UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
FORM
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Quarterly report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the quarterly period ended
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Transition report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the transition period from to . |
Commission file number:
(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)
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(State or other jurisdiction of
incorporation or organization) |
(I.R.S. Employer
Identification No.) |
c/o VanEck Digital Assets, LLC
Jonathan R. Simon, Esq.
Matthew A. Babinsky, Esq.
(Address of principal executive offices) (Zip Code)
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(Registrant’s telephone number, including area code)
Not Applicable
(Former name, former address and former fiscal year, if changed since last report)
Securities registered or to be registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act.
| Title of each class | Trading Symbol(s) |
Name of each exchange
on which registered |
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Indicate
by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such
reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days.
☒
Indicate
by check mark whether the registrant has submitted electronically every Interactive Data File required to be submitted pursuant
to Rule 405 of Regulation S-T (§232.405 of this chapter) during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the
registrant was required to submit such files).
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Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer, smaller reporting company, or an emerging growth company. See the definitions of “large accelerated filer”, “accelerated filer”, “smaller reporting company” and “emerging growth company” in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act.
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☒ | Smaller Reporting Company |
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| Emerging Growth Company |
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If
an emerging growth company, indicate by check mark if the registrant has elected not to use the extended transition period for
complying with any new or revised financial accounting standards provided pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act.
Indicate
by check mark whether the registrant is a shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act.).
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Yes
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The registrant had
VanEck Bitcoin ETF
Table of Contents
Part I. FINANCIAL INFORMATION.
Item 1. Unaudited Financial Statements.
VANECK BITCOIN ETF
Statements of Assets and Liabilities
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September 30,
2025 (Unaudited) |
December 31,
2024 |
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| Assets | ||||||||
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Investment in bitcoin, at fair value (cost $
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$ |
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$ |
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| Total assets |
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| Liabilities | ||||||||
| Total liabilities | ||||||||
| Net assets | $ |
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$ |
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| Net Asset Value per Share | $ |
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$ |
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The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.
| 1 |
VANECK BITCOIN ETF
Statements of Operations (Unaudited)
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Three Months Ended
September 30, |
Nine Months Ended
September 30, |
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| 2025 | 2024 | 2025 | 2024 | |||||||||
| Expenses | ||||||||||||
| Sponsor fee, related party | $ |
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$ |
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$ |
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$ |
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| Total expenses |
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| Sponsor fee waiver, related party |
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(
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| Net expenses |
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| Net investment loss |
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| Net realized gain and net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) | ||||||||||||
| Net realized gain on: | ||||||||||||
| Bitcoin sold for redemption of shares |
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| Bitcoin distributed for Sponsor fee, related party |
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| Net realized gain on investment in bitcoin |
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| Net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) from investment in bitcoin |
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| Net realized gain and net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) |
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| Net increase in net assets resulting from operations | $ |
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$ |
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$ |
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$ |
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The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.
| 2 |
VANECK BITCOIN ETF
Statements of Changes in Net Assets (Unaudited)
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Three Months Ended
September 30, |
Nine Months Ended
September 30, |
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| 2025 | 2024 | 2025 | 2024 | |||||||||
| Net increase from operations | ||||||||||||
| Net investment loss | $ | $ | $ | $ |
(
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| Net realized gain from investment in bitcoin |
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| Net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) from investments in bitcoin |
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| Net increase in net assets resulting from operations |
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| Capital Share transactions | ||||||||||||
| Contributions for shares issued |
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| Withdrawals for shares redeemed |
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| Net increase in capital share transactions |
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| Net increase in net assets |
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| Net assets: | ||||||||||||
| Beginning of period |
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| End of period | $ |
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$ |
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$ |
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$ |
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The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.
| 3 |
VANECK BITCOIN ETF
Schedule of Investment
| September 30, 2025 (Unaudited) | Quantity of Bitcoin | Cost | Fair Value | % of Net Assets | ||||||
| Investment in bitcoin |
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$
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$
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| Net Assets |
$
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| December 31, 2024 | Quantity of Bitcoin | Cost | Fair Value | % of Net Assets | ||||||
| Investment in bitcoin |
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$
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$
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| Net Assets |
$
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The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements.
| 4 |
VANECK BITCOIN ETF
Notes to Unaudited Financial Statements
September 30, 2025
Note 1. Organization:
VanEck Bitcoin ETF (the “Trust”), a Delaware statutory trust, is an exchange-traded fund that issues common shares of beneficial interest in an ownership of the Trust (the “Shares”). The Shares are traded on the Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc. (the “Exchange”). The Trust’s investment objective is to reflect the performance of the price of bitcoin less the net operating expenses of the Trust. The Trust is managed and controlled by VanEck Digital Assets, LLC (the “Sponsor”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Van Eck Associates Corporation (“VanEck”). The CSC Delaware Trust Company is the “Trustee” of the Trust.
Note 2. Significant Accounting Policies:
| A. |
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The preparation of financial statements in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) requires management to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. Actual results could differ from those estimates.
The Trust qualifies as an investment company solely for accounting purposes and not for any other purpose and follows accounting and reporting requirements of Accounting Standards Codification (“ASC”) Topic 946 Financial Services—Investment Companies (“ASC Topic 946”) , but is not registered, and is not required to be registered, as an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.
| B. |
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Cash, if any, represents cash deposits held at a major financial institution and is subject to credit risk to the extent its balance exceeds the federally insured limits. As of September 30, 2025, and December 31, 2024, the Trust .
| C. |
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The Trust values its investment in bitcoin and other assets and liabilities at fair value. Fair value is the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants on the measurement date.
The Trust identifies and determines the bitcoin principal market (or in the absence of a principal market, the most advantageous market) for GAAP financial statement purposes consistent with the application of fair value measurement framework in Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) ASC 820 at 11:59 p.m. EST. Under ASC 820, a principal market is the market with the greatest volume and activity level for the asset or liability. The Sponsor on behalf of the Trust will determine in its sole discretion the valuation sources and policies used to prepare the Trust’s financial statements in accordance with GAAP.
Various inputs are used in determining the fair value of assets and liabilities. Inputs may be based on independent market data or they may be internally developed. These inputs are categorized into a disclosure hierarchy consisting of three broad levels for financial reporting purposes. The three levels of the fair value hierarchy are as follows:
Level 1 – Unadjusted quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities;
Level 2 – Inputs other than quoted prices included within Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability either directly or indirectly, including quoted prices for similar assets or liabilities in active markets, quoted prices for identical or similar assets or liabilities in markets that are not considered to be active, inputs other than quoted prices that are observable for the asset or liability, and inputs that are derived principally from or corroborated by observable market data by correlation or other means; and
Level 3 – Unobservable inputs where there are little or no market activity for the asset or liability, including the Trust’s assumptions used in determining the fair value of investments.
| 5 |
VANECK BITCOIN ETF
Notes to Unaudited Financial Statements (continued)
September 30, 2025
The following is a summary of the fair value hierarchy as of September 30, 2025, and December 31, 2024:
| September 30, 2025 | Level 1 | Level 2 | Level 3 | Total | ||||||||||||
| Assets | ||||||||||||||||
| Investment in bitcoin | $ |
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$ | $ | $ |
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| December 31, 2024 | Level 1 | Level 2 | Level 3 | Total | ||||||||||||
| Assets | ||||||||||||||||
| Investment in bitcoin | $ |
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$ | $ | $ |
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The following represents the changes in quantity of bitcoin and the respective fair value:
| Bitcoin | Fair Value | ||||||||
| Beginning balance as of January 1, 2025 |
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$ |
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| Bitcoin purchased |
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| Bitcoin sold |
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| Net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) from investment in bitcoin |
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| Net realized gain on investment in bitcoin |
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| Ending balance as of September 30, 2025 |
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$ |
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| Bitcoin | Fair Value | ||||||||
| Beginning balance as of January 1, 2024 (a) | $ | ||||||||
| Bitcoin purchased |
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| Bitcoin sold |
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(
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| Net change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) from investment in bitcoin |
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| Net realized gain on investment in bitcoin |
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| Ending balance as of December 31, 2024 |
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$ |
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| (a) | The Trust did not hold any bitcoin as of January 1, 2024. |
| D. |
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Bitcoin transactions are accounted for on trade date. Realized gains and losses on the sale of bitcoin are determined based on the average cost method. Under ASC Topic 946, the average cost method is an accepted method to determine realized gains and losses on the sale of bitcoin. Proceeds received by the Trust from the issuance of baskets consist of bitcoin. Deposits of bitcoin are held by Gemini Trust Company, LLC (the “Bitcoin Custodian”) and at Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC (the “Additional Bitcoin Custodian”, and collectively the “Bitcoin Custodians”), on behalf of the Trust until (i) delivered out in connection with redemptions of baskets or cash or (ii) sold by the Sponsor, which may be facilitated by the Bitcoin Custodians, to pay fees due to the Sponsor and Trust expenses and liabilities not assumed by the Sponsor.
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The Trust’s net asset value (“NAV”) is calculated based on the Trust’s net asset holdings, as reconciled to the Bitcoin Custodians’ accounts, on a market approach determined on a daily basis using the MarketVector TM Bitcoin Benchmark Rate price at 4:00 pm EST. The Trust’s NAV per Share is calculated by taking the current market value of its total assets, subtracting any liabilities, and then dividing that total by the total number of outstanding Shares. The Trust Agreement gives the Sponsor the exclusive authority to determine the Trust’s NAV and the Trust’s NAV per Share, which it has delegated to the Administrator.
| 6 |
VANECK BITCOIN ETF
Notes to Unaudited Financial Statements (continued)
September 30, 2025
| F. |
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The Trust is treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes and, therefore, no provision for federal income taxes is required. Any interest, expenses, gains and losses are passed through to the holders of Shares of the Trust. The Sponsor has reviewed the tax positions for the period presented and has determined that no provision for income tax is required in the Trust’s financial statements.
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The Sponsor acts as the Trust’s chief operating decision maker (“CODM”), assessing performance and making decisions about resource allocation. The CODM has determined that the Trust has a operating segment based on the fact that the Trust’s long-term strategic asset allocation is pre-determined in accordance with the terms of its prospectus, with a defined investment strategy which is executed by the Sponsor. The financial information provided to and reviewed by the CODM is presented within the Trust’s financial statements.
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The financial statements included herein were prepared without audit according to the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Certain information and footnote disclosures normally included in financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP may be omitted pursuant to such rules and regulations. The financial statements reflect, in the opinion of management, all adjustments necessary that were of a normal and recurring nature and adequate disclosures to present fairly the financial position and results of operations as of and for the periods indicated. The results of operations for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2025 and September 30, 2024, are not necessarily indicative of the results to be expected for the full year or for any other period.
These financial statements should be read in conjunction with the audited financial statements and the notes thereto included in Form 10-K previously filed with the SEC.
Note 3. Trust Expenses and Other Agreements
The Trustee fee is paid by the Sponsor and is not an expense of the Trust.
The Trust holds its bitcoin at the Bitcoin Custodian and at the Additional Bitcoin Custodian, both of which are regulated third-party custodians that carry insurance (in the case of the Additional Bitcoin Custodian, such insurance is carried by its parent, Coinbase Inc., and is intended to cover the loss of client assets held by Coinbase Inc. and its subsidiaries, including the Additional Bitcoin Custodian) and are responsible for safekeeping of bitcoin owned by the Trust and holding private keys that provide access to the bitcoin in the Trust’s bitcoin account.
State Street Bank and Trust Company serves as the Trust’s administrator, transfer agent and cash custodian.
| 7 |
VANECK BITCOIN ETF
Notes to Unaudited Financial Statements (continued)
September 30, 2025
Note 4. Related Parties (a)
The Sponsor is considered to be a related party to the Trust.
MarketVector Indexes GmbH is the index sponsor and index administrator for the MarketVector Bitcoin Benchmark Rate, which is used by the Trust to determine its NAV. MarketVector Indexes GmbH is an indirectly wholly-owned subsidiary of VanEck.
Van Eck Securities Corporation, a marketing agent to the Trust, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of VanEck.
