network). Debates relating to hard forks can be contentious and hard fought among network participants and can lead to ill will. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of validating power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual validator or validating pool’s validating power to exceed 50% of the total on either network, thereby making them both more susceptible to attack.

A future fork in the Ethereum network could adversely affect the value of the Shares or the ability of the Trust to operate. A fork could also adversely affect the price of ether at the time of announcement or adoption or subsequently. For example, the announcement of a hard fork could lead to increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset, in anticipation that ownership of the pre-fork digital asset would entitle holders to a new digital asset following the fork. The increased demand for the pre-fork digital asset may cause the price of the digital asset to rise. After the hard fork, it is possible the aggregate price of the two versions of the digital asset running in parallel would be less than the price of the digital asset immediately prior to the fork. Alternatively, as with any change to software code, software upgrades and other changes to the source code or protocols of the Ethereum network could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, create problematic economic incentives which incentivize behavior which has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ether. If a fork caused operational problems for either post-fork network or blockchain, the digital assets associated with the affected network could lose some or all of their value. Furthermore, while the Sponsor will, as permitted by the terms of the Trust Agreement, determine which network is generally accepted as the Ethereum network and should therefore be considered the appropriate network for the Trust’s purposes, and there is no guarantee that the Sponsor will choose the network and the associated digital asset that is ultimately the most valuable fork. Any of these events could therefore adversely impact the value of the Shares.

On March 13, 2024, the Ethereum network underwent a planned fork called “Dencun” implementing a series of EIPs. EIP 4844, which some commentators perceive to be the most significant EIP within the Dencun series, is intended to improve the economics of Layer 2s by reducing transaction fees for Layer 2s who batch transactions executed on the Layer 2s and upload them as a batch (or as a single proof) onto the main Layer 1 Ethereum network. Among other objectives, the Dencun software upgrade was designed to provide Layer 2 scaling solutions a designated storage space on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, called Binary Large Objects (“blobsˮ), which attach large data chunks to transactions on the Layer 1 Ethereum network and are recorded on its blockchain. The data in blobs become inaccessible on the Layer 1 Ethereum network after a temporary period of time (three weeks), unlike the previous method of storing batched data from Layer 2s on the Layer 1 Ethereum network, which was stored permanently. The cost of accessing the temporary storage in blobs is expected by proponents of the Dencun upgrade to be substantially lower than the cost of storing the data on the Ethereum Layer 1 network permanently, making Layer 2s more cost-efficient to operate and, some commentators hope, making them more attractive as a scaling solution. Immediately following the upgrade, some Layer 2s reportedly experienced reduced transaction fees when batching transactions to the main Layer 1 Ethereum network, which in turn lowered the transaction costs for executing transactions on such Layer 2s, but this also is believed to have resulted in ether prices (ether being the native asset of the Layer 1 Ethereum network) dropping as well due, in part, to the reduced demand for ether to pay the transaction costs of recording data on the Layer 1 Ethereum network. Decreased ether prices could have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares. Additionally, some Layer 2s, such as Blast, reportedly experienced outages and other disruptions in the aftermath of the Dencun upgrade, which in the case of Blast halted block production on the Blast Layer 2 blockchain for a period of time, though it was reportedly restored afterward. As with any change to software code, planned forks such as Dencun could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, security risks, problematic incentive structures, or otherwise fail to work as intended or achieve the expected benefits that proponents hope for in the short term or the long term, which could also have an adverse effect on adoption of the Ethereum network and the value of ether, and therefore the Shares.

In September 2022, the Ethereum network transitioned to a proof-of-stake consensus model, in an upgrade referred to as the “Merge.” Following the Merge, a hard fork of the Ethereum network occurred, as a small number of Ethereum validators and network participants planned to maintain the proof-of-work consensus mechanism that was removed as part of the Merge. This version of the network, which is not backwards compatible with the Ethereum Layer 1 blockchain, is considered a forked branch and was rebranded as “Ethereum Proof-of-Work.” To the extent significant developer talent, users or validators abandon the Ethereum Layer 1 network and adopt the Ethereum Proof-of-Work blockchain instead, the value of the Shares could be adversely affected.

The Ethereum core developers have agreed on December 2025 as the date of the upcoming Fusaka hard fork, which is designed to expand data capacity, reinforce defenses against denial-of-service attacks, and introduce new tools for developers and users, among others. The main feature of the Fusaka upgrade is a new way of handling the data in the blobs introduced by the Dencun upgrade, which is expected to create improvements for Layer 2s to store data on the main Ethereum network. As with any change to software code, planned forks such as Fusaka could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, security risks, problematic incentive structures, or otherwise fail to work as intended or achieve the expected benefits that proponents hope for in the short term or the long term, which could also have an adverse effect on adoption of the Ethereum network and the value of ether, and therefore the Shares.

As illustrated by Dencun, the Merge, and Fusaka, the Ethereum network regularly implements planned forks in an effort to achieve its development roadmap, advance the scalability process, and to improve the network generally. For example, in connection with the Ethereum development roadmap, the Ethereum network executed planned forks to transition from the initial Frontier development stage into the Homestead development stage in 2016; to transition from the Homestead development stage to the first sub-stage, Byzantium, of the Metropolis development stage in 2017; to transition from the Byzantium sub-stage to the St. Petersburg sub-stage in early 2019; and to transition from the St. Petersburg sub-stage to the Istanbul sub-phase, in late 2019. In April 2021, the Ethereum network underwent the Berlin and Altair planned forks, among others. In 2022, Ethereum underwent the Bellatrix and Paris planned forks in connection with the Merge. In 2023, Ethereum underwent the Capella and Shanghai planned forks (collectively, “Shapella”), which enabled withdrawals of staked assets to the Ethereum Layer 1 blockchain mainnet for the first time (they had previously been locked on the Beacon Chain testnet following the Merge). On May 7, 2025, “Pectra” which is a combination of the Prague execution layer hard fork and the Electra consensus layer upgrade, went live. Pectra, among other changes, increased the maximum amount of ether that a validator can stake from 32 to 2,048, allowing validators to manage higher balances with the goal of potentially reducing costs; introduce account abstraction, allowing externally owned accounts (EOAs) to temporarily function like smart contracts; and reduce security risks and shorten the wait time for new validators. Any of these or future planned forks could fail to work as intended or could introduce bugs, coding defects, unanticipated or undiscovered problems, flaws, or security risks, create problematic economic incentives which incentivize behavior which has a negative effect on the Ethereum network’s nodes, users, validators, or the Ethereum network as a whole, or otherwise adversely affect, the speed, security, usability, or value of the Ethereum network or ether. Alternatively, such hard forks could be contentious, leading to a split and fracture in the Ethereum community to its collective detriment, as discussed above. Any such outcomes could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Forks may also occur as a digital asset network community’s response to a significant security breach. For example, in July 2016, Ethereum underwent a hard fork between the Layer 1 Ethereum network and a new digital asset running on a “forked” branch of the network, Ethereum Classic, as a result of the Ethereum network community’s response to a significant security breach. In June 2016, an anonymous hacker exploited a smart contract running on the Ethereum network to syphon approximately $60 million of ether held by The DAO, a distributed autonomous organization, into a segregated account. In response to the hack, and after a contentious debate, most participants in the Ethereum community elected to adopt a hard fork that effectively reversed the hack, and this network constitutes the Layer 1 Ethereum network. However, a minority of users continued to develop the original blockchain, now referred to as “Ethereum Classic”, which is not backwards compatible with the Layer 1 Ethereum network and is considered a forked branch, with the native digital asset on that blockchain now referred to as Ethereum Classic, or ETC. ETC now trades on several digital asset platforms. Following the July 2016 hard fork between the Ethereum and Ethereum Classic networks, new security concerns surfaced. Replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued Ethereum exchanges through at least October 2016. An Ethereum exchange announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 Ethereum Classic, worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Similar replay attack concerns occurred in connection with the Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision networks split in November 2018, and security concerns could similarly surface in connection with future hard forks.

An unplanned fork may also occur as a result of an unintentional or unanticipated software flaw in the various versions of Ethereum Client software that nodes run and use to access the Ethereum network. For example, such an unplanned fork reportedly occurred in the Go-Ethereum (“Geth”) client, which is a popular Ethereum Client that many nodes use to access the Ethereum network and whose developers are financially supported by the Ethereum Foundation. In November 2020, a bug was discovered in Geth (but not the other Ethereum Clients at the time, such as Besu, OpenEthereum, and Nethermind), and a patch was released that all nodes using the Geth client were supposed to download and apply simultaneously. However, not all nodes using Geth did so, resulting with the non-patched Geth nodes temporarily running a different version of the Ethereum blockchain than the patched Geth nodes and nodes using other Ethereum Clients. This temporarily created two conflicting versions of the Ethereum blockchain, causing the nodes using the non-patched Geth version to be unable to reach consensus with the rest of the nodes on the Ethereum blockchain, interrupting the non-patch Geth nodes’ access to the Ethereum network. For example, Infura, which is a node operator that provides services to major Ethereum smart contracts, wallet software providers like MetaMask, ether trading platforms, and other market participants, reportedly ran numerous nodes using the Geth client. Infura’s Geth client-running nodes reportedly used the outdated, non-patched Geth version initially, which is said to have caused those nodes to be on the minority blockchain, impacting transaction execution, validation, and recording on the main Layer 1 Ethereum network for Infura’s customers – such as Ethereum-based smart contracts, wallet providers like MetaMask, ether trading platforms, etc. – until Infura was able to apply the software update released by the Geth client developers to Infura’s nodes that use Geth as their Ethereum Client. Ultimately, the problem was reportedly fixed by releasing a new upgraded version of Geth that all nodes using the Geth client were to promptly download. This reportedly harmonized the conflicting versions and restored synchronization among Geth nodes, fixing the problem and restoring access to the Ethereum network, including for Infura and its customers.

In the future, if an accidental or unintentional fork similar to what happened within the Geth client in November 2020 were to reoccur within Geth (or any other major Ethereum Client), or were to happen to the Ethereum network as a whole (instead of being limited to a single Ethereum Client, in this case Geth), such a fork could lead to nodes, users and validators losing confidence in the Ethereum network and abandoning it in favor of other blockchain protocols. Furthermore, it is possible that, in a future unplanned fork, a substantial number of nodes, users and validators could adopt an incompatible version of the digital asset while resisting community-led efforts to merge the two chains, resulting in a permanent fork. Moreover, following the Merge, nodes on the Ethereum network must run two Ethereum Clients, i.e., an Execution Client and a Consensus Client paired together, with the implementations selected at the discretion of the node operator. There are multiple groups independently developing and implementing their respective Execution Clients and Consensus Clients; while some individual Execution Clients or Consensus Clients are more popular or widely adopted than others, there remains heterogeneity among Ethereum Clients. Each Execution Client and Consensus Client needs to interoperate effectively with the other Execution Client and Consensus Client. Although this diversity of Ethereum Clients is perceived by some to promote decentralization of the Ethereum network, it comes at a potential cost: if there are any unanticipated or undiscovered flaws, bugs, software defects, or interoperability failures causing any individual Execution Client to fail to interoperate effectively with any other individual Execution Client or any Consensus Client, the Ethereum network as a whole could suffer an unplanned fork, major disruption, catastrophic outage, system failure, loss of confidence or adoption among users or validators, or a variety of other problems. Any of these events could cause ether to decline in value, adversely affecting the price of Shares.