VanEck was the initial seed investor (“Seed
Capital Investor”) on December 21, 2023. On January 4, 2024, the
VanEck is a minority interest holder in the
parent company of the Bitcoin Custodian, representing less than
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Note 5. Capital Share Transactions
Investors can buy and sell Shares of the Trust in secondary market transactions through brokers. Shares trade on the Exchange under the ticker symbol HODL. Shares are bought and sold throughout the trading day like other publicly traded securities.
The Trust continuously offers the Trust Shares
in baskets consisting of
The Trust creates and redeems Shares, but only in one or more baskets. Baskets are only made in exchange for delivery to the Trust or the distribution by the Trust of the amount of bitcoin represented by the baskets being created or redeemed, the amount of which is equal to the combined NAV of the number of Shares included in the baskets being created or redeemed determined as of 4:00 p.m. EST on the day the order to create or redeem baskets is properly received. For an order to create baskets, an authorized participant will deliver cash to the Trust’s account at the cash custodian, which the Sponsor will then use to purchase bitcoin from a liquidity provider chosen by the Sponsor. For an order to redeem baskets, the Sponsor will arrange for the bitcoin represented by the basket to be sold to a liquidity provider chosen by the Sponsor and the cash proceeds distributed from the Trust’s account at the cash custodian to the authorized participant in exchange for their Shares. Only authorized participants may place orders to create and redeem baskets through the transfer agent. The transfer agent will coordinate with the Trust’s Bitcoin Custodians to facilitate settlement of the Shares and bitcoin.
Share and capital activity is as follows:
| Three Months Ended September 30, | Nine Months Ended September 30, | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2025 | 2024 (a) | 2025 (a) | 2024 (a) | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Shares | Amount | Shares | Amount | Shares | Amount | Shares | Amount | |||||||||||||||||
| Beginning of period |
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$ |
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$ |
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$ |
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$ |
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| Shares issued |
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| Shares redeemed |
(
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(
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(
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(
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(
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(
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| End of period |
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$ |
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$ |
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$ |
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| 8 |
VANECK BITCOIN ETF
Notes to Unaudited Financial Statements (continued)
September 30, 2025
Note 6. Commitments and Contingent Liabilities
In the normal course of business, the Trust enters into contracts that contain a variety of general indemnifications. The Trust’s maximum exposure under these agreements is unknown as this would involve future claims that may be made against the Trust that have not yet occurred. However, the Sponsor believes the risk of loss under these arrangements to be remote.
Note 7. Concentration Risk
Substantially all of the Trust’s assets
are holdings of bitcoin, which creates a concentration risk associated with fluctuations in the value of bitcoin due to a number
of factors. Accordingly, a decline in the value of bitcoin will have an adverse effect on the value of the Shares of the Trust.
Factors that may have the effect of causing a decline in the value of bitcoin include high volatility, which could have a negative
impact on the performance of the Trust. Bitcoin platforms are relatively new and may be unregulated or may be subject to regulation
in a relevant jurisdiction, but may not be complying, and therefore, may be more exposed to fraud and security breaches than established,
regulated exchanges for other financial assets or instruments, which could have a negative impact on the performance of the Trust.
The value of the Shares depends on the development and acceptance of the bitcoin network. The slowing or stopping of the development
or acceptance of the bitcoin network may adversely affect an investment in the Trust. The price of bitcoin on the bitcoin market
has exhibited periods of extreme volatility. Digital assets such as bitcoin were only introduced within the past decade, and the
medium-to-long term value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the capabilities and development of block-chain
technologies and to the fundamental investment characteristics of digital assets that are uncertain and difficult to evaluate.
The Trust is subject to risks due to its concentration of investments in a single asset class. Possible illiquid markets may exacerbate
losses or increase the variability between the Trust’s NAV and its market price. The amount of bitcoin represented by the
Shares may decline over time. Bitcoin with a fair value of $
Future and current regulations by a United States or foreign government or quasi-governmental agency could have an adverse effect on an investment in the Trust. Shareholders do not have the protections associated with ownership of Shares in an investment company registered under the 1940 Act or the protections afforded by the Commodity Exchange Act. Future legal or regulatory developments may negatively affect the value of bitcoin or require the Trust or the Sponsor to become registered with the SEC or CFTC, which may cause the Trust to liquidate.
The Exchange on which the Shares are listed may halt trading in the Trust’s Shares, which would adversely impact a Shareholder’s ability to sell Shares. The market infrastructure of the bitcoin spot market could result in the absence of active authorized participants able to support the trading activity of the Trust.
| 9 |
VANECK BITCOIN ETF
Notes to Unaudited Financial Statements (continued)
September 30, 2025
Note 8. Financial Highlights (a)
The financial highlights summarize certain per share operating information and financial ratios of net investment income (loss) and expenses, to daily average net assets for the periods below. An individual investor’s return and ratios may vary based on the timing of capital transactions:
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Three Months Ended
September 30, |
Nine Months Ended
September 30, |
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| Net asset value per share, beginning of period | $ |
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| From investment operations: | ||||||||||||||||
| Net investment loss (b) |
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| Net realized gain and change in unrealized appreciation (depreciation) from investments in bitcoin (d) |
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| Net increase resulting from operations |
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| Net asset value per share, end of period | $ |
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| Total return (e) |
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| Expenses before fee waiver |
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Note 9. Subsequent Event Review
The Trust has evaluated subsequent events and transactions for potential recognition or disclosure through the date the financial statements were issued and has determined that there are no material events that would require disclosure in the financial statements.
| 10 |
Item 2. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations.
This information should be read in conjunction with the financial statements and notes to financial statements included with this report. The discussion and analysis that follows may contain statements that relate to future events or future performance. In some cases, such forward-looking statements can be identified by terminology such as “may,” “will,” “should,” “could,” “expect,” “plan,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential” or the negative of these terms or other comparable terminology. All statements (other than statements of historical fact) included in this report that address activities, events or developments that may occur in the future, including such matters as changes in commodity prices and market conditions (for bitcoin and the Shares), the operations of the Trust, the plans of the Sponsor and references to the Trust’s future success and other similar matters are forward-looking statements. These statements are only predictions. Actual events or results may differ materially. These statements are based upon certain assumptions and analyses made by the Sponsor on the basis of its perception of historical trends, current conditions and expected future developments, as well as other factors it believes are appropriate in the circumstances. Whether or not actual results and developments will conform to the Sponsor’s expectations and predictions is subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, including the special considerations discussed in this Report, general economic, market and business conditions, changes in laws or regulations, including those concerning taxes, made by governmental authorities or regulatory bodies, and other world economic and political developments. Consequently, all the forward-looking statements made in this report are qualified by these cautionary statements, and there can be no assurance that the actual results or developments the Sponsor anticipates will be realized or, even if substantially realized, will result in the expected consequences to, or have the expected effects on, the Trust’s operations or the value of the Shares issued by the Trust. Moreover, neither the Sponsor nor any other person assumes responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the forward-looking statements. Neither the Trust nor the Sponsor undertakes an obligation to publicly update or conform to actual results any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of new information, future developments or otherwise, except as required by law.
Introduction
The Trust is a Delaware statutory trust. The Trust does not have directors, officers or employees. The creation and operation of the Trust has been arranged by the Sponsor. The Trust is administered by the Trust Agreement, among the Sponsor, the Trustee and the Delaware Trustee. The Trust is managed and controlled by the Sponsor, a wholly-owned subsidiary of VanEck. The Sponsor is not governed by a board of directors.
The Trust’s investment objective is to reflect the performance of bitcoin less the operating expenses of the Trust. The Trust is a passive investment vehicle that does not seek to pursue any investment strategy beyond tracking the price of bitcoin. The Trust does not engage in any activities designed to obtain a profit from, or ameliorate losses caused by, changes in the price of bitcoin.
The Trust issues and redeems Shares only in aggregations of 25,000 Shares, a Basket, or integral multiples thereof, and only in transactions with Authorized Participants.
Shares of the Trust trade on the Exchange under the ticker symbol “HODL.”
Computation of Net Asset Value
The Trust’s NAV is calculated based on the Trust’s net asset holdings, as reconciled to the Bitcoin Custodians’ accounts, on a market approach determined on a daily basis in accordance with the MarketVector TM Bitcoin Benchmark Rate price at 4:00 p.m. EST. The Trust’s NAV per Share is calculated by taking the current market value of its total assets, subtracting any liabilities, and then dividing that total by the total number of outstanding Shares. The Trust Agreement gives the Sponsor the exclusive authority to determine the Trust’s NAV and the Trust’s NAV per Share, which it has delegated to the Administrator.
| 11 |
Liquidity
The Trust is not aware of any trends, demands, conditions or events that are reasonably likely to result in material changes to its liquidity needs. In exchange for a fee, the Sponsor has agreed to assume most of the expenses incurred by the Trust. As a result, the only ordinary expense of the Trust during the period covered by this report was the Sponsor’s Fee. The Trust’s only source of liquidity is its sales of bitcoin.
Significant Accounting Policies
In preparing financial statements in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America (“GAAP”), management makes estimates and assumptions that affect the reported amounts of assets, liabilities and disclosures of contingent assets and liabilities at the date of the financial statements, as well as the reported amount of revenue and expenses reported during the period. Actual results could differ from these estimates. A description of the valuation of bitcoin, a critical accounting policy that the Trust believes is important to understanding its results of operations and financial position, is provided in the section entitled “Computation of Net Asset Value” above. In addition, please refer to Note 2 to the Financial Statements included in this report for further discussion of the Trust’s accounting policies.
Results of Operations (a)
The Quarter Ended September 30, 2024
The Trust’s NAV increased from $614,747,718 at June 30, 2024 to $759,376,653 at September 30, 2024, a 23.53% increase. The increase in the Trust’s NAV resulted primarily from the number of outstanding Shares increasing from 35,100,000 Shares at June 30, 2024 to 42,400,000 Shares at September 30, 2024. This is the net result of 12,600,000 Shares (504 Baskets) being created and 5,300,000 Shares (212 Baskets) being redeemed during the period. In addition, the price of bitcoin grew 2.26% from $61,926 at June 30, 2024 to $63,326 at September 30, 2024.
The 2.26% increase in the NAV per Share from $17.52 at June 30, 2024 to $17.91 at September 30, 2024 is directly related to the 2.26% increase in the price of bitcoin during this period.
The NAV per Share of $19.19 on July 22, 2024, was the highest during the quarter, compared with a low during the quarter of $15.02 on August 5, 2024.
Net increase in net assets resulting from operations for the quarter ended September 30, 2024, was $15,911,468 resulting from a net change in unrealized appreciation on investment in bitcoin of $11,414,566, a net realized gain of $4,496,902 on bitcoin sold for the redemption of Shares and a net investment loss of $0. The Trust had no expenses during the quarter as they were all waived by the Sponsor.
The Nine-Month Period Ended September 30, 2024
The Trust’s NAV increased from $100,000 at December 31, 2023 to $759,376,653 at September 30, 2024, a 759,277% increase. The increase in the Trust’s NAV resulted primarily from an increase in the number of outstanding Shares, which increased from 8,000 Shares at December 31, 2023 to 42,400,000 Shares at September 30, 2024. This is the net result of 51,600,000 Shares (1,752 Baskets) being created and 9,208,000 Shares (360 Baskets) being redeemed during the period. In addition, the price of bitcoin increased 43.33% from $44,182 at January 4, 2024 to $63,326 at September 30, 2024.
The 43.28% increase in the NAV per Share from $12.50 at December 31, 2023 to $17.91 at September 30, 2024 is directly related to the 43.33% increase in the price of bitcoin during this period.
The NAV per Share of $20.68 on March 13, 2024, was the highest during the period, compared with a low during the period of $11.10 on January 23, 2024.
Net increase in net assets resulting from operations for the nine-month period ended September 30, 2024, was $38,425,905, resulting from a net change in unrealized appreciation on investment in bitcoin of $24,957,145, a net realized gain of $13,521,354 on bitcoin sold for the redemption of Shares, a net realized gain of $10,977 from bitcoin sold to pay expenses during the nine-month period, and a net investment loss of $63,571. Other than the Sponsor Fee of $63,571, the Trust had no other expenses during the nine-month period.
The Quarter Ended September 30, 2025
The Trust’s NAV increased from $1,679,361,166 at June 30, 2025 to $2,039,322,369 at September 30, 2025, a 21.43% increase. The increase in the Trust’s NAV resulted primarily from an increase in the number of outstanding Shares, which increased from 55,375,000 Shares at June 30, 2025 to 63,125,000 Shares at September 30, 2025. This is the net result of 9,750,000 Shares (390
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Baskets) being created and 2,000,000 Shares (80 Baskets) being redeemed during the period. In addition, the price of bitcoin increased 6.53% from $107,231 at June 30, 2025 to $114,228 at September 30, 2025.
The 6.53% increase in the NAV per Share from $30.33 at June 30, 2025 to $32.31 at September 30, 2025 is primarily related to the 6.53% increase in the price of bitcoin during this period.
The NAV per Share of $34.59 on August 13, 2025, was the highest during the quarter, compared with a low during the quarter of $29.87 on July 1, 2025.
Net increase in net assets resulting from operations for the quarter ended September 30, 2025, was $103,792,268 resulting from a net change in unrealized appreciation on investment in bitcoin of $84,089,218 and a net realized gain of $19,703,050 on bitcoin sold for the redemption of Shares and a net investment loss of $0. The Trust had no expenses during the quarter as they were all waived by the Sponsor.
The Nine-Month Period Ended September 30, 2025
The Trust’s NAV increased from $1,280,450,332 at December 31, 2024, to $2,039,322,369 at September 30, 2025, a 59.27% increase. The increase in the Trust’s NAV resulted primarily from an increase in the number of outstanding Shares, which increased from 48,500,000 Shares at December 31, 2024 to 63,125,000 at September 30, 2025. This is the net result of 21,850,000 Shares (874 Baskets) being created and 7,225,000 Shares (289 Baskets) being redeemed during the period. In addition, the price of bitcoin increased 22.37% from $93,349 at December 31, 2024 to $114,228 at September 30, 2025.
The 22.39% increase in the NAV per Share from $26.40 at December 31, 2024 to $32.31 at September 30, 2025 is directly related to the 22.37% increase in the price of bitcoin during this period.
The NAV per Share of $34.59 on August 13, 2025, was the highest during the period, compared with a low during the period of $21.70 on April 8, 2025.
Net increase in net assets resulting from operations for the nine months ended September 30, 2025, was $297,152,438 resulting from a net change in unrealized appreciation on investment in bitcoin of $243,902,664 and a net realized gain of $53,249,774 on bitcoin sold for the redemption of Shares and a net investment loss of $0. The Trust had no expenses during the quarter as they were all waived by the Sponsor.
(a) Shares outstanding, Baskets and NAV per Share, where applicable have been adjusted to reflect the 4 for 1 share split that took place on February 14, 2025.
Item 3. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk.
Not applicable.
Item 4. Controls and Procedures.
The duly authorized officers of the Sponsor performing functions equivalent to those a principal executive officer and principal financial officer of the Trust would perform if the Trust had any officers have evaluated the effectiveness of the Trust’s disclosure controls and procedures, and have concluded that the disclosure controls and procedures of the Trust were effective as of the end of the period covered by this report to provide reasonable assurance that information required to be disclosed in the reports that the Trust files or submits under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, is recorded, processed, summarized and reported, within the time periods specified in the applicable rules and forms, and that it is accumulated and communicated to the duly authorized officers of the Sponsor performing functions equivalent to those a principal executive officer and principal financial officer of the Trust would perform if the Trust had any officers, as appropriate to allow timely decisions regarding required disclosure.
There are inherent limitations to the effectiveness of any system of disclosure controls and procedures, including the possibility of human error and the circumvention or overriding of the controls and procedures.
There were no changes in the Trust’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by this report that have materially affected, or are reasonably likely to materially affect, the Trust’s internal control over financial reporting.
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Part II. OTHER INFORMATION.
Item 1. Legal Proceedings.
None.
Item 1A. Risk Factors.
Except as set forth below, there have been no material changes to the Risk Factors last reported under Part I, Item 1A of the registrant’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2024, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 26, 2025.
The trading prices of many digital assets, including bitcoin, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of bitcoin, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value.
The trading prices of many digital assets, including bitcoin, have experienced extreme volatility in recent periods and may continue to do so. The average annualized one-year trailing volatility of bitcoin over the past ten years to date remains elevated at 65%. Over the course of 2021, there were steep increases in the value of certain digital assets, including bitcoin, and multiple market observers asserted that digital assets were experiencing a “bubble.” These increases were followed by steep drawdowns throughout 2022 in digital asset trading prices, including for bitcoin. In the 2021-2022 cycle, the price of bitcoin peaked at $67,734 and bottomed at $15,632, representing a 77% drawdown. These episodes of rapid price appreciation followed by steep drawdowns have occurred multiple times throughout bitcoin’s history, including in 2011, 2013-2014, and 2017-2018, before repeating again in 2021-2022. Digital asset prices have continued to fluctuate in 2025. For example, bitcoin lost approximately 14% of its value according to some sources in mid-October 2025 as part of wider digital asset market turmoil, widely attributed to global trade tensions, which triggered a number of dislocations in the digital asset market (the “October 2025 Flash Crash”), including liquidations of up to $20 billion in collateral in the form of various digital assets (including, but not limited to, bitcoin) securing trades (particularly perpetual futures contracts and various forms of financing transactions), along with reported service interruptions, halted orders, forced unwinding of trades, and other issues, across centralized and decentralized exchanges.
Extreme volatility may persist, and the value of the Shares may significantly decline in the future without recovery. The digital asset markets may still be experiencing a bubble or may experience a bubble again in the future. For example, in the first half of 2022, each of Celsius Network, Voyager Digital Ltd., and Three Arrows Capital declared bankruptcy, resulting in a loss of confidence in participants of the digital asset ecosystem and negative publicity surrounding digital assets more broadly. In November 2022, FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”), one of the largest digital asset platforms by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals amid rumors of the company’s liquidity issues and likely insolvency, which were subsequently corroborated by its CEO. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resigned and FTX and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States, while other affiliates have entered insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceedings around the globe, following which the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal fraud and other charges, and the SEC and CFTC brought civil securities and commodities fraud charges, against certain of FTX’s and its affiliates’ senior executives, including its former CEO. In addition, several other entities in the digital asset industry filed for bankruptcy following FTX’s bankruptcy filing, such as BlockFi Inc. and Genesis Global Capital, LLC (“Genesis”). In response to these events (collectively, the “2022 Events”), the digital asset markets have experienced extreme price volatility and other entities in the digital asset industry have been, and may continue to be, negatively affected, further undermining confidence in the digital asset markets. These events have also negatively impacted the liquidity of the digital asset markets as certain entities affiliated with FTX engaged in significant trading activity. If the liquidity of the digital asset markets continues to be negatively impacted by these events, digital asset prices, including bitcoin, may continue to experience significant volatility or price declines and confidence in the digital asset markets may be further undermined. In addition, regulatory and enforcement scrutiny has increased, including from, among others, the Department of Justice, the SEC, the CFTC, the White House and Congress, as well as state regulators and authorities. These events are continuing to develop and the full facts are continuing to emerge. It is not possible to predict at this time all of the risks that they may pose to the Trust, its service providers or to the digital asset industry as a whole.
The prices of some digital assets, including bitcoin, have fluctuated significantly following the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Many expect this new administration to facilitate a supportive regulatory approach toward the digital asset industry. Through his executive orders, President Trump has indicated that the administration will work toward providing greater regulatory clarity for blockchain technology and digital assets, thereby fostering their development in the United States. Similarly, the digital asset industry expects favorable legislation from the U.S. Congress, as certain members have expressed interest in advancing digital asset specific legislation. There can be no assurance that market expectations around future activity by the administration or
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Congress will be fulfilled, or that digital asset prices will rise or maintain their current levels. Some commentators have referred to the digital asset market post-President Trump’s election as a bubble. There can be no assurance that such a bubble does not exist. The failure of the administration and Congress to provide the expected level of regulatory clarity and support for blockchain technology and digital assets, could lead to a decline in digital asset prices, including bitcoin. Such a decline could cause a decline in the value of the Shares and cause Shareholders to suffer losses. Moreover, there can be no assurance that political dynamics and sentiments toward the digital asset industry, or market perceptions of those sentiments, will not unfavorably shift over time.
On March 6, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order for the “Establishment of the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and United States Digital Asset Stockpile” (the “Order”). The Order requires the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury to establish two offices to administer and maintain a “Strategic Bitcoin Reserve” (the “Bitcoin Reserve”) and a U.S. Digital Asset Stockpile (the “Digital Asset Stockpile”), respectively. The Bitcoin Reserve will be capitalized with bitcoin forfeited as part of U.S. criminal or civil proceedings or in satisfaction of penalties imposed by executive agencies. The Digital Asset Stockpile will be capitalized initially with other digital assets forfeited as part of criminal or civil asset forfeiture proceedings. This development has led to expectations within the bitcoin market that the United States may begin acquiring and holding bitcoin. The Order directs the Secretaries of the U.S. Treasury Department and the U.S. Department of Commerce to develop budget-neutral strategies for acquiring additional bitcoin for the Bitcoin Reserve. Legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, which would direct the acquisition of one million bitcoin by the federal government over a five-year period, which would be held in trust in secure storage by the U.S. Treasury. The bill proposes to fund the bitcoin acquisition using remittances from the Federal Reserve, revaluations of Federal Reserve gold certificates, and other funding mechanisms. Bills have also been introduced in several state legislatures to authorize the acquisition of bitcoin by state governments or their instrumentalities, some of which have failed to pass. If now or in the future, the U.S. federal government or any state government or any instrumentality thereof does not announce bitcoin acquisition plans or does announce such plans, but these plans fall short of market expectations, the price of bitcoin may decline, which may impact Share value. Even if government acquisitions occur or if legislation requiring acquisitions is enacted, the price of bitcoin may decline if there are implementation challenges, unexpected difficulties, policy or legal reversals, any of which may negatively impact Share value. Further, executive orders, such as the Order, are subject to change and can be reversed or overturned. The enduring existence and size of the Bitcoin Reserve and Digital Asset Stockpile, and the passage and implementation of legislation at the federal or state level, are subject to complex challenges and uncertainty that makes it difficult to evaluate their effect on the value of bitcoin and the Shares, now or in the future. Extreme volatility in the future, including further declines in the trading prices of bitcoin, could have a material adverse effect on the value of the Shares and the Shares could lose all or substantially all of their value. The Trust is not actively managed and will not take any actions to take advantage, or mitigate the impacts, of volatility in the price of bitcoin.
Disruptions or other problems in the supply chain for bitcoin mining hardware and difficulties in obtaining new hardware could cause harm to the Bitcoin network.
Manufacture, assembly and delivery of hardware and components for mining operations can be complex and protracted processes, in the course of which various problems could arise, including disruptions or delays in the supply chain, product quality control issues, as well as other external factors.
Mining operations can ordinarily only be profitable if the costs associated with bitcoin mining, including hardware costs, are lower than the price of bitcoin itself. In the course of the normal operation of bitcoin mining facilities, miners and other critical equipment and materials related to data center construction and maintenance, such as containers, switch gears, transformers and cables, will experience ordinary wear and tear and may also face more significant malfunctions. Declines in the condition of miners and other hardware will require bitcoin miners, over time, to repair or replace those miners.
Additionally, as the technology evolves, miners may be required to acquire newer models of mining hardware and machines to remain competitive in the market. Any upgrading process may require substantial capital investment, and miners may face challenges in doing so on a timely and cost-effective basis. The business of bitcoin miners will be subject to limitations inherent within the supply chain of their mining hardware equipment and components, including competitive, governmental, and legal limitations, and other events. For example, many miners will significantly rely on foreign imports to obtain mining hardware equipment and materials. Any global trade disruption, introductions of tariffs, trade barriers and bilateral trade frictions, together with any potential downturns in the global economy resulting, could adversely affect the necessary supply chains for mining hardware. Depending on the magnitude of such effects on the mining hardware supply chain, shipments of parts for mining hardware, or new mining hardware and equipment, may be delayed.