Protocols may also be cloned. Unlike a fork, which modifies an existing blockchain, and results in two competing networks, each with the same genesis block, a “clone” is a copy of a protocol’s codebase, but results in an entirely new blockchain and new genesis block. Tokens are created solely from the new “clone” network and, in contrast to forks, holders of tokens of the existing network that was cloned do not receive any tokens of the new network. A “clone” results in a competing network that has characteristics substantially similar to the network it was based on, subject to any changes as determined by the developer(s) that initiated the clone. For example, following the DAO hack in July 2016, holders of Ethereum voted on-chain to reverse the hack, effectively causing a hard fork. For the days following the vote, the price of Ethereum rose from $11.65 on July 15, 2016 to $14.66 on July 21, 2016, the day after the first Ethereum Classic block was mined. A clone may also adversely affect the price of ether at the time of announcement or adoption or subsequently. For example, on November 6, 2016, Rhett Creighton, a Zcash developer, cloned the Zcash Network to launch Zclassic, a substantially identical version of the Zcash Network that eliminated the Founders’ Reward. For the days following the date the first Zclassic block was mined, the price of ZEC fell from $504.57 on November 5, 2016 to $236.01 on November 7, 2016 in the midst of a broader sell off of ZEC beginning immediately after the Zcash Network launch on October 28, 2016.

Smart contracts, including those relating to DeFi applications, are a new technology and their ongoing development and operation may result in problems, which could reduce the demand for ether or cause a wider loss of confidence in the Ethereum network, either of which could have an adverse impact on the value of ether.

Smart contracts are programs that run on the Ethereum blockchain that execute automatically when certain conditions are met. Since smart contracts typically cannot be stopped or reversed, vulnerabilities in their programming can have damaging effects. For example, in June 2016, a vulnerability in the smart contracts underlying The DAO allowed an attack by a hacker to syphon approximately $60 million worth of ether from The DAO’s accounts into a segregated account. In the aftermath of the theft, certain core developers and contributors pursued a “hard fork” of the Ethereum network in order to erase any record of the theft. Despite these efforts, the price of ether reportedly dropped approximately 35% in the aftermath of the attack and subsequent hard fork. In addition, in July 2017, a vulnerability in a smart contract for a multi-signature wallet software developed by Parity led to a reportedly $30 million theft of ether, and in November 2017, a new vulnerability in Parity’s wallet software reportedly led to roughly $160 million worth of ether being indefinitely frozen in an account. Furthermore, in April 2018, a batch overflow bug was found in many Ethereum-based ERC20-compatible smart contract tokens that allows hackers to create a large number of smart contract tokens, causing multiple crypto asset platforms worldwide to shut down ERC20-compatible token trading. Similarly, in March 2020, a design flaw in the MakerDAO smart contract caused forced liquidations of crypto assets at significantly discounted prices, resulting in millions of dollars of losses to users who had deposited crypto assets into the smart contract. Other smart contracts, such as bridges between blockchain networks and DeFi protocols have also been manipulated, exploited or used in ways that were not intended or envisioned by their creators such that attackers syphoned over $3.8 billion worth of digital assets from smart contracts in 2022. Problems with the development, deployment, and operation of smart contracts may have an adverse effect on the value of ether.

In some cases, smart contracts can be controlled by one or more “admin keys” or users with special privileges, or “super users.” These users may have the ability to unilaterally make changes to the smart contract, enable or disable features on the smart contract, change how the smart contract receives external inputs and data or transmits ether or other digital assets, and make other changes to the smart contract. Furthermore, in some cases inadequate public information may be available about certain smart contracts or applications, and information asymmetries may exist, even with respect to open-source smart contracts or applications; certain participants may have hidden informational or technological advantages, making for an uneven playing field. There may be opportunities for bad actors to perpetrate fraudulent schemes and engage in illicit activities and other misconduct, such as exit scams and rug pulls (orchestrated by developers and/or influencers who promote a smart contract or application and, ultimately, escape with the money at an agreed time), or Ponzi or similar fraud schemes.

Many DeFi applications are currently deployed on the Ethereum network, and smart contracts relating to DeFi applications currently represent a significant source of demand for ether. DeFi applications may achieve their investment purposes through self-executing smart contracts that may allow users, for example, to invest digital assets in a pool from which other users can borrow without requiring an intermediate party to facilitate these transactions. These investments may earn interest to the investor based on the rates at which borrowers repay the loan, and can generally be withdrawn by the investor. For smart contracts that hold a pool of digital asset reserves, smart contract super users or admin key holders may be able to extract funds from the pool, liquidate assets held in the pool, or take other actions that decrease the value of the digital assets held by the smart contract in reserves. Even for digital assets that have adopted a decentralized governance mechanism, such as smart contracts that are governed by the holders of a governance token, such governance tokens can be concentrated in the hands of a small group of core community members, who would be able to make similar changes unilaterally to the smart contract. If any such super user or group of core members unilaterally make adverse changes to a smart contract, the design, functionality, features and value of the smart contract, its related digital assets may be harmed. In addition, assets held by the smart contract in reserves may be stolen, misused, burnt, locked up or otherwise become unusable and irrecoverable. Super users can also become targets of hackers and malicious attackers. If an attacker is able to access or obtain the super user privileges of a smart contract, or if a smart contract’s super users or core community members take actions that adversely affect the smart contract, users who transact with the smart contract may experience decreased functionality of the smart contract or may suffer a partial or total loss of any digital assets they have used to transact with the smart contract. Furthermore, the underlying smart contracts may be insecure, contain bugs or other vulnerabilities, or otherwise may not work as intended. Any of the foregoing could cause users of the DeFi application to be negatively affected or could cause the DeFi application to be the subject of negative publicity. Because DeFi applications may be built on the Ethereum network and represent a significant source of demand for ether, public confidence in the Ethereum network itself could be negatively affected, such sources of demand could diminish, and the value of ether could decrease. Similar risks apply to any smart contract or decentralized application, not just DeFi applications.

The complexity and interconnectedness of digital asset networks, applications, and economic systems enables new forms of malicious attacks that leverage a feature or vulnerability of one system to attack another. Such an attack may take the form of a temporary manipulation of the price of certain digital assets that trigger second order behaviors, such as automatic collateral liquidations on decentralized applications or digital asset trading platforms. Such an attack could adversely affect investments. A malicious actor can exploit the structure of one or a series of smart contracts or applications in ways that do not technically constitute exploitation of a “bug” or flaw in the smart contract or application. For example, such an exploit has occurred repeatedly in the Ethereum DeFi ecosystem, whereby a decentralized trading platform or lending application is designed to reference an external pricing source of a particular digital asset to determine when to liquidate collateral. By manipulating the price of the particular digital asset on a third-party platform (such as a digital asset trading platform), the pricing source used by the decentralized trading platform or application is consequently manipulated, which then leads to uneconomic collateral liquidations on the decentralized trading platform or application. Such liquidations may be processed automatically and could have a material adverse effect on our investments and trading strategies.

Unlike some digital assets, which have a limit on outstanding supply, there is no limit on ether supply.

Some digital assets have a limit on outstanding supply (“hard cap”) on the supply of outstanding digital assets. There is no hard cap on the supply of ether, which will continue to be issued as a reward to validators for new blocks. The price of many digital assets like ether is heavily influenced by supply and demand. If the supply of ether is inflationary, then in the absence of deflationary forces, ether could lose value, assuming the same amount of demand.

The value of the Shares relates directly to the value of ether, the value of which may be highly volatile and subject to fluctuations due to a number of factors.

The value of the Shares relates directly to the value of the ether held by the Trust and fluctuations in the price of ether could adversely affect the value of the Shares. The market price of ether may be highly volatile, and subject to a number of factors, including:

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an increase in the global ether supply or a decrease in global ether demand;

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market conditions of, and overall sentiment towards, the digital assets and blockchain technology industry;

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trading activity on digital asset platforms, which, in many cases, are largely unregulated or may be subject to manipulation;

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the adoption of ether as a medium of exchange, store-of-value or other consumptive asset and the maintenance and development of the open-source software protocol of the Ethereum network, and their ability to meet user demands;

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manipulative trading activity on digital asset platforms, which, in many cases, are largely unregulated;

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the lack of a hard cap on ether supply;

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forks in the Ethereum network;

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changes or instability in the leadership of the Ethereum Foundation;

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investors’ expectations with respect to interest rates, the rates of inflation of fiat currencies or ether, and digital asset exchange rates;

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consumer preferences and perceptions of ether specifically and digital assets generally;

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negative events, publicity, and social media coverage relating to the digital assets and blockchain technology industry;

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fiat currency withdrawal and deposit policies on digital asset platforms;

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the liquidity of digital asset markets and any increase or decrease in trading volume or market making on digital asset markets;

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business failures, bankruptcies, hacking, fraud, crime, government investigations, or other negative developments affecting digital asset businesses, including digital asset platforms, banks or other financial institutions and service providers which provide services to the digital asset industry;

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the use of leverage in digital asset markets, including the unwinding of positions, “margin calls,” collateral liquidations and similar events;

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investment and trading activities of large or active consumer and institutional users, speculators, validators, and investors;

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a “short squeeze” resulting from speculation on the price of ether, if aggregate short exposure exceeds the number of Shares available for purchase;

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an active derivatives market for ether or for digital assets generally;

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monetary policies of governments, legislation or regulation, tariffs, trade restrictions, currency devaluations and revaluations;

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regulatory measures or enforcement actions, if any, that restrict the use of ether as a form of payment or the purchase of ether on the digital asset markets;

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global or regional political, economic or financial conditions, events and situations, or major public issues;

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fees associated with processing an ether transaction and the speed at which ether transactions are settled;

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the maintenance, troubleshooting, and development of the Ethereum network including by validators and developers worldwide;

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the ability for the Ethereum network to attract and retain validators to secure and confirm transactions accurately and efficiently;

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ongoing technological viability and security of the Ethereum network and ether transactions, including vulnerabilities against hacks and scalability;

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governmental or regulatory actions by, or investigations or litigation in, countries around the world targeting well-known decentralized applications or smart contracts that are built on the Ethereum network, or other developments or problems, and associated publicity, involving or affecting such decentralized applications or smart contracts;

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financial strength of market participants;

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the availability and cost of funding and capital;

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the liquidity and credit risk of digital asset platforms;

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interruptions in service from or closures or failures of major digital asset platforms or their banking partners, or outages or system failures affecting the Ethereum network;

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decreased confidence in digital assets and digital assets platforms;

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poor risk management or fraud by entities in the digital asset ecosystem;

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increased competition from other digital assets or networks, including other blockchain networks combining smart contracts, programmable scripting languages, and an associated runtime environment, with blockchain-based recordkeeping, particularly where such other blockchain networks are able to offer users access to a larger consumer user base, greater efficiency, reliability, or processing speed, more economical transaction processing fees, or any other more favorable attributes, than the Ethereum network; and

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the Trust’s own acquisitions or dispositions of ether, since there is no limit on the number of ether that the Trust may acquire, and the Sponsor is an affiliate of BlackRock, which is a prominent participant in financial markets.