There are a small number of major suppliers of bitcoin mining hardware globally, and a significant amount of bitcoin mining hardware manufacturing is located in China. Mining hardware manufacturers may fail to supply the mining hardware due to their inability to manufacture sufficient mining hardware, whether due to shortages of components or resources such as semiconductors, or changes of
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laws and trade restrictions (including export/import restrictions, quotas or tariffs), or due to insolvency, or non-performance or default on their contracts. Trade policies such as export/import restrictions, quotas or tariffs may reduce the ability of bitcoin mining hardware suppliers to supply miners with bitcoin mining hardware or create a shortage or lack of components necessary for their manufacture or repair. If bitcoin miners are unable to source mining hardware from those suppliers (for example due to overwhelming global demand for bitcoin miners, or due to trade restrictions, or other causes) at commercially reasonable prices, or at all, and replacement or substitute sources of bitcoin mining hardware prove to be unavailable, there could be a negative impact on bitcoin mining globally. These could affect the Bitcoin network by making it more difficult for transactions to be confirmed, increase transaction costs, or affect the Bitcoin network’s security, among other negative effects, any of which could negatively affect the value of bitcoin and consequently the Shares.
Further, the first-generation application specific integrated circuit (“ASIC”) chips and other critical components for mining equipment may be subject to price fluctuations or shortages. For example, the ASIC chip is the key component of a mining machine as it determines the efficiency of the device. The production of ASIC chips typically requires highly sophisticated silicon wafers, which currently only a small number of fabrication facilities, or wafer foundries, in the world are capable of producing. There have been previous microchip shortages which led to price fluctuations and disruption in the supply of key bitcoin mining hardware components. ASIC chips have recently been subject to supply and demand fluctuations, significant price increases and shortages. Shortages of ASIC chips could create problems in the supply chain for bitcoin mining equipment, negatively affecting the Bitcoin network by making it more difficult for transactions to be confirmed or increasing transaction costs, or even affecting network security, which again could cause the value of bitcoin and the Shares to decline.
Due to the unregulated nature and lack of transparency surrounding the operations of bitcoin trading platforms, which may be subject to regulation in a relevant jurisdiction, but may not be complying, they may experience fraud, manipulation, security failures or operational problems, which may adversely affect the value of bitcoin and, consequently, the value of the Shares.
Digital asset trading platforms are relatively new and, in some cases, unregulated. Many operate outside the United States. Furthermore, while many prominent digital asset trading platforms provide the public with significant information regarding their ownership structure, management teams, corporate practices and regulatory compliance, many digital asset trading platforms do not provide this information. Digital asset trading platforms may not be subject to, or may not comply with, regulation in a similar manner as other regulated trading platforms, such as national securities exchanges or designated contract markets. As a result, the marketplace may lose confidence in digital asset trading platforms, including prominent trading platforms that handle a significant volume of bitcoin trading.
Many digital asset trading platforms are unlicensed, may be unregulated, may be subject to regulation in a relevant jurisdiction, but may or may not be in compliance therewith, may operate without extensive supervision by governmental authorities, and do not provide the public with significant information regarding their ownership structure, management team, corporate practices, cybersecurity, and regulatory compliance. In particular, those located outside the United States may be subject to significantly less stringent regulatory and compliance requirements in their local jurisdictions, and may take the position that they are not subject to laws and regulations that would apply to a national securities exchange or designated contract market in the United States, or may, as a practical matter, be beyond the ambit of U.S. regulators. As a result, trading activity on or reported by these digital asset trading platforms is generally significantly less regulated than trading in regulated U.S. securities and commodities markets, and may reflect behavior that would be prohibited in regulated U.S. trading venues.
The bitcoin market globally and in the United States is not subject to comparable regulatory guardrails as exist in regulated securities markets. Furthermore, many bitcoin trading venues lack certain safeguards put in place by exchanges for more traditional assets to enhance the stability of trading on the exchanges and prevent “flash crashes,” such as limit-down circuit breakers, as demonstrated by the October 2025 Flash Crash. As a result, the prices of bitcoin on trading venues may be subject to larger and/or more frequent sudden declines than assets traded on more traditional exchanges. Tools to detect and deter fraudulent or manipulative trading activities such as market manipulation, front-running of trades, and wash-trading may not be available to or employed by digital asset trading platforms, or may not exist at all.
Bitcoin trading platforms may be exposed to fraud and manipulation.
The SEC has identified possible sources of fraud and manipulation in the bitcoin market generally, including, among others (1) “wash trading”; (2) persons with a dominant position in bitcoin manipulating bitcoin pricing; (3) hacking of the Bitcoin network and trading platforms; (4) malicious control of the Bitcoin network; (5) trading based on material, non-public information (for example, plans of market participants to significantly increase or decrease their holdings in bitcoin, new sources of demand for bitcoin) or based on the
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dissemination of false and misleading information; (6) manipulative activity involving purported “stablecoins,” including Tether (for more information, “-Prices of bitcoin may be affected due to stablecoins (including Tether and US Dollar Coin (“USDC”)), the activities of stablecoin issuers and their regulatory treatment”); and (7) fraud and manipulation at bitcoin trading platforms. The effect of potential market manipulation, front-running, wash-trading, and other fraudulent or manipulative trading practices may inflate the volumes actually present in crypto market and/or cause distortions in price, which could adversely affect the Trust or cause losses to Shareholders.
Over the past several years, some digital asset trading platforms have been closed due to fraud and manipulative activity, business failure or security breaches. In many of these instances, the customers of such digital asset trading platforms were not compensated or made whole for the partial or complete losses of their account balances in such digital asset trading platforms. While, generally speaking, smaller digital asset trading platforms are less likely to have the infrastructure and capitalization that make larger digital asset trading platforms more stable, larger digital asset trading platforms are more likely to be appealing targets for hackers and malware and may be more likely to be targets of regulatory enforcement action. For example, the collapse of Mt. Gox, which filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan in late February 2014, demonstrated that even the largest digital asset trading platforms could be subject to abrupt failure with consequences for both users of digital asset platforms and the digital asset industry as a whole. In particular, in the two weeks that followed the February 7, 2014 halt of bitcoin withdrawals from Mt. Gox, the value of one bitcoin fell on other trading platforms from around $795 on February 6, 2014 to $578 on February 20, 2014. Additionally, in January 2015, Bitstamp announced that approximately 19,000 bitcoin had been stolen from its operational or “hot” wallets. Further, in August 2016, it was reported that almost 120,000 bitcoins worth around $78 million were stolen from Bitfinex. The value of bitcoin and other digital assets immediately decreased over 10% following reports of the theft at Bitfinex. In July 2017, FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-E, a now defunct digital asset trading platform, for facilitating crimes such as drug sales and ransomware attacks. In addition, in December 2017, Yapian, the operator of Seoul-based cryptocurrency trading platform Youbit, suspended digital asset trading and filed for bankruptcy following a hack that resulted in a loss of 17% of Yapian’s assets. Following the hack, Youbit users were allowed to withdraw approximately 75% of the digital assets in their platform accounts, with any potential further distributions to be made following Yapian’s pending bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, in January 2018, the Japanese digital asset trading platform, Coincheck, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $535 million, and in February 2018, the Italian digital asset trading platform, Bitgrail, was hacked, resulting in approximately $170 million in losses. In May 2019, one of the world’s largest digital asset trading platform, Binance, was hacked, resulting in losses of approximately $40 million. In November 2022, FTX, one of the largest digital asset trading platform by volume at the time, halted customer withdrawals and filed for bankruptcy, which revealed a shortfall of customer funds. Shortly thereafter, FTX’s CEO resigned and FTX and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in the United States, while other affiliates have entered insolvency, liquidation, or similar proceedings around the globe, following which the U.S. Department of Justice brought criminal fraud and other charges, and the SEC and CFTC brought civil securities and commodities fraud charges, against certain of FTX’s and its affiliates’ senior executives, including its former CEO. Around the same time, there were reports that approximately $300-600 million of digital assets were removed from FTX and the full facts remain unknown, including whether such removal was the result of a hack, theft, insider activity, or other improper behavior.
In 2019 there were reports claiming that 80.95% of bitcoin trading volume on digital asset trading platforms was false or noneconomic in nature, with specific focus on unregulated exchanges located outside of the United States. Such reports alleged that certain overseas trading platforms have displayed suspicious trading activity suggestive of a variety of manipulative or fraudulent practices, such as fake or artificial trading volume or trading volume based on non-economic “wash trading” (where offsetting trades are entered into for other than bona fide reasons, such as the desire to inflate reported trading volumes), and attributed such manipulative or fraudulent behavior to motives like the incentive to attract listing fees from token issuers who seek the most liquid and high-volume platforms on which to list their coins.
Other academics and market observers have put forth evidence to support claims that manipulative trading activity has occurred on certain bitcoin trading platforms. For example, in a 2017 paper titled “Price Manipulation in the Bitcoin Ecosystem” sponsored by the Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center at Tel Aviv University, a group of researchers used publicly available trading data, as well as leaked transaction data from a 2014 Mt. Gox security breach, to identify and analyze the impact of “suspicious trading activity” on Mt. Gox between February and November 2013, which, according to the authors, caused the price of bitcoin to increase from around $150 to more than $1,000 over a two-month period.
The potential consequences of a digital asset trading platform failure or failure to prevent market manipulation could adversely affect the value of the Shares. Manipulative trading or market abuse could create artificial or distorted prices, cause a loss of investor
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confidence in bitcoin, adversely impact pricing trends in bitcoin markets broadly, and cause losses from an investment in Shares of the Trust.
If a Liquidity Provider Agreement, the Custody Agreement, the Additional Bitcoin Custody Agreement, an Authorized Participant Agreement or Clearing Agreement is terminated or a Liquidity Provider, an Authorized Participant, the Bitcoin Custodian or the Additional Bitcoin Custodian fails to participate in the creation or redemption processes of the Trust or fails to provide services as required, the Sponsor may need to find and appoint a replacement Liquidity Provider, Authorized Participant, Bitcoin Custodian or Additional Bitcoin Custodian quickly, which could pose a challenge to the Trust’s ability to create and redeem Shares or the safekeeping of the Trust’s bitcoins, and the Trust’s ability to continue to operate may be adversely affected.
The Trust is dependent on the Bitcoin Custodian to operate, pursuant to the Custody Agreement and the Clearing Agreement. The Bitcoin Custodian performs essential functions in terms of safekeeping the Trust’s bitcoin and, via the Clearing Services, facilitates the transfer of bitcoin to the Trust by Liquidity Providers and from the Trust in connection with creations and redemptions and to pay the Sponsor Fee and extraordinary Trust expenses, and in extraordinary circumstances, to liquidate the Trust. If the Bitcoin Custodian fails to perform the functions it performs for the Trust, the Trust may be unable to operate or create or redeem Baskets, which could force the Trust to liquidate or adversely affect the price of the Shares.
The Sponsor could decide to replace the Bitcoin Custodian as the custodian of the Trust’s bitcoins, pursuant to the Custody Agreement. Similarly, the Bitcoin Custodian under the Custody Agreement and Clearing Agreement may terminate the Custody Agreement and Clearing Agreement respectively upon providing the applicable notice to the Trust for any reason, or immediately, upon the occurrence of a Termination Event (as defined below) that is incapable of being cured within ten business days or if it determines in its sole discretion it is necessary to take such action to comply with applicable laws and regulations or in connection with Gemini’s fraud or other compliance program. Under the Custody Agreement, a “Termination Event” occurs when (i) any representation, warranty, certification or statement made by the Trust was or becomes incorrect in any material respect when made; (ii) the Trust materially breaches, or fails in any material respect to perform any of its obligations under the Custody Agreement; (iii) the Trust requests a postponement of maturity or a moratorium with respect to any indebtedness or is adjudged bankrupt or insolvent, or there is commenced against the Trust a case under any applicable bankruptcy, insolvency or other similar law now or hereafter in effect, or the Trust files a petition for bankruptcy or an application for an arrangement with its creditors, seeks or consents to the appointment of a receiver, administrator or other similar official for all or any substantial part of its property, admits in writing its inability to pay its debts as they mature, or takes any corporate action in furtherance of any of the foregoing, or fails to meet applicable legal minimum capital requirements; or (iv) a change of control of the Trust, or an event, change or development that causes or is likely to cause a material adverse effect on the Trust, or in the ability of the Trust to fulfill its responsibilities under the Custody Agreement, occurs. Transferring maintenance responsibilities of the Trust’s account at the Bitcoin Custodian to another custodian may be complex and could subject the Trust’s bitcoin to the risk of loss during the transfer, which could have a negative impact on the performance of the Shares or result in loss of the Trust’s assets. Also, if the Bitcoin Custodian becomes insolvent, suffers business failure, ceases business operations, defaults on or fails to perform its obligations under the Custody Agreement or Clearing Agreement with the Trust, or abruptly discontinues the services it provides to the Trust for any reason, the Trust’s operations would be adversely affected.
On October 19, 2023, Gemini, the Bitcoin Custodian for the Trust, was named in a complaint filed by the New York Attorney General (“NYAG Lawsuit”) against Gemini and other entities, including Genesis and its affiliates (collectively, the “Genesis Entities”) in a New York state court, alleging, inter alia, that Gemini had violated New York’s Martin Act by soliciting money from the public, including persons in New York, with false assurances that an investment program called Gemini Earn, pursuant to which customers of Gemini could deposit money in Earn accounts at Gemini that would then be loaned to the Genesis Entities and repaid with interest by them, was a highly liquid investment and that Genesis was a creditworthy borrower based on the Bitcoin Custodian’s ongoing risk monitoring. On February 9, 2024, NYAG amended its lawsuit to add additional allegations against defendants other than Gemini. No new allegations were made against Gemini as part of the February 9 amendments.
On April 19, 2024, the United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York in the Genesis bankruptcy proceedings, approved a settlement that allowed for certain payments, on an in-kind “coin-for-coin” basis, to be made. Gemini made certain payments, on an in-kind “coin-for-coin” basis to Gemini Earn investors on May 29, 2024, however these investors were not made completely whole and were still owed approximately $50 million in cryptocurrency. On June 14, 2024, Gemini and NYAG entered into a Stipulation and Consent to Judgement which resolves claims against Gemini set out in the NYAG Lawsuit as described above (the “NYAG Settlement”). As part of the NYAG Settlement, Gemini will return approximately $50 million worth of digital assets to investors of the Gemini Earn program who were entitled to receive, and did receive, distributions from Gemini on May 29, 2024. Gemini will be required to make such full and complete restitution on an in-kind “coin-for-coin” basis. Additionally, Gemini will be
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banned from operating any cryptocurrency lending program in New York, unless a future state or federal legislation specifically permits cryptocurrency lending programs in or from the State of New York at which point NYAG’s consent shall be required.
On February 28, 2024, Gemini and the New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) announced that they had entered into an administrative consent settlement agreement (the “NYDFS Settlement”) that included findings, primarily with respect to the Gemini Earn program, that Gemini had conducted some of its business in an unsafe and unsound manner, made false or misleading advertising statements, and failed to maintain an effective customer due diligence program, and committed other violations of New York Banking Law and NYDFS regulations. Pursuant to this settlement, Gemini has agreed to ensure that at least $1.1 billion is returned to Gemini Earn users through the Genesis bankruptcy proceedings that are also creditors in the Genesis bankruptcy. In addition, Gemini has agreed to contribute at least $40 million for the benefit of impacted Gemini Earn users and pay a $37 million fine to NYDFS. In determining the appropriate amount of the penalty, the NYDFS acknowledged and commended Gemini’s cooperation and recognized Gemini’s engagement with the NYDFS on the matters identified in the NYDFS Settlement and its ongoing efforts to remediate the shortcomings identified in the NYDFS Settlement and during the NYDFS’ most recent examination of Gemini.
Additionally, pursuant to the NYDFS Settlement, Gemini agreed to provide an action plan to NYDFS including implementing the recommendations of an outside consultant in connection with a governance and management assessment, continuing to strengthen its controls, policies and procedures to ensure robust compliance programs in connection with its virtual currency business activity, and continuing its cooperation with the NYDFS to remediate the violations identified in the NYDFS Settlement and previous examinations. The NYDFS Settlement also reserves the NYDFS’s right to bring an action against Gemini if Gemini fails to fulfill its obligations under NYDFS Settlement. The NYDFS Settlement does not resolve any other regulatory proceedings or litigation involving Gemini. As a regulated entity with financial services licenses in multiple jurisdictions, it is possible that other regulators may decide to initiate their own action with respect to Gemini based on the findings contained in the NYDFS Settlement.
Gemini, as the Bitcoin Custodian, could be required, as a result of judicial or regulatory determinations, or could choose, to restrict or curtail the services it offers (whether in or from New York State or generally), its licenses could be impacted, or its financial condition and ability to provide services to the Trust could be affected as a result of the NYDFS Settlement, NYAG Settlement, or other litigation. If the Bitcoin Custodian were to be required or choose, as a result of litigation or regulatory action, to restrict, curtail, or terminate the services it offers, it could negatively affect the Trust’s ability to operate, hold bitcoin, or process creations or redemptions of Baskets, which could force the Trust to engage an alternate bitcoin custodian or to liquidate and could adversely affect the value of the Shares.
Similarly, the Additional Bitcoin Custodian performs essential functions in terms of safekeeping the Trust’s bitcoin in the Additional Bitcoin Vault Balance. If the Additional Bitcoin Custodian fails to perform the functions they perform for the Trust, the Trust may be unable to operate or create or redeem Baskets, which could force the Trust to liquidate or adversely affect the price of the Shares.
On March 22, 2023, Coinbase, Inc., which is an affiliate of the Additional Bitcoin Custodian, and its parent (such parent, “Coinbase Global” and together with Coinbase Inc., the “Relevant Coinbase Entities”) received a “Wells Notice” from the SEC staff stating that the SEC staff made a “preliminary determination” to recommend that the SEC file an enforcement action against the Relevant Coinbase Entities alleging violations of the federal securities laws, including the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. According to Coinbase Global’s public reporting company disclosure, based on discussions with the SEC staff, the Relevant Coinbase Entities believe these potential enforcement actions would relate to aspects of the Relevant Coinbase Entities’ Coinbase Prime service, spot market, staking service Coinbase Earn, and Coinbase Wallet, and the potential civil action may seek injunctive relief, disgorgement, and civil penalties. On June 6, 2023, the SEC filed a complaint against the Relevant Coinbase Entities in federal district court in the Southern District of New York, alleging, inter alia: (i) that Coinbase Inc. has violated the Exchange Act by failing to register with the SEC as a national securities exchange, broker-dealer, and clearing agency, in connection with activities involving certain identified digital assets that the SEC’s complaint alleges are securities, (ii) that Coinbase Inc. has violated the Securities Act by failing to register with the SEC the offer and sale of its staking program, and (iii) that Coinbase Global is jointly and severally liable as a control person under the Exchange Act for Coinbase Inc.’s violations of the Exchange Act to the same extent as Coinbase Inc. The SEC’s complaint seeks a permanent injunction against the Relevant Coinbase Entities to prevent them from violations of the Exchange Act or Securities Act, disgorgement, civil monetary penalties, and such other relief as the court deems appropriate or necessary. On February 27, 2025, the SEC and the Relevant Coinbase Entities filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice, and the case has been dismissed. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the SEC enforcement action, Coinbase Inc. is currently, and it and the Additional Bitcoin Custodian from time to time may be, subject in the future, to a variety of other litigation. Although the Trust does not presently anticipate such an outcome, there can be no assurance that in the future Coinbase Inc. or Coinbase Custody, as Bitcoin Custodian, will not be required, as a result of a judicial determination, or will not choose, to restrict or curtail the services they offer, or their financial condition and ability to provide services to the Trust, will not be negatively affected.
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Alternatively, the Sponsor could decide to replace the Additional Bitcoin Custodian as a custodian of the Trust’s bitcoin, pursuant to the Additional Custodial Services Agreement (the “Additional Bitcoin Custody Agreement”). Similarly, the Additional Bitcoin Custodian could terminate services under the Additional Bitcoin Custody Agreement for any reason and without Cause upon providing the applicable notice to the Trust for any reason, or immediately for Cause (“Cause” is defined in the Additional Bitcoin Custody Agreement as (i) the Trust breaches any provision of the Additional Bitcoin Custody Agreement and such breach is not cured within three (3) business days after notice of such breach is given to the Trust in the case of a payment-related breach or is not cured within ten (10) business days after notice of such breach is given to the Trust; (ii) the Trust takes any action to dissolve or liquidate (iii) the Trust becomes insolvent, makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, becomes subject to direct control of a trustee, receiver or similar authority; (iv) the Trust becomes subject to any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding; (v) the Additional Bitcoin Custodian becomes aware of any facts or circumstances with respect to the Trust’s financial, legal, regulatory or reputational position which reasonably would materially adversely affect The Trust’s ability to comply with its obligations under the Additional Bitcoin Custody Agreement, and such facts and circumstances cannot be cured within five (5) business days; (vi) termination is required pursuant to a facially valid subpoena, court order or binding order of a government authority; (vii) the Trust’s Additional Bitcoin Account is subject to any pending litigation, investigation or government proceeding; or (viii) the Additional Bitcoin Custodian reasonably suspects the Trust of attempting to circumvent the Additional Bitcoin Custodian’s controls in a manner the Additional Bitcoin Custodian otherwise deems inappropriate or potentially harmful to itself or third parties.) Transferring maintenance responsibilities of the Trust’s account at the Additional Bitcoin Custodian to another custodian may be complex and could subject the Trust’s bitcoin to the risk of loss during the transfer, which could have a negative impact on the performance of the Shares or result in loss of the Trust’s assets. Also, if the Additional Bitcoin Custodian becomes insolvent, suffers business failure, ceases business operations, default on or fail to perform their obligations under its contractual agreement with the Trust, or abruptly discontinue the services it provides to the Trust for any reason, the Trust’s operations including its creation and redemption processes would be adversely affected.
The Sponsor may not be able to find a party willing to serve as the custodian or perform clearing services under the same terms as the current Custody Agreement, Additional Bitcoin Custody Agreement and Clearing Agreement. To the extent that Sponsor is not able to find a suitable party willing to serve as the custodian or to perform clearing services, the Sponsor may be required to terminate the Trust and liquidate the Trust’s bitcoin. In addition, to the extent that the Sponsor finds a suitable party but must enter into a modified Custody Agreement, Additional Bitcoin Custody Agreement or Clearing Agreement that is less favorable for the Trust or Sponsor, the value of the Shares could be adversely affected.
If an Authorized Participant or a Liquidity Provider suffers insolvency, business failure or interruption, default, failure to perform, security breach, or if an Authorized Participant or a Liquidity Provider chooses not to participate in the creation and redemption processes of the Trust due to the risks described in “-The inability of Liquidity Providers to hedge their bitcoin exposure may adversely affect the liquidity of Shares and the value of an investment in the Shares” and “-If the process of creation and redemption of baskets encounters any unanticipated difficulties, the possibility for arbitrage transactions by Authorized Participants intended to keep the price of the Shares closely linked to the price of Bitcoin may not exist and, as a result, the price of the Shares may fall or otherwise diverge from NAV,” and the Trust is unable to engage replacement Authorized Participants or Liquidity Providers on commercially acceptable terms or at all, then the creation and redemption processes of the Trust or the arbitrage mechanism used to keep the Trust’s Shares trading in line with NAV could be negatively affected.
Digital asset markets in the United States exist in a state of regulatory uncertainty, and adverse legislative or regulatory developments could significantly harm the value of bitcoin or the Shares, such as by banning, restricting or imposing onerous conditions or prohibitions on the use of bitcoins, mining activity, digital wallets, the provision of services related to trading and custodying bitcoin, the operation of the Bitcoin network, or the digital asset markets generally.
There is a lack of consensus regarding the regulation of digital assets, including bitcoin, and their markets. As a result of the growth in the size of the digital asset market, as well as the 2022 Events, the U.S. Congress and a number of U.S. federal and state agencies (including FinCEN, SEC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”), CFTC, FINRA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), state financial institution regulators, and others) have been examining the operations of digital asset networks, digital asset users and the digital asset markets. Many of these state and federal agencies have brought enforcement actions or issued consumer advisories regarding the risks posed by digital assets to investors. Ongoing and future regulatory actions with respect to digital assets generally or bitcoin in particular may alter, perhaps to a materially adverse extent, the nature of an investment in the Shares or the ability of the Trust to continue to operate.