Although returns from investing in ether have at times diverged from those associated with other asset classes to a greater or lesser extent, there can be no assurance that there will be any such divergence in the future, either generally or with respect to any particular asset class, or that price movements will not be correlated. In addition, there is no assurance that ether will maintain its value in the long-, intermediate- or short- term. In the event that the price of ether declines, the Sponsor expects the value of the Shares to decline proportionately.

The value of ether as represented by the Index or other pricing source used by the Trust may also be subject to momentum pricing due to speculation regarding future appreciation in value, leading to greater volatility that could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Momentum pricing typically is associated with growth stocks and other assets whose valuation, as determined by the investing public, accounts for future appreciation in value, if any. The Sponsor believes that momentum pricing of ether has resulted, and may continue to result, in speculation regarding future appreciation in the value of ether, inflating and making the Index more volatile. As a result, ether may be more likely to fluctuate in value due to changing investor confidence, which could impact future appreciation or depreciation in the Index or other pricing source used by the Trust and could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Due to the unregulated nature and lack of transparency surrounding the operations of digital asset platforms, which may experience fraud, manipulation, security failures or operational problems, as well as the wider ether market, the value of ether and, consequently, the value of the Shares may be adversely affected, causing losses to Shareholders.

Digital asset platforms are relatively new and, in some cases, unregulated. Many operate outside the United States. Furthermore, while many prominent digital asset platforms provide the public with significant information regarding their ownership structure, management teams, corporate practices and regulatory compliance, many digital asset platforms do not provide this information. Digital asset platforms may not be subject to, or may not comply with, regulation in a similar manner as other regulated trading platforms, such as national securities exchanges or designated contract markets. As a result, the marketplace may lose confidence in digital asset platforms, including prominent platforms that handle a significant volume of ether trading.

Many digital asset platforms are unlicensed, may be unregulated, may be subject to regulation in a relevant jurisdiction, but may or may not be in compliance therewith, may operate without extensive supervision by governmental authorities, and do not provide the public with significant information regarding their ownership structure, management team, corporate practices, cybersecurity, and regulatory compliance. In particular, those located outside the United States may be subject to significantly less stringent regulatory and compliance requirements in their local jurisdictions, and may take the position that they are not subject to laws and regulations that would apply to a national securities exchange or designated contract market in the United States, or may, as a practical matter, be beyond the ambit of U.S. regulators. As a result, trading activity on or reported by these digital asset platforms is generally significantly less regulated than trading in regulated U.S. securities and commodities markets, and may reflect behavior that would be prohibited in regulated U.S. trading venues. For example, in 2019 there were reports claiming that 80.95% of bitcoin trading volume on digital asset platforms was false or noneconomic in nature, with specific focus on unregulated platforms located outside of the United States. Such reports alleged that certain overseas platforms have displayed suspicious trading activity suggestive of a variety of manipulative or fraudulent practices, such as fake or artificial trading volume or trading volume based on non-economic “wash trading” (where offsetting trades are entered into for other than bona fide reasons, such as the desire to inflate reported trading volumes), and attributed such manipulative or fraudulent behavior to motives like the incentive to attract listing fees from token issuers who seek the most liquid and high-volume platforms on which to list their coins.

Other academics and market observers have put forth evidence to support claims that manipulative trading activity has occurred on certain digital asset platforms. For example, in a 2017 paper titled “Price Manipulation in the Bitcoin Ecosystem” sponsored by the Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center at Tel Aviv University, a group of researchers used publicly available trading data, as well as leaked transaction data from a 2014 Mt. Gox security breach, to identify and analyze the impact of “suspicious trading activity” on Mt. Gox between February and November 2013, which, according to the authors, caused the price of bitcoin to increase from around $150 to more than $1,000 over a two-month period. In August 2017, it was reported that a trader or group of traders nicknamed “Spoofy” was placing large orders on Bitfinex without actually executing them, presumably in order to influence other investors into buying or selling by creating a false appearance that greater demand existed in the market. In December 2017, an anonymous blogger (publishing under the pseudonym Bitfinex’d) cited publicly available trading data to support his or her claim that a trading bot nicknamed “Picasso” was pursuing a paint-the-tape-style manipulation strategy by buying and selling bitcoin and bitcoin cash between affiliated accounts in order to create the appearance of substantial trading activity and thereby influence the price of such assets. Although bitcoin and ether are different assets, there can be no assurance that ether prices may not at times be subject to similar activity. Even in the United States, there have been allegations of wash trading even on regulated venues. Any actual or perceived false trading in the digital asset platform market, and any other fraudulent or manipulative acts and practices, could adversely affect the value of digital assets and/or negatively affect the market perception of digital assets.

The ether market globally and in the United States is not subject to comparable regulatory guardrails as exist in regulated securities markets. Furthermore, many ether trading venues lack certain safeguards put in place by exchanges for more traditional assets to enhance the stability of trading on the exchanges and prevent “flash crashes,” such as limit-down circuit breakers, as demonstrated by the October 2025 Flash Crash. As a result, the prices of ether on trading venues may be subject to larger and/or more frequent sudden declines than assets traded on more traditional exchanges. Tools to detect and deter fraudulent or manipulative trading activities such as market manipulation, front-running of trades, and wash-trading may not be available to or employed by digital asset platforms or may not exist at all. The SEC has identified possible sources of fraud and manipulation in the digital asset markets generally, including, among others (1) “wash trading”; (2) persons with a dominant position in a digital asset manipulating the digital asset’s pricing; (3) hacking of the digital asset’s peer-to-peer network, protocols and trading platforms; (4) malicious control of the digital asset network; (5) trading based on material, non-public information (for example, plans of market participants to significantly increase or decrease their holdings in the digital asset, new sources of demand for the digital asset, etc. or other events which could effect the price of the digital asset) or based on the dissemination of false and misleading information; (6) manipulative activity involving purported “stablecoins”, the activities of stablecoin issuers and their regulatory treatment”); and (7) fraud and manipulation at digital asset trading platforms. The effect of potential market manipulation, front-running, wash-trading, and other fraudulent or manipulative trading practices may inflate the volumes actually present in the digital asset markets and/or cause distortions in price, which could adversely affect the Trust or cause losses to Shareholders.

In addition, over the past several years, some digital asset platforms have been closed due to fraud and manipulative activity, business failure or security breaches. In many of these instances, the customers of such digital asset platforms were not compensated or made whole for the partial or complete losses of their account balances in such digital asset platforms. While, generally speaking, smaller digital asset platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger digital asset platforms more stable, larger digital asset platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers and malware and their shortcomings or ultimate failures are more likely to have contagion effects on the digital asset ecosystem, and therefore may be more likely to be targets of regulatory enforcement action. For example, the collapse of Mt. Gox, which filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan in late February 2014, demonstrated that even the largest digital asset platforms could be subject to abrupt failure with consequences for both users of digital asset platforms and the digital asset industry as a whole. In particular, in the two weeks that followed the February 7, 2014 halt of bitcoin withdrawals from Mt. Gox, the value of one bitcoin fell on other platforms from around $795 on February 6, 2014 to $578 on February 20, 2014. Additionally, in January 2015, Bitstamp announced that approximately 19,000 bitcoin had been stolen from its operational or “hot” wallets. Further, in August 2016, it was reported that almost 120,000 bitcoins worth around $78 million were stolen from Bitfinex, a large digital asset platform. The value of bitcoin and other digital assets immediately decreased over 10% following reports of the theft at Bitfinex. Regulatory enforcement actions have followed, such as in July 2017, when FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-E, a now defunct digital asset platform, for facilitating crimes such as drug sales and ransomware attacks. In addition, in December 2017, Yapian, the operator of Seoul-based digital asset platform Youbit, suspended digital asset trading and filed for bankruptcy following a hack that resulted in a loss of 17% of Yapian’s assets. Following the hack, Youbit users were allowed to withdraw approximately 75% of the digital assets in their platform accounts, with any potential further distributions to be made following Yapian’s pending bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, in January 2018, the Japanese digital asset platform, Coincheck, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $535 million, and in February 2018, the Italian digital asset platform Bitgrail, was hacked, resulting in approximately $170 million in losses. In May 2019, one of the world’s largest digital asset platforms, Binance, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $40 million. In November 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), one of the largest digital asset platforms by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals amid rumors of the company’s liquidity issues and likely insolvency, which were subsequently corroborated by its CEO. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resigned, and FTX and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States, while other affiliates entered insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceedings around the globe, following which the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal fraud and other charges, and the SEC and CFTC brought civil securities and commodities fraud charges, against certain of FTX’s and its affiliates’ senior executives, including its former CEO. Around the same time, there were reports that approximately $300-600 million of digital assets were removed from FTX and the full facts remain unknown, including whether such removal was the result of a hack, theft, insider activity, or other improper behavior. On February 21, 2025, Bybit, a centralized platform for exchanging digital assets, announced that more than $1.4 billion in ether had been stolen from its platform. Hackers were able to manipulate Bybit’s transfer process to authorize and complete the illicit transaction. The incident has resulted in renewed concerns over the security of digital asset platforms.

Negative perception, a lack of stability and standardized regulation in the digital asset markets and the closure or temporary shutdown of digital asset platforms due to fraud, business failure, security breaches or government mandated regulation, and associated losses by customers, may reduce confidence in the Ethereum network and result in greater volatility or decreases in the prices of ether. Furthermore, the closure or temporary shutdown of a digital asset platform used in calculating the Index may result in a loss of confidence in the Trust’s ability to determine its NAV on a daily basis. The potential consequences of a digital asset platform’s failure could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Prices of ether may be affected due to stablecoins (including Tether and USDC), the activities of stablecoin issuers and their regulatory treatment.

While the Trust does not invest in stablecoins, it may nonetheless be exposed to risks that stablecoins pose for the ether market and other digital asset markets. Stablecoins are digital assets designed to have a stable value over time as compared to typically volatile digital assets and are typically marketed as being pegged to a fiat currency, such as the U.S. dollar, at a certain value. Although the prices of stablecoins are intended to be stable, their market value may fluctuate. This volatility has in the past apparently impacted the price of ether. Stablecoins are a relatively new phenomenon, and it is impossible to know all of the risks that they could pose to participants in the ether market. In addition, some have argued that some stablecoins, particularly Tether, are improperly issued without sufficient backing in a way that, when the stablecoin is used to pay for bitcoin, could cause artificial rather than genuine demand for bitcoin, artificially inflating the price of bitcoin, and if true, there is no assurance similar dynamics would not be at work in the market for ether. There have been reports that those associated with certain stablecoins may be involved in laundering money. On February 17, 2021, the New York Attorney General entered into an agreement with Tether’s operators, including Bitfinex, requiring them to cease any further trading activity with New York persons and pay $18.5 million in penalties for false and misleading statements made regarding the assets backing Tether. On October 15, 2021, the CFTC announced a settlement with Tether’s operators, Tether Holdings Limited, Tether Operations Limited, Tether Limited, and Tether International Limited, in which they agreed to pay $42.5 million in fines to settle charges that, among others, Tether’s claims that it maintained sufficient U.S. dollar reserves to back every Tether stablecoin in circulation with the “equivalent amount of corresponding fiat currency” held by Tether were untrue. Bitfinex also agreed to pay the CFTC a $1.5 million fine to settle charges that Bitfinex offered off-exchange leveraged, margined, or financed transactions involving cryptocurrencies, including ether, with U.S. customers who were not eligible contract participants and accepted funds (including in the form of Tether stablecoins) and orders in connection with such illegal off-exchange transactions, triggering an obligation to register with the CFTC, which the CFTC order asserts it violated. The CFTC previously fined Bitfinex in 2016 on similar charges. In addition, a large amount of Tether is issued as ERC-20 tokens on the Ethereum network. If Tether were to no longer be issued or operating on the Ethereum network, there would be no need to use ether to pay the gas fees needed to record ERC-20 Tether transactions on the Ethereum blockchain, and a substantial source of demand for ether could be eliminated, which could cause the price of ether to decrease, affecting the value of the Shares.