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The 2022 Events, including among others the bankruptcy filings of FTX and its subsidiaries, Three Arrows Capital, Celsius Network, Voyager Digital, Genesis, BlockFi and others, and other developments in the digital asset markets, have resulted in calls for heightened scrutiny and regulation of the digital asset industry, with a specific focus on intermediaries such as digital asset platforms, platforms, and custodians. Federal and state legislatures and regulatory agencies may introduce and enact new laws and regulations to regulate crypto asset intermediaries, such as digital asset platforms and custodians. The March 2023 collapses of Silicon Valley Bank, Silvergate Bank, and Signature Bank, which in some cases provided services to the digital asset industry, may amplify and/or accelerate these trends. On January 3, 2023, the federal banking agencies issued a joint statement on crypto-asset risks to banking organizations following events which exposed vulnerabilities in the crypto-asset sector, including the risk of fraud and scams, legal uncertainties, significant volatility, and contagion risk. Although banking organizations are not prohibited from crypto-asset related activities, the agencies have expressed significant safety and soundness concerns with business models that are concentrated in crypto-asset related activities or have concentrated exposures to the crypto-asset sector.
U.S. federal and state regulators, as well as the White House, have issued reports and releases concerning crypto assets, including bitcoin and crypto asset markets. Further, in 2023 the House of Representatives formed two new subcommittees: the Digital Assets, Financial Technology and Inclusion Subcommittee and the Commodity Markets, Digital Assets, and Rural Development Subcommittee, each of which were formed in part to analyze issues concerning crypto assets and demonstrate a legislative intent to develop and consider the adoption of federal legislation designed to address the perceived need for regulation of and concerns surrounding the crypto industry. However, the extent and content of any forthcoming laws and regulations are not yet ascertainable with certainty, and it may not be ascertainable in the near future. We cannot predict how these and other related events will affect us or the crypto asset business.
In August 2021, the chair of the SEC stated that he believed investors using digital asset trading platforms are not adequately protected, and that activities on the platforms can implicate the securities laws, commodities laws and banking laws, raising a number of issues related to protecting investors and consumers, guarding against illicit activity, and ensuring financial stability. The chair expressed a need for the SEC to have additional authorities to prevent transactions, products, and platforms from “falling between regulatory cracks,” as well as for more resources to protect investors in “this growing and volatile sector.” The chair called for federal legislation centering on digital asset trading, lending, and decentralized finance platforms, seeking “additional plenary authority” to write rules for digital asset trading and lending. It is not possible to predict whether, or when, any of these developments will lead to Congress granting additional authorities to the CFTC, SEC or other regulators, what the nature of such additional authorities might be, how additional legislation and/or regulatory oversight might impact the ability of digital asset markets to function or how any new regulations or changes to existing regulations might impact the value of digital assets generally and bitcoin held by the Trust specifically. The consequences of increased federal regulation of digital assets and digital asset activities could have a material adverse effect on the Trust and the Shares.
FinCEN requires any administrator or exchanger of convertible virtual currency (“CVC”) to register with FinCEN as a money transmitter and comply with the anti- money laundering regulations applicable to money transmitters. Entities which fail to comply with such regulations are subject to fines, may be required to cease operations, and could have potential criminal liability. For example, in 2015, FinCEN assessed a $700,000 fine against a sponsor of a digital asset for violating several requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act by acting as an MSB and selling the digital asset without registering with FinCEN, and by failing to implement and maintain an adequate anti-money laundering program. In 2017, FinCEN assessed a $110 million fine against BTC-e, a now defunct digital asset exchange, for similar violations. The requirement that exchangers that do business in the United States register with FinCEN and comply with anti- money laundering regulations may increase the cost of buying and selling bitcoin and therefore may adversely affect the price of bitcoin and an investment in the Shares.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the “U.S. Treasury Department”) has added digital currency addresses, including addresses on the Bitcoin Blockchain, to the list of Specially Designated Nationals whose assets are blocked, and with whom U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing. Such actions by OFAC, or by similar organizations in other jurisdictions, may introduce uncertainty in the market as to whether bitcoin that has been associated with such addresses in the past can be easily sold. This “tainted” bitcoin may trade at a substantial discount to untainted bitcoin. Reduced fungibility in the bitcoin markets may reduce the liquidity of bitcoin and therefore adversely affect their price.
In February 2020, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin stated that digital assets were a “crucial area” on which the U.S. Treasury Department has spent significant time. Secretary Mnuchin announced that the U.S. Treasury Department is preparing significant new regulations governing digital asset activities to address concerns regarding the potential use for facilitating money laundering and other illicit activities. In December 2020, FinCEN, a bureau within the U.S. Treasury Department, proposed a rule that would require financial institutions to submit reports, keep records, and verify the identity of customers for certain transactions to or
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from so-called “unhosted” wallets, also commonly referred to as self-hosted wallets. In January 2021, then U.S. Treasury Secretary nominee Janet Yellen stated her belief that regulators should “look closely at how to encourage the use of digital assets for legitimate activities while curtailing their use for malign and illegal activities.”
Under regulations from the New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”), businesses involved in digital asset business activity for third parties in or involving New York, excluding merchants and consumers, must apply for a license, commonly known as a BitLicense, from the NYDFS and must comply with anti-money laundering, cybersecurity, consumer protection, and financial and reporting requirements, among others. As an alternative to a BitLicense, a firm can apply for a charter to become a limited purpose trust company under New York law qualified to engage in certain digital asset business activities. Other states have considered or approved digital asset business activity statutes or rules, passing, for example, regulations or guidance indicating that certain digital asset business activities constitute money transmission requiring licensure.
The inconsistency in applying money transmitting licensure requirements to certain businesses may make it more difficult for these businesses to provide services, which may affect consumer adoption of bitcoin and its price. In an attempt to address these issues, the Uniform Law Commission passed a model law in July 2017, the Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act, which has many similarities to the BitLicense and features a multistate reciprocity licensure feature, wherein a business licensed in one state could apply for accelerated licensure procedures in other states. It is still unclear, however, how many states, if any, will adopt some or all of the model legislation.
Law enforcement agencies have often relied on the transparency of blockchains to facilitate investigations. However, certain privacy-enhancing features have been, or are expected to be, introduced to a number of digital asset networks. If the Bitcoin network were to adopt any of these privacy-enhancing features, these features may provide law enforcement agencies with less visibility into transaction-level data. Europol, the European Union’s law enforcement agency, released a report in October 2017 noting the increased use of privacy-enhancing digital assets like Zcash and Monero in criminal activity on the internet. In May 2022, OFAC banned all U.S. persons from using Blender.io, a digital asset mixing application that operates on the Bitcoin Blockchain to obfuscate the origin, destination and counterparties of blockchain transactions, by adding certain digital asset wallet addresses associated with Blender.io to its Specially Designated Nationals list. Blender.io receives a variety of transactions and mixes them together before transmitting them to their ultimate destinations. On March 23, 2022, Lazarus Group, a state-sponsored cyber hacking group associated with North Korea, carried out a major virtual currency heist from a blockchain project linked to the online game Axie Infinity; Blender.io was used in processing some of the illicit proceeds. The U.S. Treasury Department’s press release announcing the sanctions on Blender.io observed that, while most virtual currency activity is licit, virtual currency can be used for illicit activity, including sanctions evasion, through mixers, peer-to-peer exchangers, darknet markets, and exchanges. This includes the facilitation of heists, ransomware schemes, and other cybercrimes. On October 19, 2023, FinCEN published proposed rulemaking to apply the authorities in Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to impose requirements on financial institutions that engage in CVC transactions with CVC mixers. The proposed rule, if adopted, would require covered financial institutions to report to FinCEN any CVC transactions they process that involves CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States. The term “CVC mixing” covers more than just transactions that involve CVC mixers like Tornado Cash, and seemingly could cover a broader range of conduct involving technologies, services, or methods that have the effect of obfuscating the source, destination, or amount of a CVC transaction, whether or not the obfuscation was intentional. If the rule were to be adopted as proposed and if the Bitcoin Blockchain were to be deemed to or were to adopt features which come within the rule’s ambit, it could cause covered financial institutions - such as many digital asset platforms, or the Trust’s service providers, such as the Cash Custodian - to reduce support for or cease offering services for bitcoin or to the Trust, which could impair the utility of bitcoin, the value of the Shares and the Trust’s ability to operate in compliance with new laws and regulations.
Prices of bitcoin may be affected due to stablecoins (including Tether and USDC), the activities of stablecoin issuers and their regulatory treatment.
While the Trust does not invest in stablecoins, it may nonetheless be exposed to risks that stablecoins pose for the bitcoin market and other digital asset markets. Stablecoins are digital assets designed to have a stable value over time as compared to typically volatile digital assets and are typically marketed as being pegged to a fiat currency, such as the U.S. dollar, at a certain value. Although the prices of stablecoins are intended to be stable, their market value may fluctuate. This volatility has in the past apparently impacted the price of bitcoin. Stablecoins are a relatively new phenomenon, and it is impossible to know all of the risks that they could pose to participants in the bitcoin market. Like CBDCs, stablecoins could compete with, or replace, bitcoin and other digital assets as a medium of exchange or store of value. In addition, some have argued that some stablecoins, particularly Tether, are improperly issued without sufficient backing in a way that, when the stablecoin is used to pay for bitcoin, could cause artificial rather than genuine demand for bitcoin, thereby artificially inflating the price of bitcoin. On February 17, 2021, the New York Attorney General entered
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into an agreement with Tether’s operators, requiring them to cease any further trading activity with New York persons and pay $18.5 million in penalties for false and misleading statements made regarding the assets backing Tether. On October 15, 2021, the CFTC announced a settlement with Tether’s operators in which they agreed to pay $42.5 million in fines to settle charges that, among others, Tether’s claims that it maintained sufficient U.S. dollar reserves to back every Tether stablecoin in circulation with the “equivalent amount of corresponding fiat currency” held by Tether were untrue.
USDC is a reserve-backed stablecoin issued by Circle Internet Financial that is commonly used as a method of payment in digital asset markets, including the bitcoin market. While USDC is designed to maintain a stable value at one U.S. dollar at all times, on March 10, 2023, the value of USDC fell below $1.00 for multiple days after Circle Internet Financial disclosed that $3.3 billion of the USDC reserves were held at Silicon Valley Bank, which had entered FDIC receivership earlier that day. Stablecoins are reliant on the U.S. banking system and U.S. treasuries, and the failure of either to function normally could impede the function of stablecoins, and therefore could adversely affect the value of the Shares.
Given the foundational role that stablecoins play in global digital asset markets, their liquidity can have a dramatic impact on the broader digital asset market, including the market for bitcoin. A significant portion of the digital asset market continues to depend on stablecoins such as Tether and USDC. As such, any disruption in the operation or perceived stability of these stablecoins such as a disorderly de-pegging event or a loss of market confidence resulting in a run on reserves could lead to substantial market volatility across digital assets more broadly.
Additional risks such as operational failures (e.g., technical issues that prevent settlement), concerns regarding the adequacy or transparency of reserve assets backing stablecoins, the use of unbacked or undercollateralized stablecoins in potentially manipulative trading practices and regulatory scrutiny of stablecoin issuers or intermediaries, including exchanges that facilitate stablecoin transactions, may also adversely affect market confidence and liquidity. Further, these risks are underscored by recent legislative developments. On July 18, 2025, the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act of 2025 (“GENIUS Act”) was enacted, establishing a federal regulatory framework for payment stablecoins. The GENIUS Act prohibits the issuance or use of payment stablecoins unless the issuer obtains a qualifying license and complies with a range of regulatory requirements, including reserve backing with liquid assets, redemption rights, governance standards, and operational transparency. The GENIUS Act also restricts the payment of interest on stablecoins and imposes oversight on both bank and nonbank issuers. The enactment of the GENIUS Act, or the removal or migration of prominent stablecoins from the Bitcoin network, could reduce the willingness of market participants to engage in digital asset transactions that rely on stablecoins, diminish liquidity in the bitcoin market, and adversely affect the price of bitcoin. Any such developments could, in turn, materially and adversely impact the value of the Shares.
Digital Asset Treasury Companies Risk
In recent times, a number of companies engaged in businesses outside the digital assets industry have begun to hold their corporate treasuries in digital assets instead of in fiat currency (“digital asset treasury companies”). In some cases, these companies have raised funds through financing or securities offerings and applied the proceeds to purchase digital assets, including bitcoin.