USDC is a reserve-backed stablecoin issued by Circle Internet Financial that is commonly used as a method of payment in digital asset markets, including the ether market. An affiliate of the Sponsor acts as investment manager to a Money Market Fund, the Circle Reserve Fund, which the issuer of USDC uses to hold cash, U.S. Treasury bills, notes and other obligations issued or guaranteed as to principal and interest by the U.S. Treasury, and repurchase agreements secured by such obligations or cash, which serve as reserves backing USDC stablecoins. While USDC is designed to maintain a stable value at 1 U.S. dollar at all times, on March 10, 2023, the value of USDC fell below $1.00 for multiple days after Circle Internet Financial disclosed that US$3.3 billion of the USDC reserves were held at Silicon Valley Bank, which had entered FDIC receivership earlier that day. Stablecoins are reliant on the U.S. banking system and U.S. treasuries, and the failure of either to function normally could impede the function of stablecoins, and therefore could adversely affect the value of the Shares. An affiliate of the Sponsor has a minority equity interest in the issuer of USDC. Similar to Tether, a large amount of USDC is issued as ERC-20 tokens on the Ethereum network. If USDC were to no longer be issued or operating on the Ethereum network, there would be no need to use ether to pay the gas fees needed to record ERC-20 USDC transactions on the Ethereum blockchain, and a substantial source of demand for ether could be eliminated, which could cause the price of ether to decrease, affecting the value of the Shares.

Given the foundational role that stablecoins play in global digital asset markets, their fundamental liquidity can have a dramatic impact on the broader digital asset market, including the market for ether. A significant portion of the digital asset market continues to depend on stablecoins such as Tether and USDC. As such, any disruption in the operation or perceived stability of these stablecoins such as a disorderly de-pegging event or a loss of market confidence resulting in a run on reserves could lead to substantial market volatility across digital assets more broadly.

Additional risks such as operational failures (e.g., technical issues that prevent settlement), concerns regarding the adequacy or transparency of reserve assets backing stablecoins, the use of unbacked or undercollateralized stablecoins in potentially manipulative trading practices and regulatory scrutiny of stablecoin issuers or intermediaries, including exchanges that facilitate stablecoin transactions, may also adversely affect market confidence and liquidity. Further, these risks are underscored by recent legislative developments. On July 18, 2025, the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act of 2025 (“GENIUS Act”) was enacted, establishing a federal regulatory framework for payment stablecoins. The GENIUS Act will become effective on July 18, 2028. The GENIUS Act prohibits the issuance or use of payment stablecoins unless the issuer obtains a qualifying license and complies with a range of regulatory requirements, including reserve backing with liquid assets, redemption rights, governance standards, and operational transparency. The GENIUS Act also restricts the payment of interest on stablecoins and imposes oversight on both bank and nonbank issuers. The enactment of the GENIUS Act, or the removal or migration of prominent stablecoins from the Ethereum network, could reduce the willingness of market participants to engage in digital asset transactions that rely on stablecoins, diminish liquidity in the ether market, and adversely affect the price of ether. Any such developments could, in turn, materially and adversely impact the value of the Shares.

Digital asset treasury companies risk.

In recent times, a number of companies engaged in businesses outside the digital assets industry have begun to hold their corporate treasuries in digital assets instead of in fiat currency (“digital asset treasury companies”). In some cases, these companies have raised funds through financing or securities offerings and applied the proceeds to purchase digital assets, including ether.

Digital asset treasury companies are a relatively new phenomenon and it is difficult to predict their long-term sustainability, and therefore their impact to digital asset markets, and to the Trust. Digital asset treasury companies may increase procyclical dynamics in the market because they may purchase digital assets, such as ether, when prices are rising and they may in certain circumstances be forced to sell such assets when prices are decreasing, potentially causing downward pressure on ether prices in a falling market (causing prices to fall faster than they otherwise would). Digital asset treasury companies could cause greater volatility in digital asset markets, including markets for ether. Negative events or sentiment surrounding digital asset treasury companies could affect the market for ether. The increase of consolidated positions in ether held by digital asset treasury companies could affect the operation of the Ethereum blockchain. One digital asset treasury company, BitMine Immersion Technology Inc. ("BitMine Immersion"), held approximately 2.8% of ether’s supply as of November 3, 2025. If BitMine Immersion or another similarly situated digital asset treasury company begins to operate validators, it could gain influence in how the Ethereum blockchain operates. The foregoing or similar events involving digital asset treasury companies could adversely affect holders of Shares in the Trust.

Operational cost may exceed the award for validating transaction, and increased transaction fees may adversely affect the usage of the Ethereum network.

If transaction confirmation fees become too high, the marketplace may be reluctant to use ether. This may result in decreased usage and limit expansion of the Ethereum network in the retail, commercial and payments space, adversely impacting investment in the Trust. Conversely, if the reward for validators or the value of the transaction fees is insufficient to motivate validators, they may cease to validate transactions.

Ultimately, if the awards of new ether costs of validating transactions grow disproportionately, validators may operate at a loss, transition to other networks, or cease operations altogether. Each of these outcomes could, in turn, slow transaction validation and usage, which could have a negative impact on the Ethereum network and could adversely affect the value of the ether held by the Trust. As a result of Ethereum’s fee burning mechanism, the incentives for validators to validate transactions with higher gas fees are reduced, since those validators would not receive those gas fees.

An acute cessation of validator operations would reduce the collective processing power on the Ethereum network, which would adversely affect the transaction verification process by temporarily decreasing the speed at which blocks are added to the blockchain and make the blockchain more vulnerable to a malicious actor obtaining control in excess of 50% of the processing power on the blockchain. Reductions in processing power could result in material, though temporary, delays in transaction confirmation time. Any reduction in confidence in the transaction verification process may adversely impact the value of Shares of the Trust or the ability of the Sponsor to operate.

If regulators or public utilities take actions that restrict or otherwise impact mining activities, such actions could result in decreased security of a digital asset network, including the Ethereum network , which could adversely affect the value of the Shares.

Concerns have been raised about the electricity required to secure and maintain digital asset networks. Although measuring the electricity consumed by the process of securing and maintaining digital asset networks is difficult because these operations are performed by various machines with varying levels of efficiency, the process consumes a significant amount of energy. Driven by concerns around energy consumption and the impact on public utility companies, various states and cities have implemented, or are considering implementing, moratoriums on mining activity in their jurisdictions.

Ethereum uses a system called proof-of-stake to validate transaction information. Anyone that owns the specific proof-of-stake digital asset can participate in staking, subject to certain minimum amounts as determined by the applicable proof-of-stake digital asset. Generally, the higher the amount staked by any actor, the higher the chances of being chosen by the applicable blockchain to act as validator and reaping validator rewards; in other words, the higher the stake, the higher the chances of earning a staking reward. This has led to the creation of staking pools, where third parties combine smaller stakes into large pools, which leads to higher returns for owners of small stakes, in return for a fee collected by the third parties.

Other digital asset networks may use a system called proof-of-work to validate transaction information. It’s called proof-of-work because solving the encrypted hash takes time and energy, which acts as proof that work was done. Proof of work requires users to mine or complete complex computational puzzles before submitting new transactions to the network.

Proof-of-stake digital assets allow people to pledge or lock up some of their holdings as a way of vouching for the accuracy of newly added information. Meanwhile, proof-of-work digital assets require people to solve complex cryptographic puzzles — which can incur significant energy costs — before they’re allowed to propose a new block. This expenditure of time, computing power and energy is intended to make the cost of fraud higher than the potential rewards of a dishonest action.

The operations of digital asset networks can consume significant amounts of electricity, which may have a negative environmental impact and give rise to public opinion against allowing, or government regulations restricting, the use of electricity for mining operations, in the case of proof-of-work networks. Additionally, miners on proof-of-work networks may be forced to cease operations during an electricity shortage or power outage, or if electricity prices increase where the mining activities are performed.

The operations of the Ethereum network and other digital asset networks may also consume significant amounts of energy, even though the Ethereum blockchain is generally considered to consume significantly less energy than other digital asset networks, such as the Bitcoin blockchain, due to its of proof-of-stake, rather than proof-of-work, transaction validation mechanism. Further, in addition to the direct energy costs of performing calculations on any given digital asset network, there are indirect costs that impact a network’s total energy consumption, including the costs of cooling the machines that perform these calculations.

Notwithstanding Ethereum’s move to proof-of-stake, if regulators or public utilities take action that restricts or otherwise impacts mining activities generally, such actions could result in decreased security of a digital asset network, including the Ethereum network, and consequently adversely impact the value of the Shares. This could adversely affect the price of ether, or the operation of the Ethereum network, and accordingly decrease the value of the Shares, by creating negative sentiment around digital assets generally.

The limited ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions of Shares could have adverse consequences for the Trust.

Authorized Participants must be registered broker-dealers. Registered broker-dealers are subject to various requirements of the federal securities laws and rules, including financial responsibility rules such as the customer protection rule, the net capital rule and recordkeeping requirements. On May 15, 2025, the Division of Trading and Markets of the SEC and the Office of General Counsel of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) stated that broker-dealers are permitted to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions in connection with spot crypto exchange-traded products; however, there has yet to be definitive regulatory guidance on and the specific details of how registered broker-dealers can comply with SEC rules with regard to transacting in or holding spot ether. Until further regulatory clarity emerges regarding whether registered broker-dealers can hold and deal in ether under such rules, there is a risk that registered broker-dealers participating in the in-kind creation or redemption of Shares for ether may be unable to demonstrate compliance with such requirements. While compliance with rules such as the customer protection rule, the net capital rule and recordkeeping requirements would be the broker-dealer’s responsibility, a national securities exchange is required to enforce compliance by its member broker-dealers with applicable federal securities law and rules. As of the date of this report, Virtu Americas LLC, has executed an agreement that gives them the ability to conduct creations and redemptions in-kind for ether in addition to conducting creations and redemptions for cash.

Even with the recent approval of in-kind creations and redemptions, the Trust’s limited ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions could result in the exchange-traded product arbitrage mechanism failing to function as efficiently as it otherwise would, leading to the potential for the Shares to trade at premiums or discounts to the NAV, and such premiums or discounts could be substantial. See “—The use of cash creations and redemptions, as opposed to in-kind creations and redemptions, may adversely affect the arbitrage transactions by Authorized Participants intended to keep the price of the Shares closely linked to the price of ether and, as a result, the price of the Shares may fall or otherwise diverge from NAV.” Furthermore, if cash creations or redemptions are unavailable, either due to the Sponsor’s decision to reject or suspend such orders, the unavailability of Ether Trading Counterparties or the Prime Execution Agent’s services, or otherwise, Authorized Participants will be limited in their ability to redeem or create Shares, in which case the arbitrage mechanism may not function as efficiently. This could result in impaired liquidity for the Shares, wider bid/ask spreads in secondary trading of the Shares and greater costs to investors and other market participants. In addition, the Trust’s limited ability to facilitate in-kind creations and redemptions, and resulting relative reliance on cash creations and redemptions, could cause the Sponsor to halt or suspend the creation or redemption of Shares during times of market volatility or turmoil, among other consequences.

Any of these factors could adversely affect the performance of the Trust and the value of the Shares.

If the Custodian Agreement, the Prime Execution Agent Agreement, the Authorized Participant Agreements or the Ether Trading Counterparty Agreements are terminated or the Custodians, the Prime Execution Agent, the Authorized Participants or the Ether Trading Counterparties fail to provide services as required, the Trustee may operationalize the Additional Ether Custodian or may need to find and appoint replacement custodians, an execution agent, authorized participants or ether trading counterparties, which could pose a challenge to the safekeeping of the Trust ’ s ether, the Trust ’ s ability to create and redeem Shares and the Trust ’ s ability to continue to operate may be adversely affected.

The Trust is dependent on the Ether Custodian, which is Coinbase Custody, and the Prime Execution Agent, Coinbase Inc. to operate. Coinbase Custody performs essential functions in terms of safekeeping the Trust’s ether in the Vault Balance, and its affiliate, Coinbase Inc., in its capacity as Prime Execution Agent, facilitates the buying and selling of ether by the Trust in connection with creations and redemptions, the selling of ether to pay the Sponsor’s Fee, any other Trust expenses, to the extent applicable, and in extraordinary circumstances, to liquidate the Trust’s ether. If Coinbase Custody or Coinbase Inc. fails to perform the functions they perform for the Trust, the Trust may be unable to operate or create or redeem Baskets, which could force the Trust to liquidate or adversely affect the price of the Shares.

On March 22, 2023, the Prime Execution Agent and its parent, Coinbase Global, Inc. (such parent, “Coinbase Global” and together with Coinbase Inc., the “Relevant Coinbase Entities”) received a “Wells Notice” from the SEC staff stating that the SEC staff made a “preliminary determination” to recommend that the SEC file an enforcement action against the Relevant Coinbase Entities alleging violations of the federal securities laws, including the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. According to Coinbase Global’s public reporting company disclosure, based on discussions with the SEC staff, the Relevant Coinbase Entities believe these potential enforcement actions would relate to aspects of the Relevant Coinbase Entities’ Coinbase Prime service, spot market, staking service Coinbase Earn, and Coinbase Wallet, and the potential civil action may seek injunctive relief, disgorgement, and civil penalties. On June 6, 2023, the SEC filed a complaint against the Relevant Coinbase Entities in federal district court in the Southern District of New York, alleging, inter alia: (i) that Coinbase Inc. has violated the Exchange Act by failing to register with the SEC as a national securities exchange, broker-dealer, and clearing agency, in connection with activities involving certain identified digital assets that the SEC’s complaint alleges are securities, (ii) that Coinbase Inc. has violated the Securities Act by failing to register with the SEC the offer and sale of its staking program, and (iii) that Coinbase Global is jointly and severally liable as a control person under the Exchange Act for Coinbase Inc.’s violations of the Exchange Act to the same extent as Coinbase Inc. The SEC’s complaint against the Relevant Coinbase Entities did not allege that ether is a security, nor did it allege that Coinbase Inc’s activities involving ether caused the alleged registration violations, and the Ether Custodian was not named as a defendant. The SEC’s complaint sought a permanent injunction against the Relevant Coinbase Entities to prevent them from violations of the Exchange Act or Securities Act, disgorgement, civil monetary penalties, and such other relief as the court deems appropriate or necessary.

On February 27, 2025, the SEC and Coinbase Inc. and Coinbase Global filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice, and the case has been dismissed. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the SEC enforcement action, Coinbase Inc. is currently, and it and the Ether Custodian from time to time may be, subject in the future, to a variety of other litigation. Although the Trust does not presently anticipate such an outcome, there can be no assurance that in the future Coinbase Inc., as Prime Execution Agent, or Coinbase Custody, as the Ether Custodian, will not be required, as a result of a judicial determination, or will not choose, to restrict or curtail the services they offer, or their financial condition and ability to provide services to the Trust will not be negatively affected. If in the future the Prime Execution Agent or the Ether Custodian were to be required or choose to restrict or curtail the services they offer for any reason, whether related to litigation or otherwise, it could negatively affect the Trust’s ability to operate or process creations or redemptions of Baskets, which could force the Trust to liquidate or adversely affect the price of the Shares.

Alternatively, the Trustee could decide to replace Coinbase Custody as the Ether Custodian of the Trust’s ether, pursuant to the Custodian Agreement. Similarly, Coinbase Custody or Coinbase Inc. could terminate services under the Custodian Agreement or the Prime Execution Agent Agreement respectively upon providing the applicable notice to the Trust for any reason, or immediately for Cause. A Termination for Cause is defined in the Custodian Agreement and Prime Execution Agent Agreement as (i) the Trust materially breaching any provision of the Custodian Agreement and such failure is not cured within 30 calendar days after notice of such breach is provided by Coinbase Inc. to the Trust, or the Trust materially breaching any provision of the Prime Execution Agent Agreement and such breach remains uncured for 10 calendar days following notice; (ii) the Trust becomes bankrupt or insolvent; or (iii) the Trust fails to pay and settle in full its obligations to Coinbase Custody’s affiliate, the Trade Credit Lender (as defined below), which may, from time to time, provide financing to the Trust in the form of Trade Credits. In the event that the Trust transfers maintenance responsibilities of the Trust’s account at the Ether Custodian to another custodian (or transfers the Trust’s ether from the Ether Custodian or the Prime Execution Agent to the Additional Ether Custodian or vice versa), the Trust’s ether would be subject to a risk of loss during the transfer, which, if such risk eventuates, could have a negative impact on the performance of the Shares or result in loss of the Trust’s assets. As Prime Execution Agent, Coinbase Inc. does not guarantee uninterrupted access to the Trading Platform or the services it provides to the Trust as Prime Execution Agent. Under certain circumstances, Coinbase Inc. is permitted to halt or suspend trading on its trading platform, or impose limits on the amount or size of, or reject, the Trust’s orders, including in the event of, among others, (a) delays, suspension of operations, failure in performance, or interruption of service that are directly due to a cause or condition beyond the reasonable control of Coinbase Inc, (b) the Trust has engaged in unlawful or abusive activities or fraud, (c) the acceptance of the Trust’s order would cause the amount of Trade Credits extended to exceed the maximum amount of Trade Credit (as defined below) that the Trust’s agreement with the Trade Credit Lender permits to be outstanding at any one time, or (d) a security or technology issue occurred and is continuing that results in Coinbase Inc. being unable to provide trading services or accept the Trust’s order, in each case, subject to certain protections for the Trust. Also, if Coinbase Custody or Coinbase Inc. becomes insolvent, suffers business failure, ceases business operations, defaults on or fails to perform their obligations under their contractual agreements with the Trust, or abruptly discontinues the services they provide to the Trust for any reason, the Trust’s operations, including its creation and redemption processes, would be adversely affected.

Further, if the Trustee decides to operationalize the Additional Ether Custodian, the Additional Ether Custodian would perform essential functions in terms of safekeeping any of the Trust’s ether that is held with Anchorage. The Anchorage Custodian Agreement provides the Trust with an available alternative ether custodian to safeguard the Trust’s ether; however, if the Trustee does not operationalize the Additional Ether Custodian, or if Anchorage fails to perform the functions of the Anchorage Custodian Agreement once operationalized, the Trust may be unable to operate or create or redeem Baskets, or may suffer losses, which could force the Trust to liquidate or adversely affect the price of the Shares. Anchorage could terminate services under the Anchorage Custodian Agreement upon providing the applicable notice to the Trust for any reason, or immediately for Cause. A “Termination for Cause” is defined in the Anchorage Custodian Agreement as: (i) the Trust materially breaches any provision of the Additional Ether Custodian Agreement, and such breach remains uncured for a period of 30 calendar days after notice of such breach is provided by Anchorage to the Trust; or (ii) the Trust becomes bankrupt or insolvent. If Anchorage were to terminate services under the Anchorage Custodian Agreement, the Trustee may need to find and appoint a replacement ether custodian.

The Trustee may not be able to find a party willing to serve as the custodian of the Trust’s ether or as the Trust’s prime execution agent under the same terms as the current Custodian Agreement or Prime Execution Agent Agreement or at all. To the extent that Trustee is not able to find a suitable party willing to serve as the custodian or prime execution agent, the Trustee may be required to terminate the Trust and liquidate the Trust’s ether. In addition, to the extent that the Trustee finds a suitable party but must enter into a modified custodian agreement or prime execution agreement that is less favorable for the Trust or Trustee, the value of the Shares could be adversely affected. If the Trust is unable to find a replacement prime execution agent, its operations could be adversely affected.

Similarly, if an Authorized Participant or an Ether Trading Counterparty suffers insolvency, business failure or interruption, default, failure to perform, security breach, or in certain circumstances a force majeure event or if an Authorized Participant or an Ether Trading Counterparty, as applicable, chooses not to participate in the creation and redemption process of the Trust, and the Trust is unable to engage replacement Authorized Participants or Ether Trading Counterparties or access alternative services on commercially acceptable terms or at all, then the creation and redemption process of the Trust, the arbitrage mechanism used to keep the Shares in line with the NAV and the Trust’s operations generally could be negatively affected.

The lack of full insurance and Shareholders ’ limited rights of legal recourse against the Trust, the Delaware Trustee, the Sponsor, the Trust Administrator, the Cash Custodian, the Prime Execution Agent, the Ether Custodian and, if operationalized, the Additional Ether Custodian, expose the Trust and its Shareholders to the risk of loss of the Trust ’ s ether for which no person or entity is liable.

The Trust is not a banking institution or otherwise a member of the FDIC or Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) and, therefore, deposits held with or assets held by the Trust are not subject to the protections enjoyed by depositors with FDIC or SIPC member institutions. In addition, neither the Trust nor the Sponsor insure the Trust’s ether.

Coinbase Global has informed the Sponsor that it maintains a commercial crime insurance policy of up to $320,000,000, which is intended to cover the loss of client assets held by Coinbase Global and all of its subsidiaries, including the Ether Custodian and the Prime Execution Agent (collectively, Coinbase Global and its subsidiaries are referred to as the “Coinbase Insureds”), including from employee collusion or fraud, physical loss including theft, damage of key material, security breach or hack, and fraudulent transfer. The insurance maintained by Coinbase Global is shared among all of Coinbase Insureds’ customers, is not specific to the Trust or to customers holding ether with the Ether Custodian or Prime Execution Agent and may not be available or sufficient to protect the Trust from all possible losses or sources of losses. Coinbase Global’s insurance may not cover the type of losses experienced by the Trust. Alternatively, the Trust may be forced to share such insurance proceeds with other clients or customers of the Coinbase Insureds, which could reduce the amount of such proceeds that are available to the Trust. In addition, the digital asset insurance market is limited, and the level of insurance maintained by Coinbase Global may be substantially lower than the assets of the Trust. While the Ether Custodian maintains certain capital reserve requirements depending on the assets under custody, and such capital reserves may provide additional means to cover client asset losses, the Trust cannot be assured that the Ether Custodian will maintain capital reserves sufficient to cover actual or potential losses with respect to the Trust’s digital assets. None of Coinbase Inc., Coinbase Custody, or Coinbase Global is an FDIC or SIPC member institution.