Digital asset treasury companies are a relatively new phenomenon and it is impossible to predict all of the risks they could pose to the Trust. On the one hand, digital asset treasury companies may increase procyclical dynamics in the market because they may purchase digital assets, such as bitcoin, when prices are rising and they may sell such assets when prices are decreasing, potentially making bitcoin more expensive in a rising market and then causing downward pressure on bitcoin prices in a falling market (causing prices to fall faster than they otherwise would). Digital asset treasury companies could cause greater volatility in digital asset markets, including markets for bitcoin. Negative events or sentiment surrounding digital asset treasury companies could affect the market for bitcoin. On the other hand, digital asset treasury companies may compete with the Trust in the marketplace as a perceived alternative means of achieving exposure to the price of bitcoin (to a greater or lesser extent) through investing in securities. The foregoing or similar events involving digital asset treasury companies could adversely affect holders of Shares in the Trust.
The value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the fundamental investment characteristics of bitcoin as a digital asset, including the fact that digital assets are bearer instruments and loss, theft, destruction, or compromise of the associated private keys could result in permanent loss of the asset, and the capabilities and development of blockchain technologies such as the bitcoin blockchain.
Digital assets such as bitcoin were only introduced within the past 16 years, and the value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors over time relating to the capabilities and development of blockchain technologies, such as the recentness of their development, their dependence on the internet and other technologies, their dependence on the role played by users, developers and miners and the
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potential for malicious activity. Given the recentness of the development of digital asset networks, digital assets may not function as intended and parties may be unwilling to use digital assets, which would dampen the growth, if any, of digital asset networks. Because bitcoin is a digital asset, the value of the Shares is subject to a number of factors relating to the fundamental investment characteristics of digital assets, including the fact that digital assets are bearer instruments and loss, theft, compromise, or destruction of the associated private keys could result in permanent loss of the asset.
The Bitcoin network, including the cryptographic and algorithmic protocols associated with the operation of the Bitcoin Blockchain, has only been in existence since 2009, and bitcoin markets have a limited performance record, making them part of a new and rapidly evolving industry that is subject to a variety of factors that are difficult to evaluate. For example, the following are some of the risks could materially adversely affect the value of the Shares:
| ● | Digital assets, including bitcoin, are controllable only by the possessor of both the unique public key and private key or keys relating to the Bitcoin network address, or “wallet,” at which the digital asset is held. Private keys must be safeguarded and kept private in order to prevent a third party from accessing the digital asset held in such wallet. The loss, theft, compromise or destruction of a private key required to access a digital asset may be irreversible. If a private key is lost, stolen, destroyed or otherwise compromised and no backup of the private key is accessible, the owner would be unable to access the digital asset corresponding to that private key and the private key will not be capable of being restored by the digital asset network resulting in the total loss of the value of the digital asset linked to the private key. | |
| ● | Digital asset networks are dependent upon the internet. A disruption of the internet, or major telecommunications and internet service providers, or a digital asset network, such as the Bitcoin network, could affect the ability to transfer digital assets, including bitcoin, and, consequently, could negatively impact their value. In addition, data center hosting and cloud services providers play a crucial role in the global Internet economy. Many of the Trust’s service providers conduct their business operations and processes using cloud providers and third-party data center hosting facilities, including Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, and other cloud services. In October 2025, news outlets reported that Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure both suffered significant service interruptions which caused disruptions to some of their cloud services customers. Any disruptions or failures of the Sponsor’s systems or the third-party hosting facility or cloud services that the Sponsor uses, or may use in the future, or of the Trust’s service providers’ systems or the third party hosting facilities or cloud services that they use, or may use in the future, including as a result of a natural disaster, fire, cyberattack, act of terrorism, geopolitical conflict, pandemic, the effects of climate change, or other catastrophic event, as well as power outages, service disruptions or interruptions, scheduled or unscheduled downtime, software or hardware defects, telecommunications infrastructure outages, a decision to close such facilities or cease providing such services, or other problems with the Sponsor’s or a Trust service provider’s systems or third-party data center hosting or cloud providers that the Sponsor or a Trust service provider uses, or may use in the future, such as a failure to meet service standards, could severely impact the Trust’s or Sponsor’s ability to conduct business operations, such as creation and redemption processes or deposits or withdrawals into the Trust’s custodial accounts, any of which could materially adversely affect the Trust’s operations or cause losses to the Trust’s Shareholders. | |
| ● | Banks and other established financial institutions may refuse to process funds for bitcoin transactions; process wire transfers to or from bitcoin trading platforms, bitcoin-related companies or service providers; or maintain accounts for persons or entities transacting in bitcoin. This could dampen liquidity in the market and damage the public perception of digital assets generally or any one digital asset in particular, such as bitcoin, and their or its utility as a payment system, which could decrease the price of digital assets generally or individually. Further, the lack of availability of banking services, including those provided by the Cash Custodian or the financial institutions at which the Bitcoin Custodian maintains the cash credited to the Trust’s Fiat Account, could inhibit or prevent the Trust from being able to complete cash creations or redemptions, or the timely liquidation of bitcoin even if the Sponsor determined that such liquidation were appropriate or suitable. | |
| ● | Users, developers and miners may otherwise switch to or adopt certain digital assets at the expense of their engagement with other digital asset networks, which may negatively impact those networks, including the Bitcoin network. | |
| ● | As the Bitcoin network continues to develop and grow, certain technical issues might be uncovered and the trouble shooting and resolution of such issues requires the attention and efforts of bitcoin’s global development community. Like all software, the Bitcoin network is at risk of vulnerabilities and bugs that can potentially be exploited by malicious actors. For example, in 2010, the Bitcoin network underwent a hard fork to reverse the effects of a hack in which an unknown attacker took advantage of a software vulnerability in the early source code of the Bitcoin network to fraudulently mint a large amount of bitcoin. | |
| ● | The acceptance of software patches or upgrades by a significant, but not overwhelming, percentage of the users and miners in a digital asset network, such as the Bitcoin network, could result in a “fork” in such network’s blockchain, including the Bitcoin Blockchain, resulting in the operation of multiple separate networks. | |
| ● | In August 2017, the Bitcoin network underwent a hard fork that resulted in the creation of a new digital asset network called Bitcoin Cash. This hard fork was contentious, and as a result some users of the Bitcoin Cash network may harbor ill will toward the Bitcoin network. These users may attempt to negatively impact the use or adoption of the Bitcoin network, as could constituencies adversely impacted by any contentious hard forks that take place in the future. |
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| ● | Also in August 2017, the Bitcoin network was upgraded with a technical feature known as “Segregated Witness” with the promise of increasing the number of transactions per second that can be handled on-chain and enabling so-called second layer solutions, such as the Lightning Network or payment channels, that have the potential to increase transaction throughput by processing certain transactions outside the main Bitcoin Blockchain, but which may fail to achieve the expected benefits or widespread adoption or lead to new or unanticipated problems, leading to a decline in public support for, and the price of, bitcoin. | |
| ● | As of the date of this Report, the largest 100 bitcoin wallets held a substantial amount of the outstanding supply of bitcoin and it is possible that some of these wallets are controlled by the same person or entity. Moreover, it is possible that other persons or entities control multiple wallets that collectively hold a significant number of bitcoin, even if each wallet individually only holds a small amount. As a result of this concentration of ownership, large sales by such holders could have an adverse effect on the market price of bitcoin. | |
| ● | Governance of the Bitcoin network is by voluntary consensus and open competition. As a result, there may be a lack of consensus or clarity on the governance of the Bitcoin network, which may stymie the Bitcoin network’s utility and ability to grow and face challenges. In particular, it may be difficult to find solutions or martial sufficient effort to overcome any future problems on the Bitcoin network, especially long-term problems. | |
| ● | Over the past decade, bitcoin mining operations have evolved from individual users mining with computer processors, graphics processing units and first-generation application specific integrated circuit (“ASIC”) machines to “professionalized” mining operations using proprietary hardware or sophisticated machines. If the profit margins of bitcoin mining operations are not sufficiently high, including, but not limited to, due to an increase in electricity costs or a decline in the market price of bitcoin, or if bitcoin mining operations are unable to arrange alternative sources of financing (e.g., if lenders refuse to make loans to such miners), bitcoin miners are more likely to sell more bitcoins than they otherwise would, resulting in an increase in liquid supply of bitcoin, which would generally tend to reduce bitcoin’s market price. | |
| ● | To the extent that any miners cease to record transactions that do not include the payment of a transaction fee in solved blocks or do not record a transaction because the transaction fee is too low, such transactions will not be recorded on the Bitcoin Blockchain until a block is mined by a miner who does not require the payment of transaction fees or is willing to accept a lower fee. Any widespread delays in the recording of transactions could result in a loss of confidence in a digital asset network. | |
| ● | Digital asset mining operations can consume significant amounts of electricity, which may have a negative environmental impact and give rise to public opinion against allowing, or government regulations restricting, the use of electricity for mining operations. Additionally, miners may be forced to cease operations during an electricity shortage or power outage, or if electricity prices increase where the mining activities are performed. | |
| ● | There are a small number of major suppliers of bitcoin mining hardware globally, and a significant amount of bitcoin mining hardware manufacturing is located in China. Mining hardware manufacturers may fail to supply the mining hardware due to their inability to manufacture sufficient mining hardware, whether due to shortages of components or resources such as semiconductors, or due to default, insolvency, or changes of laws and trade restrictions (including export/import restrictions, quotas or tariffs). Trade policies such as export/import restrictions, quotas or tariffs may reduce the ability of bitcoin mining hardware suppliers to supply miners with bitcoin mining hardware or create a shortage or lack of components necessary for their manufacture or repair. If bitcoin miners are unable to source mining hardware from those suppliers (for example due to overwhelming global demand for bitcoin miners, or due to trade restrictions, or other causes) at commercially reasonable prices, or at all, and replacement or substitute sources of bitcoin mining hardware prove to be unavailable, there could be a negative impact on bitcoin mining globally. These could affect the Bitcoin network by making it more difficult for transactions to be confirmed, increasing transaction costs, or affecting the Bitcoin network’s security, among other negative effects, any of which could negatively affect the value of bitcoin and consequently the Shares. | |
| ● | Many digital asset networks, including the Bitcoin network, face significant scaling challenges and may periodically be upgraded with various features designed to increase the speed and throughput of digital asset transactions. These attempts to increase the volume of transactions may not be effective, and such upgrades may fail, resulting in potentially irreparable damage to the Bitcoin network and to the value of bitcoin. | |
| ● | The open-source structure of many digital asset network protocols, such as the protocol for the Bitcoin network, means that developers and other contributors are generally not directly compensated for their contributions in maintaining and developing such protocols. As a result, the developers and other contributors of a particular digital asset may lack a financial incentive to maintain or develop the network or may lack the resources to adequately address emerging issues. Alternatively, some developers may be funded by companies whose interests are at odds with other participants in a particular digital asset network. A failure to properly monitor and upgrade the protocol of the Bitcoin network could damage that network. | |
| ● | In the past, flaws in the source code for digital assets have been exposed and exploited, including flaws that disabled some functionality for users, exposed users’ personal information and/or resulted in the theft of users’ digital assets. The cryptography underlying bitcoin could prove to be flawed or ineffective, or developments in mathematics and/or technology, including advances in digital computing, algebraic geometry and quantum computing, could result in such cryptography becoming ineffective. Quantum computing technology is an emerging phenomenon which, because it is still developing, makes it difficult to predict its ultimate effect on the future value of bitcoin and other digital assets. However, if quantum computing technology |
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| is able to advance and significantly increase its capacity relative to the capacity of today’s leading quantum computers, it could potentially undermine the viability of many of the cryptographic algorithms used across the world’s information technology infrastructure, including the cryptographic algorithms used for digital assets like bitcoin. Advances in quantum computing create the risk that the cryptography underlying the Bitcoin network could become ineffective, which, if realized, could compromise the security of the Bitcoin network, or allow a malicious actor to compromise the wallets holding bitcoin owned by the Trust or others on the Bitcoin network, which would result in losses to Shareholders. While various actors in the Bitcoin community are taking steps to enable the uses of cryptographic algorithms that would be resistant to advanced quantum computers, there is no guarantee that new quantum-proof architectures will be built and appropriate transitions will be implemented across the network at scale in a timely manner; any such changes could require the achievement of broad consensus within the Bitcoin network community and a fork (or multiple forks), and there can be no assurance that such consensus would be achieved or the changes implemented successfully. See “-The Bitcoin network’s decentralized governance structure may negatively affect its ability to grow and respond to challenges” and “-A temporary or permanent “fork” could adversely affect the value of the Shares.” If any of the foregoing were to occur, it could result in losses to Shareholders. In any of these circumstances, a malicious actor may be able to compromise the security of the Bitcoin network or take the Trust’s bitcoin, which would adversely affect the value of the Shares. Moreover, the functionality of the Bitcoin network may be negatively affected such that it is no longer attractive to users, thereby reducing or even eliminating demand for bitcoin. Even if another digital asset other than bitcoin were affected by similar circumstances, any reduction in confidence in the source code or cryptography underlying digital assets generally could negatively affect the demand for digital assets and therefore adversely affect the value of the Shares. |
Moreover, because digital assets, including bitcoin, have been in existence for a short period of time and are continuing to develop, there may be additional risks in the future that are impossible to predict as of the date of this Report.