Furthermore, under the Custodian Agreement, the Ether Custodian’s liability is limited as follows, among others: (i) other than with respect to claims and losses arising from spot trading of ether, or fraud or willful misconduct, the Mutually Capped Liabilities (defined below), the Ether Custodian’s aggregate liability under the Custodian Agreement shall not exceed the greater of (A) the greater of (x) $5 million and (y) the aggregate fees paid by the Trust to the Ether Custodian in the 12 months prior to the event giving rise to the Ether Custodian’s liability, and (B) the value of the affected ether or cash giving rise to the Ether Custodian’s liability; (ii) the Ether Custodian’s aggregate liability in respect of each cold storage address shall not exceed $100,000,000; (iii) in respect of the Ether Custodian’s obligations to indemnify the Trust and its affiliates against third-party claims and losses to the extent arising out of or relating to, among others, the Ether Custodian’s gross negligence, violation of its confidentiality, data protection and/or information security obligations, or violation of any law, rule or regulation with respect to the provision of its services (the “Mutually Capped Liabilities”), the Ether Custodian’s liability shall not exceed the greater of (A) $5 million and (B) the aggregate fees paid by the Trust to the Ether Custodian in the 12 months prior to the event giving rise to the Ether Custodian’s liability; and (iv) in respect of any incidental, indirect, special, punitive, consequential or similar losses, the Ether Custodian is not liable, even if the Ether Custodian has been advised of or knew or should have known of the possibility thereof. In general, the Ether Custodian is not liable under the Custodian Agreement unless in the event of its negligence, fraud, material violation of applicable law or willful misconduct. The Ether Custodian is not liable for delays, suspension of operations, failure in performance, or interruption of service to the extent it is directly due to a cause or condition beyond the reasonable control of the Ether Custodian. In the event of potential losses incurred by the Trust as a result of the Ether Custodian losing control of the Trust’s ether or failing to properly execute instructions on behalf of the Trust, the Ether Custodian’s liability with respect to the Trust will be subject to certain limitations which may allow it to avoid liability for potential losses or may be insufficient to cover the value of such potential losses, even if the Ether Custodian directly caused such losses. Furthermore, the insurance maintained by the Ether Custodian may be insufficient to cover its liabilities to the Trust.

If the Trustee operationalizes the Additional Ether Custodian, the Trust’s holdings at the Additional Ether Custodian would be covered by insurance held by Anchor Labs Inc., the parent company of the Additional Ether Custodian (“Anchor Labs”). Anchor Labs maintains crime insurance coverage for a minimum limit of $100,000,000, which is intended to cover the loss of Trust assets held by the Additional Ether Custodian, including from dishonest or fraudulent acts committed by Anchor Labs and all of its subsidiaries, including the Additional Ether Custodian (collectively Anchor Labs and its subsidiaries are referred to as the “Anchor Labs Insureds”) employees, its agents and subcontractors; forgery and alteration; computer crime; wire transfer coverage; physical damage or theft of private key data; social engineering coverage; and security breaches or hacking. The insurance maintained by Anchor Labs may be shared among Anchor Labs Insureds’ other customers, is not necessarily exclusive to the Trust or to customers holding ether with the Additional Ether Custodian and may not be available or sufficient to protect the Trust from all possible losses or sources of losses. Alternatively, the Trust may be forced to share such insurance proceeds with other clients or customers of the Anchor Labs Insureds, which could reduce the amount of such proceeds that are available to the Trust. In addition, the digital asset insurance market is limited, and the level of insurance maintained by Anchor Labs may be substantially lower than the assets of the Trust. While the Additional Ether Custodian maintains certain capital reserve requirements depending on the assets under custody, and such capital reserves may provide additional means to cover client asset losses, the Trust cannot be assured that the Additional Ether Custodian will maintain capital reserves sufficient to cover actual or potential losses with respect to the Trust’s digital assets. The insurance program does not cover, insure or guarantee the performance of the Trust. The Additional Ether Custodian is neither FDIC-insured nor SIPC-insured.

With respect to the Anchorage Custodian Agreement, other than with respect to claims and losses arising from: (i) fraud or willful misconduct of the Additional Ether Custodian and (ii) the Anchorage Mutually Capped Liabilities (defined below), in no event will the Additional Ether Custodian’s liability exceed the value of the cash or affected ether giving rise to such liability. With respect to Anchorage Mutually Capped Liabilities, other than with respect to claims and losses arising from fraud or willful misconduct of the Additional Ether Custodian, in no event will the Additional Ether Custodian’s liability exceed the greater of $5 million and the aggregate amount of fees paid by client to the Additional Ether Custodian in the 12-month period prior to the event giving rise to such liability. “Anchorage Mutually Capped Liabilities” means (i) claims and losses arising from a party’s breach of its confidentiality obligations under the Anchorage Custodian Agreement, (ii) a party’s indemnity obligations under the Anchorage Custodian Agreement (except with respect to the full amount of any Trust ether lost, which shall not constitute an Anchorage Mutually Capped Liability), and (iii) claims and losses arising from the violation, misappropriation, or infringement by a party of any third party intellectual and/or industrial property rights, including patent rights, copyrights, moral rights, trademarks, trade names, service marks, trade secrets, rights in inventions (including applications for, and registrations, extensions, renewals, and re-issuances of the foregoing).

With respect to claims and losses related to a withdrawal or transfer of ether, if the Trust has operationalized Anchorage, the value of such digital assets shall be determined by reference to the benchmark valuation on the date delivery of such ether in connection with such withdrawal or transfer is due in accordance with the terms of the Anchorage Custodian Agreement. In respect of any incidental, indirect, special, punitive, consequential or similar losses, the Additional Ether Custodian is not liable, even if the Additional Ether Custodian has been advised of or knew or should have known of the possibility thereof. The Additional Ether Custodian is not liable for delays, suspension of operations, failure in performance, or interruption of service to the extent it is directly due to a cause or condition beyond the reasonable control of the Additional Ether Custodian.

Similarly, under the Prime Execution Agent Agreement, the Prime Execution Agent’s liability is limited as follows, among others: (i) other than with respect to claims and losses arising from spot trading of ether, or fraud or willful misconduct, or the PB Mutually Capped Liabilities (defined below), the Prime Execution Agent’s aggregate liability shall not exceed the greater of (A) the greater of (x) $5 million and (y) the aggregate fees paid by the Trust to the Prime Execution Agent in the 12 months prior to the event giving rise to the Prime Execution Agent’s liability, and (B) the value of the cash or affected ether giving rise to the Prime Execution Agent’s liability; (ii) in respect of the Prime Execution Agent’s obligations to indemnify the Trust and its affiliates against third-party claims and losses to the extent arising out of or relating to, among others, the Prime Execution Agent’s gross negligence, violation of its confidentiality, data protection and/or information security obligations, violation of any law, rule or regulation with respect to the provision of its services, or the full amount of the Trust’s assets lost due to the insolvency of or security event at a Connected Trading Venue (as defined below) (the “PB Mutually Capped Liabilities”), the Prime Execution Agent’s liability shall not exceed the greater of (A) $5 million and (B) the aggregate fees paid by the Trust to the Prime Execution Agent in the 12 months prior to the event giving rise to the Prime Execution Agent’s liability; and (iii) in respect of any incidental, indirect, special, punitive, consequential or similar losses, the Prime Execution Agent is not liable, even if the Prime Execution Agent has been advised of or knew or should have known of the possibility thereof. In general, with limited exceptions (such as for failing to execute an order), the Prime Execution Agent is not liable under the Prime Execution Agent Agreement unless in the event of its gross negligence, fraud, material violation of applicable law or willful misconduct. The Prime Execution Agent is not liable for delays, suspension of operations, failure in performance, or interruption of service to the extent it is directly due to a cause or condition beyond the reasonable control of the Prime Execution Agent. These and the other limitations on the Prime Execution Agent’s liability may allow it to avoid liability for potential losses or may be insufficient to cover the value of such potential losses, even if the Prime Execution Agent directly caused such losses. Both the Trust and the Prime Execution Agent and its affiliates (including the Ether Custodian) are required to indemnify each other under certain circumstances.

Moreover, in the event of an insolvency or bankruptcy of the Prime Execution Agent (in the case of the Trading Balance) or the Ether Custodian (in the case of the Vault Balance), given that the contractual protections and legal rights of customers with respect to digital assets held on their behalf by third parties are relatively untested in insolvency of these types of entities in the digital asset industry, there is a risk that customers’ assets – including the Trust’s assets – may be considered the property of the estate of the Prime Execution Agent (in the case of the Trading Balance), or the Ether Custodian (in the case of the Vault Balance), and customers – including the Trust – may be at risk of being treated as general unsecured creditors of such entities and subject to the risk of total loss or markdowns on value of such assets.

The Custodian Agreement contains an agreement by the parties to treat the ether credited to the Trust’s Vault Balance as financial assets under Article 8 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code (“Article 8”), in addition to stating that the Ether Custodian will serve as fiduciary and custodian on the Trust’s behalf. The Ether Custodian’s parent, Coinbase Global, has stated in its most recent public securities filings that in light of the inclusion in its custody agreements of provisions relating to Article 8 it believes that a court would not treat custodied digital assets as part of its general estate in the event the Custodian were to experience insolvency. However, due to the novelty of digital asset custodial arrangements courts have not yet considered this type of treatment for custodied digital assets and it is not possible to predict with certainty how they would rule in such a scenario. If the Ether Custodian became subject to insolvency proceedings and a court were to rule that the custodied ether were part of the Ether Custodian’s general estate and not the property of the Trust, then the Trust would be treated as a general unsecured creditor in the Ether Custodian’s insolvency proceedings and the Trust could be subject to the loss of all or a significant portion of its assets. Moreover, in the event of the bankruptcy of the Ether Custodian, an automatic stay could go into effect and protracted litigation could be required in order to recover the assets held with the Ether Custodian, all of which could significantly and negatively impact the Trust’s operations and the value of the Shares.

With respect to the Prime Execution Agent Agreement, there is a risk that the Trading Balance, in which the Trust’s ether and cash is held in omnibus accounts by the Prime Execution Agent (in the latter case, as described below in “—Loss of a critical banking relationship for, or the failure of a bank used by, the Prime Execution Agent could adversely impact the Trust’s ability to create or redeem Baskets, or could cause losses to the Trust”), could be considered part of the Prime Execution Agent’s bankruptcy estate in the event of the Prime Execution Agent’s bankruptcy. The Prime Execution Agent Agreement contains an Article 8 opt-in clause with respect to the Trust’s assets held in the Trading Balance. The Prime Execution Agent is not required to hold any of the ether or cash in the Trust’s Trading Balance in segregation. Within the Trading Balance, the Prime Execution Agent Agreement provides that the Trust does not have an identifiable claim to any particular ether (and cash). Instead, the Trust’s Trading Balance represents an entitlement to a pro rata share of the ether (and cash) the Prime Execution Agent has allocated to the omnibus wallets the Prime Execution Agent holds, as well as the accounts in the Prime Execution Agent’s name that the Prime Execution Agent maintains at Connected Trading Venues (the “Connected Trading Venue”) (which are typically held on an omnibus, rather than segregated, basis). If the Prime Execution Agent suffers an insolvency event, there is a risk that the Trust’s assets held in the Trading Balance could be considered part of the Prime Execution Agent’s bankruptcy estate and the Trust could be treated as a general unsecured creditor of the Prime Execution Agent, which could result in losses for the Trust and Shareholders. Moreover, in the event of the bankruptcy of the Prime Execution Agent, an automatic stay could go into effect and protracted litigation could be required in order to recover the assets held with the Prime Execution Agent, all of which could significantly and negatively impact the Trust’s operations and the value of the Shares. There are no policies that would limit the amount of ether that can be held temporarily in the Trading Balance maintained by the Prime Execution Agent.

Under the Trust Agreement, the Trustee and the Sponsor will not be liable for any liability or expense incurred, including, without limitation, as a result of any loss of ether by the Ether Custodian or Prime Execution Agent, absent willful misconduct, gross negligence, reckless disregard or bad faith on the part of the Trustee or the Sponsor or breach by the Sponsor of the Trust Agreement, as the case may be. As a result, the recourse of the Trust or the Shareholders to the Trustee or the Sponsor, including in the event of a loss of ether by the Ether Custodian or Prime Execution Agent, is limited.

The Shareholders’ recourse against the Sponsor, the Trustee, and the Trust’s other service providers for the services they provide to the Trust, including, without limitation, those relating to the holding of ether or the provision of instructions relating to the movement of ether, is limited. For the avoidance of doubt, neither the Sponsor, the Trustee, nor any of their affiliates (including, among others, BlackRock), nor any other party has guaranteed the assets or liabilities, or otherwise assumed the liabilities, of the Trust, or the obligations or liabilities of any service provider to the Trust, including, without limitation, the Ether Custodian and Prime Execution Agent. The Prime Execution Agent Agreement and Custodian Agreement provide that neither the Sponsor, the Trustee, nor their affiliates shall have any obligation of any kind or nature whatsoever, by guaranty, enforcement or otherwise, with respect to the performance of any the Trust’s obligations, agreements, representations or warranties under the Prime Execution Agent Agreement or Custodian Agreement or any transaction thereunder. Consequently, a loss may be suffered with respect to the Trust’s ether that is not covered by the Ether Custodian’s insurance and for which no person is liable in damages. As a result, the recourse of the Trust or the Shareholders, under applicable law, is limited.

The Shares may trade at a price that is at, above or below the Trust ’ s NAV as a result of the non-current trading hours between NASDAQ and the digital asset market.

The Trust’s NAV will fluctuate with changes in the market value of ether, and the Sponsor expects the trading price of the Shares to fluctuate in accordance with changes in the Trust’s NAV, as well as market supply and demand. However, the Shares may trade on NASDAQ at a price that is at, above or below the Trust’s NAV for a variety of reasons. For example, NASDAQ is open for trading in the Shares for a limited period each day, but the digital asset market is a 24-hour marketplace. During periods when NASDAQ is closed but constituent trading platforms are open, significant changes in the price of ether on the digital asset market could result in a difference in performance between the value of ether as measured by the Index and the most recent NAV or closing trading price. For example, if the price of ether on the digital asset market, and the value ether as measured by the Index, move significantly in a negative direction after the close of NASDAQ, the trading price of the Shares may “gap” down to the full extent of such negative price shift when the Exchange reopens. If the price of ether on the digital asset market drops significantly during hours the NASDAQ is closed, shareholders may not be able to sell their Shares until after the “gap” down has been fully realized, resulting in an inability to mitigate losses in a negative market. Even during periods when the NASDAQ is open, large constituent trading platforms (or a substantial number of smaller constituent trading platforms) may be lightly traded or closed for any number of reasons, which could increase trading spreads and widen any premium or discount on the Shares.

Digital asset markets in the United States exist in a state of regulatory uncertainty, and adverse legislative or regulatory developments could significantly harm the value of ether or the Shares, such as by banning, restricting or imposing onerous conditions or prohibitions on the use of ether, validator activity, digital wallets, the provision of services related to trading and custodying ether, the operation of the Ethereum network, or the digital asset markets generally.

There is a lack of consensus regarding the regulation of digital assets, including ether, and their markets. As a result of the growth in the size of the digital asset market, as well as the 2022 Events, the U.S. Congress and a number of U.S. federal and state agencies (including FinCEN, SEC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”), CFTC, FINRA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), state financial institution regulators, and others) have been examining the operations of digital asset networks, digital asset users and the digital asset markets. Many of these state and federal agencies have brought enforcement actions or issued consumer advisories regarding the risks posed by digital assets to investors. Ongoing and future regulatory actions with respect to digital assets generally or ether in particular may alter, perhaps to a materially adverse extent, the nature of an investment in the Shares or the ability of the Trust to continue to operate. The 2022 Events, including among others the bankruptcy filings of FTX and its subsidiaries, Three Arrows Capital, Celsius Network, Voyager Digital, Genesis, BlockFi and others, and other developments in the digital asset markets, have resulted in calls for heightened scrutiny and regulation of the digital asset industry, with a specific focus on intermediaries such as digital asset platforms, platforms, and custodians. Federal and state legislatures and regulatory agencies may introduce and enact new laws and regulations to regulate crypto asset intermediaries, such as digital asset platforms and custodians. The March 2023 collapses of Silicon Valley Bank, Silvergate Bank, and Signature Bank, which in some cases provided services to the digital asset industry, may amplify and/or accelerate these trends.

US federal and state regulators, as well as the White House, have issued reports and releases concerning crypto assets, including ether and crypto asset markets. Further, in 2023 the House of Representatives formed two new subcommittees: the Digital Assets, Financial Technology and Inclusion Subcommittee and the Commodity Markets, Digital Assets, and Rural Development Subcommittee, each of which were formed in part to analyze issues concerning crypto assets and demonstrate a legislative intent to develop and consider the adoption of federal legislation designed to address the perceived need for regulation of and concerns surrounding the crypto industry. However, the extent and content of any forthcoming laws and regulations are not yet ascertainable with certainty, and it may not be ascertainable in the near future. We cannot predict how these and other related events will affect us or the crypto asset business.

It is not possible to predict whether, or when, any of these developments will lead to Congress granting additional authorities to the CFTC, SEC or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how additional legislation and/or regulatory oversight might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function or how any new regulations or changes to existing regulations might impact the value of digital assets generally and ether held by the Trust specifically. The consequences of increased federal regulation of digital assets and digital asset activities could have a material adverse effect on the Trust and the Shares.

FinCEN requires any administrator or exchanger of convertible virtual currency (“CVC”) to register with FinCEN as a money transmitter and comply with the anti-money laundering regulations applicable to money transmitters. Entities which fail to comply with such regulations are subject to fines, may be required to cease operations, and could have potential criminal liability. For example, in 2015, FinCEN assessed a $700,000 fine against a sponsor of a digital asset for violating several requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act by acting as an MSB and selling the digital asset without registering with FinCEN, and by failing to implement and maintain an adequate anti-money laundering program. In 2017, FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-e, a now defunct digital asset platform, for similar violations. The requirement that exchangers that do business in the United States register with FinCEN and comply with anti-money laundering regulations may increase the cost of buying and selling ether and therefore may adversely affect the price of ether and an investment in the Shares.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the “U.S. Treasury Department”) has added digital currency addresses, including addresses on the Ethereum network, to the list of Specially Designated Nationals whose assets are blocked, and with whom U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing. Such actions by OFAC, or by similar organizations in other jurisdictions, may introduce uncertainty in the market as to whether ether that has been associated with such addresses in the past can be easily sold. This “tainted” ether may trade at a substantial discount to untainted ether. Reduced fungibility in the ether markets may reduce the liquidity of ether and therefore adversely affect their price.

In February 2020, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin stated that digital assets were a “crucial area” on which the U.S. Treasury Department has spent significant time. Secretary Mnuchin announced that the U.S. Treasury Department is preparing significant new regulations governing digital asset activities to address concerns regarding the potential use for facilitating money laundering and other illicit activities. In December 2020, FinCEN, a bureau within the U.S. Treasury Department, proposed a rule that would require financial institutions to submit reports, keep records, and verify the identity of customers for certain transactions to or from so-called “unhosted” wallets, also commonly referred to as self-hosted wallets. In January 2021, then U.S. Treasury Secretary nominee Janet Yellen stated her belief that regulators should “look closely at how to encourage the use of digital assets for legitimate activities while curtailing their use for malign and illegal activities.”

Under regulations from the New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”), businesses involved in digital asset business activity for third parties in or involving New York, excluding merchants and consumers, must apply for a license, commonly known as a BitLicense, from the NYDFS and must comply with anti-money laundering, cybersecurity, consumer protection, and financial and reporting requirements, among others. As an alternative to a BitLicense, a firm can apply for a charter to become a limited purpose trust company under New York law qualified to engage in certain digital asset business activities. Other states have considered or approved digital asset business activity statutes or rules, passing, for example, regulations or guidance indicating that certain digital asset business activities constitute money transmission requiring licensure.

The inconsistency in applying money transmitting licensure requirements to certain businesses may make it more difficult for these businesses to provide services, which may affect consumer adoption of ether and its price. In an attempt to address these issues, the Uniform Law Commission passed a model law in July 2017, the Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act, which has many similarities to the BitLicense and features a multistate reciprocity licensure feature, wherein a business licensed in one state could apply for accelerated licensure procedures in other states. It is still unclear, however, how many states, if any, will adopt some or all of the model legislation.

Law enforcement agencies have often relied on the transparency of blockchains to facilitate investigations. However, certain privacy-enhancing features have been, or are expected to be, introduced to a number of digital asset networks. If the Ethereum network was to adopt any of these privacy-enhancing features, these features may provide law enforcement agencies with less visibility into transaction-level data. For example, “privacy pools,” zero knowledge proofs, and other technologies that could enhance privacy have been discussed by participants in the Ethereum network. Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, released a report in October 2017 noting the increased use of privacy-enhancing digital assets like Zcash and Monero in criminal activity on the internet. In August 2022, OFAC banned all U.S. citizens from using Tornado Cash, a digital asset protocol designed to obfuscate blockchain transactions, by adding certain Ethereum wallet addresses associated with the protocol to its Specially Designated Nationals list. On October 19, 2023, FinCEN published a proposed rulemaking to apply the authorities in Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to impose requirements on financial institutions that engage in CVC transactions with CVC mixers. The proposed rule, if adopted, would require covered financial institutions to report to FinCEN any CVC transactions they process that involves CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States. The term “CVC mixing” covers more than just transactions that involve CVC mixers like Tornado Cash, and seemingly could cover a broader range of conduct involving technologies, services, or methods that have the effect of obfuscating the source, destination, or amount of a CVC transaction, whether or not the obfuscation was intentional. If the rule were to be adopted as proposed and if the Ethereum network were to be deemed to or were to adopt features which come within the rule’s ambit, it could cause covered financial institutions – such as many digital asset platforms or the Trust’s service providers, such as the Prime Execution Agent or Cash Custodian – to reduce support for or cease offering services for ether or to the Trust, which could impair the utility of ether, the value of the Shares and the Trust’s ability to operate in compliance with new laws and regulations.