Shareholders do not have the protections associated with ownership of Shares in an investment company registered under the 1940 Act or the protections afforded by the CEA.
The 1940 Act is designed to protect investors by preventing insiders from managing investment companies to their benefit and to the detriment of public investors, such as: the issuance of securities having inequitable or discriminatory provisions; the management of investment companies by irresponsible persons; the use of unsound or misleading methods of computing earnings and asset value; changes in the character of investment companies without the consent of investors; and investment companies from engaging in excessive leveraging. To accomplish these ends, the 1940 Act requires the safekeeping and proper valuation of fund assets, restricts greatly transactions with affiliates, limits leveraging, and imposes governance requirements as a check on fund management.
The Trust is not registered as an investment company under the 1940 Act, and the Sponsor believes that the Trust is not required to register under such act. Consequently, Shareholders do not have the regulatory protections provided to investors in investment companies.
The Trust will not hold or trade in commodity interests (as currently defined) regulated by the CEA, as administered by the CFTC. Furthermore, the Sponsor believes that the Trust is not a commodity pool for purposes of the CEA, and that neither the Sponsor nor the Trustee is subject to regulation by the CFTC as a commodity pool operator or a commodity trading advisor in connection with the operation of the Trust. Consequently, Shareholders will not have the regulatory protections provided to investors in CEA-regulated instruments or commodity pools. However, Congress is currently considering legislation, such as the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025 (CLARITY Act), which could give the CFTC greater powers to regulate the spot digital asset market. It is possible that, if legislation is passed, it could require the Trust or the Sponsor, or service providers to the Trust, such as the Liquidity Provider, Authorized Participant, Bitcoin Custodian, or Additional Bitcoin Custodian among others, to register with the CFTC. Such additional regulatory obligations may cause the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor, Liquidity Provider, Authorized Participant, Bitcoin Custodian, or Additional Bitcoin Custodian to incur extraordinary expenses. If the Trust, the Trustee, the Sponsor, Liquidity Provider, Authorized Participant, Bitcoin Custodian, or Additional Bitcoin Custodian decided to seek the required licenses, there is no guarantee that they will timely receive them. The Trustee may decide to discontinue and wind up the Trust. A dissolution of the Trust in response to the changed regulatory circumstances may be at a time that is disadvantageous to the Shareholders. A Liquidity Provider may also instead decide to terminate its role as a Liquidity Provider of the Trust, which may decrease the liquidity of the Shares.
A temporary or permanent “fork” of the bitcoin blockchain could adversely affect an investment in the Trust. Shareholders will not receive the benefits of any forks or airdrops.
Bitcoin software is open source. Any user can download the software, modify it and then propose that the core developers, users and miners adopt the modification. When a modification is introduced by the core developers and a substantial majority of users and miners consent to the modification, the change is implemented and the Bitcoin network continues to operate uninterrupted on a single
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blockchain. However, if less than a substantial majority of users and miners consent to the proposed modification, but the modification is nonetheless implemented by some users and miners and the modification is not compatible with the software prior to its modification, the consequence would be what is known as a “fork” (i.e., “split”) of the Bitcoin network (and the blockchain), with one version running the pre-modified software and the other running the modified software. The effect of such a fork would be the existence of two (or more) versions of the Bitcoin network running in parallel, but with each version’s bitcoin lacking interchangeability, and with different blockchains. Such a fork in the Bitcoin Blockchain typically would be addressed by community-led efforts to merge the forked Bitcoin Blockchains, and several prior forks have been so merged. Since the Bitcoin network’s inception, modifications to the Bitcoin network have generally been accepted by the majority of users and miners, ensuring that the Bitcoin network remains a coherent economic system and the focal point of the majority of developer activity. There is no assurance, however, that this will continue to be the case, and if it is not, then the price of bitcoin could be negatively affected. The original blockchain and the forked blockchain could potentially compete with each other for users, developers, and miners, leading to a loss of these for the original blockchain. A fork of any kind could adversely affect an investment in the Trust or the ability of the Trust to operate and the Trust’s procedures may be inadequate to address the effects of a fork.
Additionally, a fork could be introduced by an unintentional, unanticipated software flaw in the multiple versions of otherwise compatible software miners and users run. It is also possible that, in a future accidental or unintentional fork, a substantial number of users and miners could adopt an incompatible version of the digital asset while resisting community-led efforts to merge the two blockchains, resulting in a permanent fork. Any of these events could cause bitcoin to decline in value.
Furthermore, a hard fork can lead to new security concerns. For example, when the Ethereum and Ethereum Classic networks split in July 2016, replay attacks, in which transactions from one network were rebroadcast to nefarious effect on the other network, plagued digital assets exchanges through at least October 2016. A digital assets exchange announced in July 2016 that it had lost 40,000 Ether Classic, worth about $100,000 at that time, as a result of replay attacks. Another possible result of a hard fork is an inherent decrease in the level of security due to significant amounts of mining power remaining on one network or migrating instead to the new forked network. After a hard fork, it may become easier for an individual miner or mining pool’s hashing power to exceed 50% of the processing power of the network that retained or attracted less mining power, thereby making digital assets that rely on that network, which could include bitcoin, more susceptible to attack. Any of these events could cause the Bitcoin network to be less attractive to potential users, or cause a decline in speculative interest, and thereby cause bitcoin to decline in value.
Forks have occurred already to the Bitcoin network, including, but not limited to, forks resulting in the creation of Bitcoin Cash (August 1, 2017), Bitcoin Gold (October 24, 2017) and Bitcoin SegWit2X (December 28, 2017), among others. The only crypto asset to be held by the Trust will be bitcoin. The Trust has adopted procedures to address situations involving a fork that results in the issuance of new alternative bitcoin that the Trust may receive. Typically, the holder of bitcoin has no discretion in a hard fork; it merely has the right to claim the new forked asset on a pro rata basis while it continues to hold the same number of bitcoin.
There have been other contentious disputes over changes to the Bitcoin network’s source code, so far these have not led to hard forks. For example, the predominant software implementation used to access the Bitcoin network is Bitcoin Core. The October 2025 release of the updated Bitcoin Core client (version 30) removed a long-standing limit on the inclusion of non-transaction-related data in blocks, the effect of which is to permit larger amounts of arbitrary data to be embedded in transactions. This change has prompted debate within the bitcoin community, though – because the change is backwards-compatible, rather than a hard fork – certain previous versions of the Bitcoin Core client remain operable, and it remains interoperable with other clients, such as Bitcoin Knots. Some participants have expressed concerns that such changes could facilitate the inclusion of illegal or non-transaction-related content on the Bitcoin Blockchain, or introduce new or unknown software vulnerabilities. In response, certain miners and users have reportedly adopted alternative client software implementations to access the Bitcoin network, such as Bitcoin Knots. There is a risk that unresolved divisions could lead to community fragmentation which, if they grew severe enough and were not resolved, eventually a future Bitcoin network hard fork, which may adversely affect the security or stability of the Bitcoin network (such as if miners leave the original Bitcoin network for the forked network), reduce or impede the adoption of bitcoin overall, or cause bitcoin or the Shares to lose value.
We refer to the right to receive any benefits arising from a fork, airdrop (defined below), or similar event as an Incidental Right and any such virtual currency acquired through an Incidental Right as IR Virtual Currency. The Trust has adopted the following procedures to address situations involving any fork, airdrop or similar event that results in the issuance of Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency that the Trust may receive. The Trust Agreement stipulates that if a fork occurs, the Sponsor shall determine which asset constitutes bitcoin and which network constitutes the Bitcoin network, and the Sponsor will as soon as possible cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. Because the Trust will abandon any Incidental Rights and IR Virtual Currency, the Trust would not receive any direct or indirect consideration for the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency and
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thus the value of the Shares will not reflect the value of the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. In the event the Trust seeks to change this position, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by the Exchange seeking approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to distribute the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency that is not bitcoin in-kind to the Sponsor, as agent for the Shareholders, and the Sponsor would arrange to sell or otherwise dispose of the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency and for the proceeds (if any) to be distributed to the Shareholders. There can be no assurance as to whether or when the Sponsor would make such a decision, or when the Exchange will seek or obtain this approval, if at all.
In addition to forks, a digital asset may become subject to a similar occurrence known as an “airdrop.” In an airdrop, the promotors of a new digital asset announce to holders of another digital asset that such holders will be entitled to claim a certain amount of the new digital asset for free, based on the fact that they hold such other digital asset. Neither the Trust nor the Sponsor shall be under any obligation to claim or attempt to secure or realize any economic benefit from “airdropped” assets, and the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably and permanently abandon, for no consideration, such Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency. In the event the Trust seeks to change this position, an application would need to be filed with the SEC by the Exchange seeking approval to amend its listing rules to permit the Trust to distribute the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency associated with the airdropped assets in-kind to the Sponsor, as agent for the Shareholders, and the Sponsor would arrange to sell or otherwise dispose of the Incidental Rights or IR Virtual Currency and for the proceeds (if any) to be distributed to the Shareholders.
With respect to any fork, airdrop or similar event, the Sponsor will cause the Trust to irrevocably abandon the Incidental Rights and any IR Virtual Currency associated with such event. As such, Shareholders will not receive the benefits of any forks, and the Trust is not able to participate in any airdrop.
Even if required regulatory approval is sought and obtained, Shareholders may not receive the benefits of any forks, airdrops, or similar events, the Trust may not choose, or be able, to participate in an airdrop, and the timing of receiving any benefits from a fork, airdrop or similar event is uncertain. Any inability to recognize the economic benefit of a hard fork or airdrop could adversely affect the value of the Shares.
Item 2. Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities and Use of Proceeds.
a) None.
b) Not applicable.
c) 2,000,000 Shares (80 Baskets) were redeemed during the quarter ended September 30, 2025.
| Period |
Total Number of Shares
Redeemed |
Average Per Share | ||||||
| 07/01/25 to 07/31/25 | 325,000 | $ | 33.22 | |||||
| 08/01/25 to 08/31/25 | 175,000 | 33.45 | ||||||
| 09/01/25 to 09/30/25 | 1,500,000 | 31.19 | ||||||
| Total | 2,000,000 | $ | 31.72 | |||||
Item 3. Defaults Upon Senior Securities.
None.
Item 4. Mine Safety Disclosures.
Not applicable.
Item 5. Other Information.
Not applicable.
Item 6. Exhibits.
See the Exhibit Index below, which is incorporated by reference herein.
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* Filed herewith.
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SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned in the capacities* indicated thereunto duly authorized.
VANECK DIGITAL ASSETS, LLC
Sponsor of VanEck Bitcoin ETF
| By: | /s/ Jan F. van Eck* | |
| Jan F. van Eck | ||
| President and Chief Executive Officer | ||
| (Principal Executive Officer) | ||
| By: | /s/ John J. Crimmins* | |
| John J. Crimmins | ||
| Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer | ||
| (Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer) |
Date: November 13, 2025
* The Registrant is a trust and the persons are signing in their capacities as officers of VanEck Digital Assets, LLC., the Sponsor of the Registrant.
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