If regulators subject the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor, Authorized Participants or Ether Trading Counterparties to regulation as a money services business or money transmitter, this could result in extraordinary expenses to the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor or the Ether Trading Counterparties and also result in decreased liquidity for the Shares.

To the extent that the activities of the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor, Authorized Participants or Ether Trading Counterparties cause it to be deemed an MSB under the regulations promulgated by FinCEN, the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor, Authorized Participants or the Ether Trading Counterparties may be required to comply with FinCEN regulations, make certain reports to FinCEN and maintain certain records. Similarly, the activities of the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor, Authorized Participants or Ether Trading Counterparties may require it to be licensed as a money transmitter or as a digital asset business, such as under the New York State Department of Financial Services’ BitLicense regulation.

Such additional regulatory obligations may cause the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor, Authorized Participants or Ether Trading Counterparties to incur extraordinary expenses. If the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor, Authorized Participants or the Ether Trading Counterparties decided to seek the required licenses, there is no guarantee that they will timely receive them. The Trustee may decide to discontinue and wind up the Trust. A dissolution of the Trust in response to the changed regulatory circumstances may be at a time that is disadvantageous to the Shareholders. An Ether Trading Counterparty may also instead decide to terminate its role as an Ether Trading Counterparty of the Trust, which may decrease the liquidity of the Shares.

Additionally, to the extent the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor, Authorized Participants, or Ether Trading Counterparties are found to have operated without appropriate state or federal licenses, it may be subject to investigation, administrative or court proceedings, and civil or criminal monetary fines and penalties, all of which would harm the reputation of the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor, Authorized Participants or the Ether Trading Counterparties and have a material adverse effect on the price of the Shares. Although Ether Trading Counterparties represent to the Trust that they have obtained all necessary governmental licenses and approvals and have consulted their own counsel in connection with the activities contemplated by the Ether Trading Counterparty Agreements, if such representations prove inaccurate, such Ether Trading Counterparties may suffer adverse consequences and be unable to perform their obligations or engage in ether transactions with the Trust, or the Trust’s operations could be adversely affected and decreased liquidity for the Shares or losses for Shareholders could result.

Coinbase serves as the ether custodian and the prime execution agent for several competing exchange-traded Ethereum products, which could adversely affect the Trust ’ s operations and ultimately the value of the Shares.

The Prime Execution Agent and the Ether Custodian are both affiliates of Coinbase Global. As of the date hereof, Coinbase Global is one of the largest publicly traded crypto asset company in the world by market capitalization and is also the largest crypto asset custodian in the world by assets under custody. By virtue of its leading market position and capabilities, and the relatively limited number of institutionally-capable providers of crypto asset brokerage and custody services, Coinbase serves as the ether custodian and prime execution agent for several competing exchange-traded ether products, as well as other companies in the digital asset industry, such as digital asset treasury companies. Similarly, the Additional Ether Custodian serves as the custodian for several competing exchange-traded ether products and other companies in the digital assets industry. Therefore, Coinbase and Anchorage have a critical role in supporting the U.S. spot ether exchange-traded product ecosystem and the digital assets industry generally, and their size and market share creates the risk that they may fail to properly resource its operations to adequately support all such products that use their services that could harm the Trust, the Shareholders and the value of the Shares. If the Ether Custodian or Additional Ether Custodian were to favor the interests of certain products over others, it could result in inadequate attention or comparatively unfavorable commercial terms to less favored products, which could adversely affect the Trust’s operations and ultimately the value of the Shares.

As illustrated by the 2022 Events, many of the players in the digital assets markets are interconnected – for example, certain market participants may be active in both borrowing and lending, or engage in a wide variety of trading relationships and transactions, with respect to many of the same counterparties, or with respect to the same digital assets or blockchain networks – which can heighten the contagion risks if one of them defaults on its obligations to others or a given digital blockchain network or digital asset were to stop functioning properly or lose substantial value, as applicable, leading to correlated failures in a wider market downturn or a disruption or market dislocation affecting that particular blockchain network or that particular digital asset, or losses. It is possible that, in circumstances similar to the 2022 Events, this interconnectedness risk affecting the Ether Custodian, the Additional Ether Custodian, the Prime Execution Agent, Authorized Participants, Ether Trading Counterparties, or other service providers to the Trust could adversely affect the Trust or its Shareholders, for instance by disrupting creation and redemption processes, or (in the case of the Prime Execution Agent or the Ether Custodian or Additional Ether Custodian) resulting in a loss of funds, such as (in the event of a large scale system failure or cybersecurity breach) by exhausting available insurance funds.

Shareholders do not have the protections associated with ownership of shares in an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act or the protections afforded by the CEA.

The Investment Company Act is designed to protect investors by preventing insiders from managing investment companies to their benefit and to the detriment of public investors, such as: the issuance of securities having inequitable or discriminatory provisions; the management of investment companies by irresponsible persons; the use of unsound or misleading methods of computing earnings and asset value; changes in the character of investment companies without the consent of investors; and investment companies from engaging in excessive leveraging. To accomplish these ends, the Investment Company Act requires the safekeeping and proper valuation of fund assets, restricts greatly transactions with affiliates, limits leveraging, and imposes governance requirements as a check on fund management.

The Trust is not a registered investment company under the Investment Company Act, and the Sponsor believes that the Trust is not required to register under such act. Consequently, Shareholders do not have the regulatory protections provided to investors in investment companies.

The Trust will not hold or trade in commodity interests (as currently defined) regulated by the CEA, as administered by the CFTC. Furthermore, the Sponsor believes that the Trust is not a commodity pool for purposes of the CEA, and that neither the Sponsor nor the Trustee is subject to regulation by the CFTC as a commodity pool operator or a commodity trading adviser in connection with the operation of the Trust. Consequently, Shareholders will not have the regulatory protections provided to investors in CEA-regulated instruments or commodity pools. However, Congress is currently considering legislation, such as the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025 (CLARITY Act), which could give the CFTC greater powers to regulate the spot digital asset market. It is possible that, if legislation is passed, it could require the Trust or the Sponsor, or service providers to the Trust, such as the Prime Execution Agent, Authorized Participants, or Ether Trading Counterparties, among others, to register with the CFTC. Such additional regulatory obligations may cause the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor, Prime Execution Agent, Authorized Participants or Ether Trading Counterparties to incur extraordinary expenses. If the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor, Prime Execution Agent, Authorized Participants or the Ether Trading Counterparties decided to seek the required licenses, there is no guarantee that they will timely receive them. The Trustee may decide to discontinue and wind up the Trust. A dissolution of the Trust in response to the changed regulatory circumstances may be at a time that is disadvantageous to the Shareholders. An Ether Trading Counterparty may also instead decide to terminate its role as an Ether Trading Counterparty of the Trust, which may decrease the liquidity of the Shares.

Item 2. Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities and Use of Proceeds

a) None.

b) Not applicable.

c) 58,320,000 Shares (1,458 Baskets) were redeemed during the quarter ended September 30, 2025.

Period		Total Number of Shares Redeemed				Average Price Paid Per Share
07/01/25 to 07/31/25			2,400,000			$	19.5360
08/01/25 to 08/31/25			26,240,000				30.1888
09/01/25 to 09/30/25			29,680,000				32.3406
Total			58,320,000			$	30.8455

Item 3. Defaults Upon Senior Securities

None.

Item 4. Mine Safety Disclosures.

Not applicable.

Item 5. Other Information.

Not applicable.

Item 6. Exhibits

Exhibit No.		Description
3.1		Certificate of Trust of iShares Ethereum Trust incorporated by reference to Exhibit 3.1 of the Registration Statement on Form S-1 (File No. 333-275583) filed by the Registrant on November 16, 2023
3.2		Certificate of Amendment to Certificate of Trust of iShares Ethereum Trust incorporated by reference to Exhibit 3.2 of the Registration Statement on Form S-1/A (File No. 333-275583) filed by the Registrant on May 29, 2024
3.3		Certificate of Amendment to Certificate of Trust of iShares Ethereum Trust incorporated by reference to Exhibit 3.3 of the Registration Statement on Form S-1/A (File No. 333-275583) filed by the Registrant on June 21, 2024
4.1		Third Amended and Restated Trust Agreement incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.1 of the Pre-Effective Amendment No. 2 to Post‑Effective Amendment No. 1 to the Registration Statement on Form S-1/A (File No.333-275583) filed by the Registrant on July 11, 2025
4.2		Form of Authorized Participant Agreement is incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.2 of the Pre-Effective Amendment No. 1 to Post‑Effective Amendment No. 1 to the Registration Statement on Form S-1 (File No. 333-275583) filed by the Registrant on May 9, 2025
10.1		Third Amended and Restated Coinbase Prime Broker Agreement incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.1 of the Registration Statement on Form S-1/A (File No. 333-275583) filed by the Registrant on May 29, 2024
10.2		Coinbase Custody Custodial Services Agreement (included as Exhibit A in Exhibit 10.1) incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.2 of the Registration Statement on Form S-1/A (File No. 333-275583) filed by the Registrant on May 29, 2024)
10.3		Services Agreement with The Bank of New York Mellon, as cash custodian and trust administrator incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.3 of the Registration Statement on Form S-1/A (File No. 333-275583) filed by the Registrant on May 29, 2024
10.4		ETF Services Agreement with BRIL incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.4 of the Registration Statement on Form S-1/A (File No. 333‑275583) filed by the Registrant on May 29, 2024
10.5		Amendment to the Third Amended and Restated Coinbase Prime Broker Agreement incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.1 of Form 8-K (File No. 001- 42166) filed by the Registrant on September 19, 2024
10.6		Master Custody Service Agreement with Anchorage Digital Bank N.A. incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10.1 of Form 8-K (File No. 001‑42166) filed by the Registrant on April 8, 2025
31.1*		Certification by Principal Executive Officer Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002
31.2*		Certification by Principal Financial Officer Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002
32.1*		Certification by Principal Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes‑Oxley Act of 2002
32.2*		Certification by Principal Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes‑Oxley Act of 2002
101.INS*		Inline XBRL Instance Document - the instance document does not appear in the Interactive Data File because its XBRL tags are embedded within the Inline XBRL document.
101.SCH*		Inline XBRL Taxonomy Extension Schema Document
101.CAL*		Inline XBRL Taxonomy Extension Calculation Linkbase Document
101.DEF*		Inline XBRL Taxonomy Extension Definition Linkbase Document
101.LAB*		Inline XBRL Taxonomy Extension Label Linkbase Document
101.PRE*		Inline XBRL Taxonomy Extension Presentation Linkbase Document
104		Cover Page Interactive Data File included as Exhibit 101 (embedded within the Inline XBRL document)

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* Filed herewith

SIGNATURES

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned in the capacities* indicated thereunto duly authorized.

iShares Delaware Trust Sponsor LLC,
Sponsor of the iShares Ethereum Trust ETF (registrant)

/s/ Shannon Ghia

Shannon Ghia
Director, President and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal executive officer)

Date:

November 5, 2025

/s/ Bryan Bowers

Bryan Bowers
Director and Chief Financial Officer
(Principal financial and accounting officer)

Date:

November 5, 2025

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* The registrant is a trust and the persons are signing in their respective capacities as officers of iShares Delaware Trust Sponsor LLC, the Sponsor of the registrant.